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ABSTRACT
This thesis addresses the difficulty young children have making the transition from 
solving simple addition and subtraction problems with referential support to the 
formalised language of arithmetic ('what does one and one make?') (Hughes, 1981, 
1986). Nine experiments are reported testing a total of 782 children between 4 and 5 
years old on their use of strategic prompts in addition and subtraction. Results 
produced evidence for their significant positive impact, whether it be imagery, solving 
problems with their eyes closed or provision of a memory-check for the initial addend. 
Effectiveness was mainly on more difficult problems, particularly subtraction, with one 
mentalistic strategy generating results as effective as those using concrete referents. 
Five-and-a-half year old children were shown to have greater sensitivity overall to such 
prompts, whereas the younger children of around five years showed less sensitivity to 
the imagery-prompt, but like their older counterparts were most sensitive to prompts 
involving a memory-check. Referential support was also found to be effective when 
the older children were presented with written formal code notation. Furthermore, 
children were also found to be sensitive to implicit (rather than explicit) strategic 
prompts with child-initiated strategies, like 'fingers', most effective when chosen by the 
children themselves. Results are discussed in relation to how such explicit strategic 
prompts are effective, whether working directly or indirectly.
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CHAPTER 1
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Children's early number development
This thesis is concerned with four to five year olds learning of arithmetic in terms of 
simple addition and subtraction problems. In the last twenty to thirty years 
developmental psychology has broadened its investigation to look beyond just 
understanding when young children develop the necessary conceptual invariants in 
logical understanding for doing arithmetic. Three main approaches for studying 
mathematical development have been identified by Bryant (1995) in his review paper 
on ‘Children and Arithmetic':
Universal intellectual development and mathematical achievement.
Mathematical achievements and mathematical difficulties 
Mathematics and culture.
This literature review also identifies three approaches but, whilst the first approach 
(domain-general theories) is largely concerned with the same theory as that outlined 
by Bryant under 'Universal intellectual development and mathematical achievement', 
the other two are conceptualised differently in order to review the research relating 
specifically to the effects of strategic prompting on young children's simple addition 
and subtraction problems.
1. Domain-general type theories. Piaget (1952) is the main example of this 
theoretical viewpoint which is concerned with intellectual development in general and 
understanding the logical principles and conceptual invariants necessary for children's 
understanding of number. His empirical paradigm was the success of children on a 
series of tasks to test logic and in this sense success on such tasks had implications for 
a child's overall cognitive development.
2. Information processing type theories. This theoretical perspective examines 
reaction times and errors made when analysing how arithmetical problems are solved 
and the strategies used. The empirical paradigm involved looks at mathematical 
activities and as such is a domain-specific approach. The focus is on a child’s 
experience in the classroom with number related activities in terms of how problems 
are solved and the mistakes children make.
3. Context and Culture. This viewpoint stresses both immediate local context effects 
and the wider cultural environment. It posits that mathematical understanding depends 
on experiences children have and the cultural tools they acquire. It is a social cognitive 
approach in the Vygotskian tradition (Vygotsky 1962) citing a two-way connection 
between experience and cultural environment and mathematical development.
1.1 DOMAIN-GENERAL APPROACHES
This section is in three parts. The first part looks at the findings of Piaget, which is 
followed by a review of the 'counting' literature and finally a section on 'imagination 
and deductive reasoning'.
1.1.1 Piaget
Up until the early 1970s consideration of child's number development was synonymous 
with the writings of Piaget. His theory outlined in his book. The Child's Conception o f 
Number (1952), was straightforward: to be numerate children had to be logical.
Thus, according to Piaget, any lack of conceptual understanding in arithmetic reflected 
a logical cognitive deficit. He adopted an empirical paradigm to judge children's 
development of number understanding using a set of critical tasks to test logic. In this 
way differences in reasoning reflected differences in understanding of the underlying 
concepts, which each task was testing, and hence different stages in a child's 
development. This was therefore a stage theory where a child's capacity to learn and
understand was dependent on their particular stage of attainment with the change from 
one stage to another being a qualitative one.
The starting point in relation to a child's concept of number was the belief in the 
necessity of children to understand the principle of conservation as *a kind of functional 
a priori' (^Piaget, 1952, p.4). According to Piaget, this understanding came about 
when a child reached the concrete operational stage of thinking at around 6 to 7 years 
of age. Conservation was seen as the understanding of the invariance of quantity, 
whether continuous or discontinuous, in spite of spatial transformation. A typical task 
testing conservation of a discontinuous quantity, involved the child in understanding 
that if the same number of beads had been counted out into two separate jars of 
different sizes, there was still the same number in each (p. 25). He viewed the changes 
in a child's thinking on the conservation task as characterised by three stages. At the 
first stage children of around 5 years old, demonstrating their irreversibility of thought, 
typically respond with a 'global comparison', thinking that the taller jar has more beads 
than the wider one. Their thinking is dominated by consideration of the perceptual 
cues, provided by the different sizes of the jars. In the second phase, known as the 
'intuitive or semi-operational' stage, at around 5 to 6 years, although there is now 
realisation that the same number of beads have been counted into each jar and hence an 
understanding of one-to-one correspondence, the child is still unable to resolve how 
this knowledge co-ordinates with the different size jars. This was a critical finding in 
that the understanding of one-to-one correspondence did not necessarily mean the 
understanding of the lasting cardinal equivalence of two sets, which have had nothing 
added or taken away. The third and final stage of development was reached at around 
6 to 7 years as a result of working through the conflict between these two  ^
inconsistencies - the different size in the jars and the knowledge that the same number 
of beads had been counted into each one. Therefore, the final 'operational' phase was 
where the necessary and lasting equivalence of the set was understood irrespective of 
the differing size of the jars. It was on reaching this third stage of development that 
the child became a 'conserver', demonstrating reversibility of thought.
According to Piaget (1952) a child's development of a number concept depended not 
only on the ability to conserve, but on ordinality (or sériation) and classification. 
Children still at a pre-operational stage in their thinking prior to 7 years of age 
experience difficulty with both these concepts. Ordinality is the ability to order an item 
in relation to its number. A classic test for this was when Piaget asked a child to order 
a series of sticks according to size (p. 123). The development of a child's conceptual 
understanding of ordinality was again characterised by the same three stages in 
thinking as that for conservation. First, the global comparison stage where the child is 
capable of partially ordering the sticks but not with consistency throughout the whole 
line. By the second intuitive phase, although the child is now able to seriate, they 
cannot insert any extra sticks into the appropriate place at the end of the task. The 
final operational stage reflects simultaneous co-ordination of all the necessaiy 
relations, ie. when arranging each stick according to its height, the understanding that 
it has to be at the same time longer than those that precede it and shorter than those 
that follow it. This necessitated the co-ordination of the two inverse relations s>r and 
s<t (p. 155). Moreover, having understood cardination and ordination a child has to be 
able to co-ordinate the two ie. to know the position of a number fi-om its cardinality 
and to know its cardinality from its position. For instance, to know a position of a 
number from its cardinality a child has to realise which steps, and how many, have 
been climbed when a given number of a staircase is selected (p. 134). A typical task 
for testing cardinality from ordinality, is the 'hurdles and mat' task (p. 139), where a 
mat is placed before and after every hurdle. In this task, it is necessary to discover the 
position of the last hurdle jumped, given a certain number of mats.
Although Piaget used the conservation of number task to test a child's ability to think 
logically, he also saw it as important for understanding addition and subtraction (in 
terms of reversibility of operations) as was the ability to understand the additive 
composition of number. He claimed that a child may be seen to understand 'what two 
and three makes' but will not truly understand addition until the realisation that two 
subsets can be put together and broken down again. Although there is an implicit 
understanding of additive composition with ordinality, it is necessary to understand
that a whole remains constant irrespective of the various sums of its parts eg. 
8=4+4=5+3=7+l. This involves the logical inclusion of one class in another which 
requires the child to consider the parts and the whole simultaneously. Piaget tested 
this kind of deductive reasoning with a class inclusion task. This typically involves a 
row of brown and white wooden beads, with more brown ones than white ones 
(p. 164). To understand the relationship between the parts and its whole, it is necessary 
to understand that 'wooden' is the superordinate class with 'brown' and 'white' each 
forming subordinate ones. A pre-operational child at the first stage of conceptual 
understanding typically believes that there are more brown beads than wooden beads 
thereby showing a failure to grasp the necessity of comparing the size of the whole set 
with the sub-sets. This failure is due to a pre-operational child's inability to mentally 
represent operations reversibly, mastery of which heralds the concrete operational 
stage of thought. It is not until the child reaches this stage that they can 
simultaneously think about the parts and the whole.
For Piaget, all mathematical reasoning is formal or hypothetico-deductive since when 
saying 'a piece of cloth costs 12 francs' (Piaget 1965 p. 69) the premises are simply 
given, which means disregarding reality and any prior experiences when carrying out 
any reasoning. According to Piaget final mastery of deductive reasoning is not reached 
until a child is capable of formal operational thought at around 11 to 12 years old.
This kind of thinking requires an ability to isolate one variable from another in order to 
consider its effect. For instance, Inhelder & Piaget (1958) used a pendulum task for 
testing 'exclusion' (p. 67). The problem was to find the factor that determines the 
frequency of the oscillations. There are four possible variables - length of string, 
weight of the object on the end of the string, the height of the dropping point 
(amplitude of the oscillation) and the force of the push of the pendulum by the subject. 
The subject needs to ascertain that it is the length of the string which is the only 
variable having a causal role. Verbal syllogisms have also often been used to 
investigate deductive reasoning (Piaget 1965, Osherson 1974, Scribner 1977,
Hawkins, Pea, Glick & Scribner 1984, Dias & Harris 1988, 1990) where it is necessary 
to reason solely from the premises and independently of the empirical truth of such
premises. Again, according to Piagetian theory such type of thinking does not appear 
until a child has reached formal operational thinking. Until this age children do not 
respond to premises without questioning them as their logical justification is still at an 
imperfect stage.
In summary, according to Piaget, a child's development of a number concept is 
dependent on the ability to conserve, classify and understand ordinality and to 
understand the logical necessity of the premises. In this way the theory is both logical 
and ordinal. Failure in number tasks is therefore attributed to a logical cognitive deficit. 
Counting is seen as purely rote learning with little connection with numerical 
operations. Children do not understand counting and mathematical concepts until they 
had reached the concrete operational stage of development at around 6 to 7 years of 
age when they can understand the relations between objects. Piaget further claimed 
that teaching children before they were ready led to only superficial learning, thus 
underpinning the notion that mathematical concepts depend for their development on 
mental activity through interaction with the physical environment. He cited arithmetic 
as not difficult, and for the most part children would do it independently and 
spontaneously. He developed the notion of a child's readiness and saw the teacher as 
simply a facilitator in this process (Piaget 1953). It was this philosophy which led to 
the adoption of progressive methods in school as suggested by the Plowden Report in 
1967. However, by the early 1970s research findings began to question whether 
Piaget had under-estimated children's conceptual understanding of number both in 
terms of the validity of his tasks (Rose & Blank 1974, McGarrigle & Donaldson 1975, 
Light & Buckingham & Robbins 1979, Samuel & Biyant 1984, Pratt 1988) and the 
lack of importance attributed to what children could do as opposed to what they could 
not, particularly with regard to counting (Gelman 1972a, Gelman & Tucker 1975, 
Gelman 1977, Gelman & Gallistel 1978, Fuson & Hall 1983, Cowan 1984, 1987a, 
1987b). Piagetian theory was also criticised for its inability to predict or show how to 
deal with children's difficulties in arithmetic in the classroom (Hughes 1986, 1991). For 
Piaget children experience difficulties at school because they are introduced to formal 
arithmetic too early.
Research on social-context effects questioning the validity of the conservation task, 
will be discussed later in this literature review. But Brainerd (1973) highlighted the 
paradox of the test when assessing a child's performance on the task: using a 
'judgment criterion', where the child only answers the 'conservation' question without 
justification, probably yields a Type 1 error ie. an over-estimation of competence 
whereas an 'explanation criterion' probably yields a Type 2 error or an 
under-estimation of competence. Bryant (1995) also questioned whether failure to 
understand logical necessity was indeed shown by the inability to justify. Therefore, 
such criticism concerning validity questioned whether failure at a standard Piagetian 
conservation of number task did in fact demonstrate lack of conceptual understanding 
of number and whether Piaget had under-estimated young children's number 
competence.
In order to try to validate Piaget's claims developmental research began to look at 
things from a different viewpoint and to start from tasks young children could do as 
opposed to ones they could not. First, the nature and context of 'counting' was seen 
to play an important part in children's performance on number tasks (eg. Donlan & 
Hutt 1991) and research began to analyse children's development of counting in order 
to recognise the principles underlying it (eg. Gelman & Gallistel 1978, Fuson 1988, 
Briars & Siegler 1984, Baroody 1992, Cowan 1984). Secondly, it was felt that Piaget 
may have underestimated children's deductive reasoning with regard to their 
understanding of syllogisms (Hawkins, Pea, Glick & Scribner 1984, Dias & Harris 
1988, 1990). Evidence for children's development of counting and deductive 
reasoning will each be taken in turn.
1.1.2 Counting
One of the main areas where it was felt that children's competence had been 
under-estimated by Piaget was in counting. Counting was seen as an activity in which 
young children frequently spontaneously engaged and which demonstrated a degree of 
skill in number development (Gelman & Gallistel 1978, Ginsburg 1977, Siegler &
Robinson 1982). It was also thought to be a pre-requisite for other mathematical skills 
such as addition and subtraction (Briars & Siegler 1984) with Starkey & Gelman 
(1982) claiming children to have a set of arithmetic reasoning principles underlying 
preschoolers' performance on addition and subtraction.
Gelman & Gallistel (1978) shared with Piaget the claim that a child was active in the 
construction of their knowledge but put forward the notion of a theoretical construct 
in terms of skeletal structures which guide number development - an innatist view 
similar to Chomsky's Language Acquisition Device (1965) whereby a child has innate 
predispositions known as linguistic universals which guide language development. The 
argument being that counting ability was innately primed by cognitive principles and 
the development of counting in the pre-school period involved practice of counting 
procedures rather than the emergence of new principles (Gelman & Meek 1983). This 
viewpoint was known as 'principles before skills' and claimed that although young 
children may make mistakes when counting they do not have to be taught the rules of 
counting. This was evidenced by children's development of novel counting systems eg. 
1, 2, 5, 9 and their stable order usage, in the same way as children develop irregular 
past tense verbs, like 'goed'. Neither of these practices could have been learned from 
those around them. It was also too difficult for children to simply learn to count by 
rote since knowing when and how to use counting was too sophisticated a process to 
imitate. (Gelman & Meek 1986). Such research claimed that the conventional 
counting process began shortly after children begin to talk and developed rapidly 
(Gelman & Gallistel 1978, Fuson & Hall 1983, Sophian 1987). Gelman identified 
three how to count principles:
1. One-to-one correspondence: each object in a set must be represented with one and 
only one number or tag (either a conventional or non-conventional number);
2. Stable order principle: whatever the numbers, they must be produced in a 
repeatable ordered way, irrespective of the tag used.
3. Cardinal principle: the last number represents the cardinal value of the set ie. the 
magnitude of the numerosity;
The evidence for Gelman's 'principles before skills' perspective came partly from the 
studies which have shown that babies can discriminate between numbers (Starkey & 
Cooper 1980, Starkey, Spelke & Gelman 1983, Starkey, Spelke & Gelman 1990) and 
also from the 'magic' experiments where children, from roughly two years old, were 
found to spontaneously count ( Gelman 1972a, Gelman & Tucker 1975, Gelman 
1977). These 'magic' experiments involved children of two to four years being shown 
two different arrays with a different number of items in each. The number of items 
ranged from three to five and therefore the largest number with which the child had to 
deal was eight. In the first part of the experiment, the array with the larger number of 
items was designated by the experimenter as the 'winner*. In the second phase, the 
array of items on the winning plate was transformed ('magically') by the experimenter 
and the child had to reply what had happened. Although Gelman claimed that 
pre-schoolers number knowledge was limited to small number problems (less than 3 or 
4), she found that 80% of 2 year olds could count and 60% could use the three how to 
count principles, albeit one of the principles was a little shaky. This figure reached 
75% by 4 years old.
Two further principles in terms of'what can be counted' and 'how items are counted' 
were also added by Gelman & Gallistel (1978).
4. Abstraction-, the three 'how to count principles' can be applied to any array or 
collection of entities with each item an entity rather than a 'one' or 'two' etc.
5. Order irrelevance’, each item is only counted once and assigned one number, 
irrespective of its position in the set being counted;
A further distinction was made between two kinds of related abilities : estimator - 
operator processes. The estimator processes were concerned with how children 
abstract number from an array and the operator processes those through which the 
child reasons about number ie. the difference between numbers as categories and 
numbers as concepts. Counting was an estimator process which required producing a 
mental representation of numerosity and mapping it to the number to which that
numerosity refers. Operator processes included addition and subtraction ie. the 
process of putting one number with another to produce another number.
Gelman's five principles were seen as indisputable in terms of ability to count, but it 
was questioned as to whether they were sufficient in terms of understanding what 
counting means and understanding the numerical quantities involved (Nunes & Bryant 
1996). Moreover, the notion of'principles before skills' was not without its critics 
(Briars & Siegler 1984, Fuson 1988, Wynn 1990, Baroody 1992) owing to the lack of 
replication of some of the findings from the error-detection studies (Gelman & Meek 
1983). There were two main arguments. First, concerning the methodology used for 
gaining evidence for the three 'how to count' principles and secondly, the failure of 
young children to realise the usefiilness of counting when reasoning about number or 
judging equivalence of sets.
First, consideration of the evidence provided by Gelman for her claims for the 
'one-to-one correspondence and order-irrelevance principles'. In terms of counting 
Gelman & Gallistel (1978) looked at children of two to six years and asked them to 
count single sets of objects in a particular arrangement, or in straight rows, to test 
observance of the three principles. The aim was to show that even very young children 
understood these principles as soon as they begin to count. The most compelling 
evidence for the one-to-one principle came from Gelman & Meek (1983) 'error 
detection' experiments on 4 to 5 year olds, where a puppet was introduced to do the 
counting instead of the children counting themselves. It was hypothesised that 
previous failure to observe the rules or variability in performance might be connected 
with performance demands and not absence of implicit knowledge of the counting 
principles. Results showed that for numbers up to twenty 3 to 5 year olds were 
successful at spotting the mistakes when the puppet violated the counting principles. 
Furthermore, when the puppet counted in an unusual way, by starting in the middle of 
a row, but still observed the counting principles, this still generated 95% and 96% 
correct responses for 3 and 4 year olds.
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Contrary to this evidence. Briars & Siegler (1984) error-detection studies on 3 to 5 
year olds failed to replicate these findings. As well as the standard error-detection 
counts, unusual correct count conditions were again introduced. Not only were 
children tested on reverse order counts (right to left), starting in the middle and 
counting outwards, but they also had to undertake non-adjacent counts where the 
colour of the plastic chips was alternated, necessitating the counting of one colour 
before the other. In this study, children were found to generate much lower 
percentages than Gelman & Meek's (1983) findings. The fact that Gelman had 
recorded the child's 'best response', which was not necessarily the first response in the 
error-detection tasks, may have contributed to the higher percentages (Nunes &
Bryant 1996). Such variability questioned the validity of the 'principles first' assertion. 
Briars & Siegler claimed children's ability to distinguish optional and essential features 
in counting changed considerably over the pre-school period with five year olds, unlike 
3 year olds, significantly more likely to accept each of the unusual correct counts than 
any of the actual counting errors. The findings of Fuson (1988) also questioned the 
validity of'principles first' claim. Fuson tested 3 to 6 year olds where items were 
arranged randomly or in circles. Results showed that counting random arrangements 
made it more difficult to keep track of the position in the array whilst counting. 
However, in this case it cannot be discounted that failure was memory-related since 
when the starting place in a circle was tagged, there was greater success.
This inconsistency of findings from both Briars & Siegler (1984) and Fuson (1988) led 
to the notion of'skills before principles' viewpoint where variability was a failure to 
have developed a proficient skill. The skills-first model saw counting development 
inducted fi*om adult teaching through imitation, practice and reinforcement thereby 
highlighting associative learning principles (Fuson & Hall 1983, Briar & Siegler 1984, 
Fuson 1988, Wynn 1990). As a child became proficient through practice they were 
able to generalise the skill to novel settings. Children's variable performance within 
and across tasks (Fuson & Hall 1983, Fuson 1988) was viewed as task specific, yet to 
be generalised. This skills-after perspective was also evidenced by Fuson, Richards & 
Briars (1982) and Baroody & Price (1983) who found initial conventional patterns of
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counting to be followed by stable non-conventional counting ie. the child initially 
counts 1 , 2 , 3  and then adopts a novel 1, 3, 2 etc. The novel counting was claimed to 
arise from lack of proficiency in the counting skill. It was also claimed that simply 
producing a stable sequence did not mean understanding of the principle prior to this 
(Fuson & Hall 1983). In the same way, as an ability to correctly complete a different 
order task, when counting a set of numbers in an array, does not necessarily mean 
understanding of the order-irrelevance principle underlying the counting skill (Baroody 
1992).
The second main stumbling block for the principles-first viewpoint was in terms of a 
child's understanding of cardinality. Understanding cardinality, according to Gelman & 
Gallistel (1978) was evidenced by the ability to repeat the last number of a 'counted set' 
to denote its magnitude and the ability to detect errors when the puppet was counting 
(Gelman, Meek & Merkin 1986). Cardinality was also evidenced by the correct 
response to 'how many' type questions (Davis, Bridges & Brosgall 1985, Gelman & 
Meek 1986) at the end of a count. However, others have found that young children 
fail to relate 'how many' questions to previous counting (Fuson & Hall 1983). Instead 
'repetition of the last word' when counting was simply cited as being the 'last word rule' 
which preceded the cardinality principle (Fuson 1988). Furthermore, it was claimed 
that repetition of the last number counted may simply have been picked up by rote 
(Fuson 1988, Frye, Braisby, Lowe, Maroudas & Nicholls 1989). Others have 
suggested that Gelman was using an incomplete understanding of cardinality to Piaget 
in that her testing for cardinality involved counting a single set of items, whereas 
Piaget claimed that there was a need to grasp the relationship of one set of items to 
another set, in order to realise quantitative significance and hence cardinality (Frydman 
& Bryant 1988, Bryant 1995). In trying to reconcile this difference, Bryant (1995) 
claimed that the criteria used by the two theorists - Piaget (1952) and Gelman & 
Gallistel (1978) - were completely different. Piaget opted for the necessity of a child to 
understand both ordinality and cardinality whereas Gelman was concerned with the 
understanding of her five principles. Bryant concluded that arguably the Gelman 
position was too undemanding whereas the Piagetian criteria were too stringent.
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The third criticism for 'principles-first' viewpoint comes from children's failure to 
realise the usefulness of counting. If children do not understand when it would be 
useful to count they cannot be said to understand what they are doing when they are 
counting (Michie 1984a, 1984b, Fuson 1988, Frydman & Bryant 1988, Cowan, Foster 
& Al-Zubaidi 1993, Saxe 1979, Sophian 1988). Children also fail to use counting 
when asked to give someone a certain number of objects (Piaget 1952, Wynn 1990, 
Fuson 1988) instead just grabbing handfuls of objects. Bryant (1995) concluded that 
the fact children 'do not seem to know exactly when to count suggests that they have 
no idea why counting is important (p. 13).' It has also been found that children failed to 
realise the efficiency of counting when judging equivalent sets (Michie 1984a, 1984b; 
Fuson 1988) but when prompted to use counting children did improve their 
performance (Cowan et al 1993). Frydman & Bryant (1988) found that although 
children had shared out equal numbers of sweets they still failed to realise that each 
doll had received the same amount. Thus, they do not realise the usefulness of 
counting the sweets that each doll had received. The complexity of working out what 
children understand when counting was fiarther highlighted by Cowan, Dowker, 
Christakis & Bailey (1996) investigating the order-irrelevance principle who found that 
error-detection was facilitated by presentation of counting in a story context and when 
the children did not have to count for themselves.
However, in answer to this criticism, and in order to account for the variability in 
counting ability displayed by young children and the lack of transfer to novel activities, 
(Briar & Siegler 1984, Baroody 1984a) Greeno, Riley & Gelman (1984) found it 
usefiil to distinguish between three interacting competences when talking about 
counting. First, conceptual: counting which was innately primed. Secondly, 
procedural the practical skills necessary for application of these principles eg. learning 
the labels 1, 2, 3... and counting from left to right). Thirdly, utilisation: assessing the 
relevant task demands. This third competence was relatively late to develop.
Therefore, a child's problem with trusting counting over relative length (such as 
required in the number conservation task) was simply a matter of gaining knowledge of 
when to operate such utilisation competence.
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As opposed to either a 'principles-first' or 'skills-first' dichotomy an integrated model of 
the two has been put forward - a 'mutual-development' viewpoint. According to this 
perspective, an understanding of counting evolves gradually but in conjunction with 
counting-skill development (Baroody & Ginsburg 1986). This claimed some innate 
basis for number but not for all counting-skill development. Development of counting 
was dependent on both perfecting counting procedures and emergence of new 
principles (Baroody 1992). As opposed to a dichotomy between 'principles-first' v 
'skills-first', there was a continuum of weak v strong schemata with 'weak' highlighting 
a child's initial knowledge of counting, which was task-specific, moving along to 
'strong' which denoted highly generalisable knowledge. Baroody (1992) claimed this 
perspective could account for spontaneous corrections in counting and insights. For 
instance, Alison (4 years old) (p. 106), after counting a collection of things, was asked 
how many there would be if she had counted in the opposite direction. Although 
initially Alison used counting, after a couple of trials she realised that the direction of 
counting did not matter. The mutual developmental model assumed that the weak 
schemata of the order irrelevance principle was sufficiently developed in Alison's case 
to enable the use of counting which led her to the necessary insight.
To sum up, contrary to Piagetian theory, the wealth of evidence derived from counting 
studies acknowledge the importance of young children's counting in terms of 
demonstrating the wealth of their mathematical knowledge and its relevance in the 
development of a concept of number (Sophian 1992) . There is, therefore, much 
support for Gelman in highlighting the critical importance of a child's counting to their 
development of number understanding. This pointed to Piaget underestimating its 
importance in his theory. However, although counting was clearly important, this still 
did not mean a child understood number relations which require operational thinking 
or even whether failure in justifying the logical necessity of a correct solution in a 
Piagetian task demonstrated lack of understanding (Bryant 1995). Moreover, Nunes 
& Bryant (1996) claimed that the puppet 'error-detection* studies showed that children 
were influenced by the situation in which they were counting, even if the methodology 
used by Gelman & Meek (1983) was questioned in respect of what a child understands
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when they count. Therefore, if an adult engages in the task the child was more likely to 
reflect on the situation and do better.
1.1.3 Imagination and deductive reasoning
Recent research has also questioned whether Piaget had under-estimated young 
children's competence in deductive reasoning (Hawkins et al 1984, Dias & Harris 
1988, 1990). Piaget believed children could not reason deductively until 6 to 7 years 
of age or until they had reached the concrete operational stage of thought and could 
succeed on class inclusion and transitive inference tasks. As far as being able to reason 
systematically when presented with verbal syllogisms this required formal operational 
thinking which a child developed at around 11 to 12 years. According to Piaget 
younger children's errors in syllogistic reasoning, displaying an 'empirical bias', were 
attributable to a logical cognitive deficit (Piaget 1965). Hawkins et al 1984 and Dias 
& Harris (1988) investigated 'unfamiliar context' on children's deductive reasoning. 
Children of 4 to 6 years were presented with syllogisms in a 'fantasy' or 'make-believe' 
context. It was concluded that the contextual setting was more important than the 
problem content and that the use of the make-believe setting and a child's imagination 
allowed children to relinquish their dependence on their own reality and allow them to 
reason systematically. Scribner (1977) had previously also found unschooled adults in 
West Africa guilty of making the same kinds of errors on simple syllogisms as young 
children. These findings were followed up by Dias & Harris (1990) who explored the 
effect of three different make-believe cues ('setting', 'dramatic intonation', 'imagery') on 
4 to 6 year old's ability to solve simple syllogisms. Those in the 'setting' condition 
were asked to imagine they were on a planet when considering the premises while 
those receiving the 'dramatic intonation' were presented with the syllogisms read out 
by the experimenter whose voice was used to 'dramatic effect'. The 'imagery' group 
was asked to make a picture in their heads of the premises of the syllogisms. It was 
found that the use of imagery proved to be the most effective cue when compared with 
either the make-believe setting or dramatic intonation conditions. It was also the only 
cue given where the children were able to justify their answers, as to the logical
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necessity of the premises. Dias & Harris concluded a child's imagination to be 'crucial 
for systematic reasoning' as opposed to simply being a means of escaping from 
everyday reality or for thinking about some past experience.
This was a striking finding for the powerfulness of the use of imagery in young 
children's thinking since Piaget & Inhelder (1971) had viewed a pre-operational child 
as only able to use imagery to reproduce some earlier perceptual input in static format. 
More recently, it has been shown that 3 to 5 year olds can use imagery in a 
non-productive eg. imagining impossible scenarios like 'dogs that fly'. Furthermore, 
when asked to make a picture in their head of an everyday object (eg. a rock or even a 
photograph) they can also make the distinction between a mental entity and its physical 
counterpart, realising that although the imagined object cannot be seen or touched it 
can be mentally manipulated, unlike the real object (Wellman & Estes, 1986, Estes, 
Wellman & Woolley, 1989; Woolley & Wellman 1993). But it is not until around 5 
years that children are able to fully understand the extent to which mental entities 
represent the physical world, eg. realising when imagining a dog that it is not real since 
it is a mental representation, but that there is such a thing as a dog in the first place 
(Harris, Brown, Marriott, Whittall & Harmer 1991; Woolley & Wellman, 1993). 
Moreover, Harris (1991 p. 284) has viewed children's imagination in terms of a child's 
possessing a representational system which operates according to a series of default 
settings. These settings correspond 'to current intentional states of self and current 
states of the world (as known to self)...', and remain operative unless an imagined 
premise overrides them, with the greater the number of settings requiring temporary 
suspension, the more difficult the simulation required.
1.2 INFORMATION PROCESSING APPROACH
This section also has three parts. The first part reviews the literature concerned with 
the 'strategies' children use in arithmetic, followed by a section discussing 'children's 
failure to use strategies they know'. The final section gives a fairly brief outline of the
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research literature concerned with ^cognitive capacity' explanations for children's 
difficulties with arithmetic.
In contrast to the Piagetian stage model of cognitive development this perspective 
looks at 'how' changes in children's thinking come about. This approach encompasses 
understanding how children think at a given time, what is changing and how this is 
being accomplished and in particular the processes through which one strategy is used 
rather than another (eg. Siegler 1995, Siegler 1996). Unlike Piaget the empirical 
paradigm tends to be domain-specific with the kinds of classroom tasks which children 
do on a daily basis being explored eg. arithmetic (Siegler & Robinson 1982, Geary & 
Burlingham-Dubree 1989), reading and spelling (Siegler 1986) . However, the goal is 
to reveal cross-domain commonalities in children's strategy choices (Siegler 1991). In 
the domain of arithmetic, the key issue addressed is how such number processes 
develop and what kinds of difficulties children encounter (eg. Siegler & Robinson 
1982, Carpenter & Moser 1983, Siegler & Shrager 1984, Siegler & Jenkins 1989). 
There are three types of evidence outlined in this section. First, that relating to 
strategy usage of young children when solving simple addition and subtraction 
problems, since this is the key issue addressed by the thesis. In this connection, it is 
necessary to consider both problem structure and the solution strategies children use, 
since inefficient or inappropriate choice or execution of strategy could be one reason 
for errors being made. Secondly, the failure of young children to use a known strategy 
(counting) in the standard conservation of number task (eg. Piaget 1952, Michie 
1984a, 1984b, Cowan 1987b, Cowan et al 1993). Thirdly, the aspect of'cognitive 
capacity' with competence linked to the development of some basic cognitive 
mechanisms (Case 1985, Boulton-Lewis 1993, Boulton-Lewis & Tait 1994).
Prior to discussing the evidence it is necessary to highlight the different methodologies 
used, since it is difficult to infer what internal cognitive processes children use to solve 
addition and subtraction problems, and each method has its strengths and weaknesses. 
They include: the interview/self-report; chronometric studies involving measurement 
of time lapse fi'om presentation of problem to answer, where the increase in time
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correlates with a strategy requiring more processing time (eg. direct retrieval of 
number facts is quicker than counting from 1 (Groen & Parkman 1972, Groen & 
Resnick 1977); combination of both of the preceding, known as microgenetic 
(Siegler & Jenkins 1989, Siegler 1995); analysis of error patterns (Llindvall & Ibarra 
1980); analysis of eye-movements when working on a computation (Hegarty, Mayer & 
Monk 1995); and 'intervention' where the concept or skill is identified together with an 
analysis of why it is difficult to acquire followed by the provision of new instructions 
with a test of the result. This latter method is the empirical paradigm adopted in this 
thesis.
1.2.1 Strategy
Instead of a one-to-one relationship between age and strategy children are found to use 
a variety of strategies with the variability of strategy use being within and between 
individuals (Siegler 1991). Very often the same problems are reported to yield 
different strategy choices on different days of testing (Siegler 1987a, McGilly &
Siegler 1989).
To account for this variability and in contrast to the stage models previously advocated 
Siegler (1995 p. 225) put forward an 'overlapping wave' model to explain children's 
cognitive development, with each wave corresponding to a different strategy or way of 
thinking. The overlapping waves account for the variability in children's thinking at 
any one time, together with the notion of gradual change as opposed to the brief 
transitional periods posited by Piagetian stage models (eg. Case 1985). The model 
also accounted for why some strategies used early on in a child's development fall 
away and others, previously used infrequently, sometimes become more frequent 
(Siegler 1996). Evidence, supporting this model, comes through a microgenetic 
investigation of 5 year olds understanding of the standard Piagetian conservation of 
number task (Siegler 1995). Children were presented with four training sessions and 
assigned to one of three conditions - those who simply received feedback in terms of 
incorrect/correct response with others given feedback and asked to explain their own
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reasoning, whilst the final condition received feedback on their own performance but 
had to explain the experimenter's reasoning. The results showed that being asked to 
explain the experimenter's reasoning led to more learning. The overlapping waves 
accounted for why the same children sometimes gave the correct justification for 
'conservation' whereas at other times did not.
Addition and Subtraction
As far as addition and subtraction problems are concerned, it is necessary to consider 
both the initial stage of task assessment, when meaning is extracted from the problem, 
and the process of strategy choice for performing the computation. This also involves 
examination of the problem structure both 'syntactic' and 'semantic'. Taking each in 
turn, problem structure and strategy choice.
Problem Structure
When characterising problems there are both 'syntactic' and 'semantic' variables to take 
into account: 'syntactic', being the number of words in the problems, the sequence of 
information and the presence of words that cue an operation. 'Semantic' (its meaning) 
structure is found to be more important in the processes children choose to use 
(Carpenter, Hiebert & Moser 1981, Carpenter & Moser 1983). Arguably, problem 
structure can be viewed as a 'very localised context' effect since the processes children 
use to solve problems are related to both 'syntactic' as opposed to 'semantic' structure, 
A common framework has been adopted to characterise semantic structure in terms of 
the actions which are required for their solution: change, compare, combine and 
equalise (Carpenter & Moser 1983, Riley Greeno & Heller 1982). Problems which 
are classified as 'change' involve one quantity being transformed to another by adding 
to it or subtracting from it. Other problem situations, such as comparisons, involve 
understanding of part-whole relationships. 'Change' type problems are considered to 
be the most straightforward and these involve two types of number meanings: static 
measures and transformations. (Nunes & Bryant 1996), eg. 'If there was one brick in 
the box and I put two more in - how many would there be altogether?' 'One' and 'two'
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are static measures and 'three' is the transformation. Wright (1994) (cited in Nunes & 
Bryant 1996) investigated whether children's understanding of the invariants of 
addition changed with this type of distinction. Children were found to be quicker to 
understand 'commutativity' (2+3 =3+2) vrith addition of two static measures than a 
missing addend type problem where the transformation assumed a different place in the 
structure.
However, whatever the type of problem, how meaning is extracted from the wording 
of the semantic structure of problems is complicated since responses are not 
necessarily based on this meaning alone. Hudson (1983) found when investigating 
'compare' type problems that children failed to answer 'how many more birds are there 
than worms?' but succeeded when asked 'how many birds will not have a worm to eat?' 
although arguably they were changing this into a 'matching'/equalising type problem. It 
is therefore the situation, in terms of both syntactic and semantic variables, together 
with the invariants of addition and subtraction which is important (Nunes & Bryant 
1996). The problems involved in this current research are of the 'change-join' 
(addition) eg. '1+2=' and 'change-separate' (subtraction) eg. '2-1- type which involves 
two static measures.
Using a different methodology, Hegarty et al (1995) looked at how meaning is 
extracted from addition and subtraction problems in terms of mental models and 
problem solving. This was through tracking eye-movements when children were 
presented with formal computations. They reported two basic approaches. First, 
'direct translation' or a short cut approach where the problem solver attempts to 
identify key words in statements together with a relational term (eg. 'more' for addition 
problems and 'less' for subtraction). This involved using the arithmetic operations 
indicated by the key words, sometimes referred to as the 'key word' method (Briars & 
Larkin 1984). Secondly, there was the 'meaningful' approach where the problem 
statement is translated into a mental model of the situation described in the problem. 
They suggested that the more competent problem solvers tended to focus on 
understanding the problem first prior to seeking a quantitive solution, which is the
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opposite to those of lesser ability, supporting the work of Chi, Glaser & Farr (1988) 
on experts and novices. Hegarty et al also suggested that direct translation may 
account for the poorer performance on arithmetic problems by American children 
when compared to Japanese (Stevenson & Stigler 1992), since American children used 
this approach more often than the Japanese. It was also found that schooling in the US 
tended to focus on accuracy of computations rather than understanding the problem. 
This method also makes least demands on working memory. Evidence for successful 
problem solvers, using qualitatively different comprehension processes for word 
problems, supports Siegler & Jenkins (1989) view that strategy choice is dependent on 
both situation and individual factors and that no single strategy is used consistently. 
According to Hegarty et al (1995) it is also not necessarily a matter of practice so that 
less successful problem solvers gain insight and eventually switch to the 'meaningful' 
approach. Children need to be given a reason to change from their mental set or 
functional fixedness.
As far as performing the computations are concerned strategic competence is 
discussed in terms of which strategies are used, when each strategy is used and how 
strategies are chosen (Lemaire & Siegler 1995).
Which strategies are used
As far as working out the computations on simple addition and subtraction problems 
there are three basic strategies: direct modelling using some kind of concrete 
referents, strategies based on the use of counting sequences and those based on direct 
retrieval o f number facts (Carpenter & Moser 1983). Alongside this is the use of 
'subitizing' which is the accurate enumeration of a small set of objects through direct 
visual apprehension without the need to count (Klahr 1973, Starkey & Cooper 1995). 
As far as assessing when these strategies are used findings are consistent with the 
conclusion that children's earliest solution processes for word problems are based on 
modelling (Carpenter & Moser 1983) and subitizing (eg. Starkey & Cooper 1995). 
First evidence of growth is when children begin to use counting strategies, that mirror 
the action of a problem, as opposed to needing to model with concrete referents.
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However, this shift from complete modelling to mentalised counting strategies 
depends, not only on mastery of mechanical techniques, but on development of number 
concepts in terms of cardinality (Fuson & Hall 1983) and a deeper understanding of 
addition and subtraction with levels building on each other as opposed to being 
independent (Carpenter & Moser 1983).
The following sets out some background to the 'subitizing strategy' followed by 
'counting based' strategies used in addition and subtraction. For the most part the term 
'addend' is used to refer to both numbers in the computations to avoid possible 
confusion of the unfamiliar terms of 'minuend' and 'subtrahend' for subtraction 
problems and 'augend' and 'addend' for addition problems. This practice was adopted 
by Fuson 1988 (p. 249).
Subitizing
There is a dispute as to whether this ability is a precursor to verbal counting ability 
(Klahr 1973) or whether subitizing depends on the ability to count (Gelman &
Gallistel, 1978). Gallistel & Gelman (1992) have subsequently agreed that subitizing is 
non-verbal counting but still dependent on the possession of counting principles. 
Starkey & Cooper (1995) investigated 2 to 5 year olds and claimed that subitizing 
develops prior to verbal counting and that the ability to learn to count, depends on this 
ability, with children able to subitize amounts up to five by 5 years of age. They see 
subitizing as being a one-to-one correspondence ability as opposed to ordinal ability. 
Therefore, subitizing is only a possible strategy when solving problems involving 
smaller numbers.
Addition
The main addition strategies identified (Groen & Parkman 1972, Carpenter et al 1981, 
Fuson 1984, 1988) are: Direct retrieval: when the answer to a computation is 
retrieved from long-term memory; the min. model (Groen & Parkman 1972, Groen & 
Resnick 1977); counting on the amount of the smaller addend from the larger addend; 
counting on from first addend, counting from the first number of the problem; 
counting from one: counting from one to the larger addend and then counting on the 
smaller addend; Siegler & Jenkins (1989) made specific the following strategies using
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concrete referents: counting fingers: each addend is counted on fingers and then 
summed from the beginning; fingers: each addend is represented by fingers but the 
solution is obtained by looking not counting (sometimes fingers might also be used as 
a 'memory aid' for the min. model); summing/counting all. counting out each addend 
and then summing them.
Subtraction
The main subtraction strategies identified (Carpenter et al 1981, Fuson 1984, 1988, 
Siegler 1987b) are; Direct retrieval: when the answer to a computation is retrieved 
from long-term memory, counting down from larger number or separatingfrom: 
starting with the larger addend, the amount of the smaller addend is counted down eg. 
8-5 would be counted 7, 6, 5, 4, 3 with the answer '3'; counting down to or separating 
to: this is similar to the counting down from except counting is until the smaller 
addend is remaining rather than removed eg. 8-5 would be counted 7, 6, 5 with the 
answer '3'; counting up from smaller number or adding on: counting starts from the 
smaller addend and proceeds to the larger addend eg. 8-5 would be counted 6,7,8; 
matching: this is only possible when concrete referents are available where each 
addend is matched one-to-one with each other; smaller-count: use of'counting down 
from' strategy on '12-3' but 'counting up from' on '12-9' ie. whichever counting 
procedure, counting down or counting up, can be carried out with fewer counts. 
Woods, Resnick & Groen 1975); with concrete referents the same two fingers 
strategies as for addition: counting fingers: using fingers to represent the larger 
addend and then taking away the amount of the smaller addend and counting the 
remaining fingers: fingers: the same process as the proceeding strategy except the 
summing process of the remaining fingers is done by 'finger recognition' as opposed to 
counting; and separatingfrom/taking away using some kind o f concrete referent: 
counting out larger addend and then separating the smaller number and counting the 
remainder.
How strategies are chosen
A strategy-choice model (Siegler & Shrager 1984) was put forward with people 
having no choice but to behave within this mechanism ie. adopting a strategy implies
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another could have been adopted Strategies differ in their accuracy, in their demands 
on memory and the amount of time they require and in the range of problems to which 
they apply (Siegler & Shipley 1987). One of the main possibilities as to how children 
come to choose strategies in adaptive ways concerns their metacognitive knowledge. 
According to this viewpoint children use knowledge of their own cognitive capacities 
when considering the demands of the task and available strategies. But Siegler & 
Shipley (1987) cite that there are only modest correlations between explicit knowledge 
about cognitive capabilities and strategy use (eg. Cavanaugh & Perlmutter 1982).
An alternative explanation for strategy usage was provided by the Distribution of 
Associations model (Siegler & Shrager 1984) in terms of the workings of memory, 
with associations between problems and answers influencing strategy choices, based on 
past experience. The model claims the memoiy representation of arithmetic facts 
contains both correct and incorrect answers, and selection of an answer is based on the 
strength of the associations, both in terms of speed and accuracy. For instance, when 
solving a simple problem, like '2+2', few incorrect answers would have been encoded 
thereby generating a peaked association between the problem and the answer o f '4'. 
Whereas on more complex problems more incorrect encodings would have been laid 
down and there would be a flatter distribution of association and therefore more 
chance of error. Moreover, the process of strategy choice is seen to be divided into 
three phases (Siegler & Shipley 1987): retrieval, elaboration of the representation and 
counting. When presented with the problem '2+2', provided the child is confident with 
the first retrieval, it is given, if not an elaboration process is undertaken and alternative 
strategy is used. Fast strategies are found to be preferred when accurate, and slower 
ones when past experience shows them to be accurate whereas another strategy might 
not be (Siegler 1987a). For instance, back-up strategies ('count all' and min. model 
Groen & Parkman 1972) were found to be used on more difficult addition problems as 
opposed to trusting retrieval (Siegler 1986). More recently, Siegler & Shipley (1995) 
have fiirther clarified the model of strategy choice to highlight its consideration of not 
just one type of information from long-term memoiy (past experience with the 
particular computation eg. '2+2') but three types. This includes information on all
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problems in the domain, (eg. all addition problems) and on other problems with the 
same features (eg. adding '2'). Each strategy has a strength according to its accuracy 
and speed when related to each of these areas. The probability of using any given 
strategy is relative to that strategy's strength in relation to all the other strategies. In 
this way it can be seen that there is a great deal of variability within individuals in terms 
of strategy choice (eg. Siegler 1996).
Difference in confidence of children has also been cited to account for why children 
with the same repertoire of strategies use different strategies for different sums (Siegler 
1988b). Three types of subjects were found: 'good', 'not so good' and 'perfectionists’. 
The good students used retrieval more often and accurately whereas the 'not so good' 
students made more errors whatever the strategy. The perfectionists were accurate but 
in the majority of cases used a counting-based strategy as opposed to direct retrieval.
In a further study by Kerkman & Siegler (1993), it was also concluded that the poorer 
performance of the 'not so good' children was not due to a metacognitive deficit but as 
a result of having a poorer selection of strategies from which to choose as opposed to 
choosing poorly. Furthermore, it has been found that there are cultural differences 
with Japanese children not relying predominantly on the counting strategies which 
seems to be the case with Western societies (Hatano 1982). This may reflect different 
teaching practices or simply linguistic differences between the two numeration systems 
and the impact on digit span.
1.2.2 Children's failure to use 'strategies' they know
Children's failure to use strategies they know has been particularly investigated with 
regard to the standard conservation of number task and young children's use of the 
min. model (counting on from the larger addend) with regard to addition problems.
First, the evidence that children prefer to trust relative length as opposed to counting in 
the conservation of number task has already been mentioned when discussing counting 
(eg. Bryant 1974, Michie 1984a, 1984b, Cowan 1987b). A simple explanation is that
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children do not realise that using perceptual comparison is less reliable than counting. 
This could be attributable to children's lack of understanding of counting and its 
underlying principles (Briars & Siegler 1984, Fuson 1988, Sophian 1987, Wynn 1990), 
lack of utilisation competence (Greeno et al 1984, Gelman & Meek 1986) whereby a 
child has a principled understanding of counting but does not always know when to 
apply it. Moreover, children may use subitizing with small arrays as opposed to 
counting (eg. Klahr 1973 ).
Secondly, Siegler & Jenkins (1989) when investigating 5 to 6 year olds discovery of 
the min. model for addition problems reported that once discovered it was not always 
chosen on subsequent trials unless a sum was presented which gave a clear signal for 
its use. For instance, the problem '12-9' would be solved with the min. model as 
opposed to '12-6'. However, although children may choose to use inefficient strategies 
Siegler & Jenkins (1989) found illegitimate ones were seldom used: For instance, 
faulty strategies like adding the first addend twice (eg. '2+3' would be answered with 
'4') or counting on from the larger addend, the number of times indicated by that 
addend (eg. '2+3' would be answered with '6'), were not used. It was concluded that 
most individuals use multiple strategies to solve problems. The notion of a 'goal 
sketch', directing strategy choice, was put forward to account for why children were 
able to implement the most effective strategy, when there was a clear signal as to its 
efficacy, and seldom discovered illegitimate ones.
However, it has been found that children can be encouraged to use strategies which 
they had initially failed to use spontaneously. The beneficial effect of providing 
children with feedback on their performance when asked to count, brought about an 
improvement in subsequent spontaneous counting (Michie 1984b, Cowan et al 1993). 
Moreover, as opposed to feedback, agreement between strategies has also been put 
forward by Bryant (1982) as a factor in whether or not children would choose to use a 
strategy. In a measuring study, Bryant (1982) found 6 year old children spontaneously 
began to use a measure, after they had been shown that using a stick to measure two 
towers was as effective as placing the towers side by side for a perceptual comparison.
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This finding for the beneficial effect of'agreement between strategies' challenged the 
Piagetian notion of children's intellectual development proceeding as a result of 
resolution of conflict between strategies. According to Bryant the problem with the 
Piagetian account is being aware of conflict does not give any clue as to how to solve 
it. Cowan et al (1993) tested the effectiveness of feedback and agreement between 
strategies. It was found that both were equally effective in encouraging children to 
spontaneously count with 5 to 7 year olds making a significant improvement in 
judgments given, although the pre-school children did not. The conclusion was that 
there was an increase in confidence to use counting but not in understanding the 
greater reliability of counting as opposed to a length comparison. Moreover, Cowan 
et al cited the limitations of both the Piagetian conflict account and Bryant (1982) 
'agreement between strategies' account for bringing about cognitive change: "...if more 
powerful strategies are needed to agree with an existing strategy then how could 
children ever adopt a strategy for something new' (p. 419). Furthermore, they also 
cited the difficulty of both accounts being too individualistic instead of encouraging the 
children to value the input of others.
1.2.3 Cognitive Capacity
Errors in addition and subtraction problems can come about as a result of overload on 
cognitive capacity in a number of ways: the number of mental operations required, 
overload of information, the need to hold information for too long in working memory 
or simply failure to remember the numbers to be computed, as Bryant & Trabasso 
(1971) found when investigating transitive inference. In this case, failure was found 
sometimes to be due to forgetting the premises of the inference. Two aspects of 
evidence will be highlighted in this section: the development of working memory 
which increases the ability to memorise the numbers and procedures in the 
computations and the 'processing load' required when mapping arithmetic problems 
into mental models.
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Working Memory
The structure of working memory has been characterised by Baddeley & Hitch (1974) 
as being made up of a 'central executive’ with some fixed pool of mental resources, 
responsible for initiating and directing processes, reasoning, language comprehension 
and retrieval from long-term memory (LTM). The central executive which is thought 
to serve the 'keeping track' mechanism required when counting or working out 
arithmetical procedures (Ashcraft 1995) is served by two sub-systems. First, the 
articulatory loop, responsible for maintaining information in the auditory rehearsal 
system (eg. counting, Logie & Baddeley, 1987; Ashcraft, 1995). Secondly, the visual 
scratch pad, responsible for maintaining and manipulating visual and spatial 
characteristics of the problem. A child's ability to process information and their 
laiowledge base both develop with age (Carey 1985; Chi & Ceci 1988; Halford 
1993). More recently, as already outlined in the previous section, as opposed to 
strategy choice being viewed as a result of metacognitive knowledge or growth of 
more sophisticated computable counting mechanisms (eg. min, model - Groen & 
Parkman 1972) a strength-based retrieval model, in terms of the memoiy trace for 
experiences with particular problems, has been put forward - Distribution of 
Associations Model (Siegler & Shrager 1984). Therefore, a central role is given to 
memory in the solution process. Furthermore, in Case (1985) stage theory of 
cognitive development, the importance of the development of working memory 
capacity is central, where it is hypothesised that the transition from one stage to 
another occurs when working memory capacity for that specific type of representation 
reaches four units. Evidence for the importance of working memory was also obtained 
by Geary & Brown (1991) when investigating maths-disabled children of 5 to 6 years 
who were found to have a working memory deficiency. During the first grade it was 
found that non-maths disabled children moved from using a 'counting-on' mechanism 
to 'direct retrieval' with an improved rate of strategy execution. But the 
maths-disabled showed no academic improvement over the year, neither moving to a 
retrieval strategy, nor improving their rate of counting.
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Processing load
The demands in terms of processing load have been investigated by Boulton-Lewis 
(1993) & Boulton-Lewis & Tait (1994) with reference to Halford's (1993) structure 
mapping theory where understanding a new concept requires construction of a mental 
model to reflect the structure of the concept. Halford (1993) provides a template for 
structuring of such tasks where a mental model is used to generate procedures. 
However, it is not necessary to invoke the mental model each time a calculation is 
undertaken (Greeno et al 1984, Halford 1993). As far as solution of simple addition 
and subtraction problems three levels were defined:
1. Element mapping : individual elements in one structure are mapped into individual 
elements in another structure (eg. tally-type system of matching 'two' of any entity with 
the number 'two'). This is thought to be possible by the time a child reaches 1 year of 
age.
2. Relational mapping : two elements and the relation between them are mapped 
from one structure to another (eg. 2<4) from around 2 years of age.
3. System mapping : three elements with a set of relations between them are mapped 
(eg. 2 + 1 = 3 )  from 4 to 5 years old (Boulton-Lewis & Halford 1992)
School algorithms for addition and subtraction problems require two mapping 
processes if concrete representations are used. First, mapping the number (verbal or 
written) into a concrete representation, followed by performing the addition or 
subtraction operation, then mapping this result back into its magnitude and thence into 
a number (Boulton-Lewis & Tait 1994). If mapping from a concrete representation is 
poorly understood this can disrupt the understanding of a concept. It is already well 
documented that by the time children are introduced to formal algorithms at school 
they see little connection between them and their informal strategies (Ginsburg 1977, 
Carpenter et al 1981, Nunes, Schliemann & Carraher 1993). Furthermore, others have 
claimed that concrete representations often fail to produce the expected positive 
outcomes in terms of conceptual understanding (Mason 1989a, Lesh, Behr & Post 
1987, Threlfall 1996).
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1.3 CONTEXT AND CULTURE
Vergnaud (1985) put forward a theory of conceptual understanding to include the 
importance of the contextual situation, both local or cultural. It was claimed that 
maths always involves: 
a set of situations that give meaning to the concept;
a set of invariants that are constituted by relationships essential to the concepts; 
a set of symbols to represent it;
In the last twenty years the importance of 'context* effects when testing young 
children's number competence has been recognised . This is both in terms of'context' 
effects within tasks eg. standard conservation of number task (Rose & Blank 1974, 
McGarrigle & Donaldson 1975, Light et al 1979, Samuel & Bryant 1984, Pratt 1988) 
and also the wider social and cultural context (eg. Carraher, Carraher & Schliemann 
1985, Nunes et al 1993, Nunes & Bryant 1996). This section outlines the evidence 
from each of these aspects. First, 'localised' context effects followed by effects as a 
result of the wider social and cultural environment.
1.3.1 Context Effects
Evidence on social context-effects questioned the validity of the Piagetian standard 
conservation of number task. Whilst not denying its reliability the notion that the task 
was only testing a child's conservation of number was queried. It was found that 
children could conserve provided the task was presented within a meaningfiil context 
(eg. McGarrigle & Donaldson 1975; Rose & Blank, 1974; Light et al 1979). This 
questioned whether what children did in conservation tasks was simply determined by 
their understanding of number. By allowing the child to see the purpose behind the 
task and understand the adult's intentions, whether with regard to the language used or 
the type of questioning, enabled more children to be number-conservers. For instance, 
children need to attend to the actual words spoken to succeed in a Piagetian class 
inclusion task. The salient features appear to be the properties of the sub-groups, as
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opposed to the superordinate group, but to succeed a child needs to attend to the parts 
and whole simultaneously. Donaldson (1978) stated that young children were more 
sensitive to 'context effects' since their language understanding was influenced by the 
meaning of the situation, as opposed to actual linguistic content. She made the 
distinction between context-dependent thought and context-independent thought. 
Context-dependent thinking was termed as 'embedded' thought to describe that 
thinking which dealt with familiar situations where intentions and purposes were 
understood. Context-independent thinking was termed 'disembedded' thought, as this 
type of thinking required children to operate without the supportive context of 
meaningful events. According to Donaldson (1978) as long as a child's thinking was 
sustained by the kind of'human sense', provided by a meaningful context, children 
tended to have less difficulty with the task.
The importance of context or situation has also been found with regard to young 
children's understanding of addition and subtraction problems (Hughes 1981, 1986). 
Difficulty was experienced when the numbers were presented without reference to 
concrete entities but children were successful when problems were phrased within a 
hypothetical context or situation. This was a critical finding since it moved the 
dichotomy in numerical understanding away from 'concrete v abstract' to 'embedded 
(concrete or hypothetical) v disembedded and consideration of the links between the 
two. The Hughes (1981) study on addition and subtraction had looked explicitly at 
number word tasks, as opposed to implicit number tasks, which had already 
documented young children's competence with small numbers by the time they began 
school (Gelman 1972, Groen & Resnick 1977, Houlihan & Ginsburg 1981, Starkey & 
Gelman 1982, Siegler & Robinson 1982). For instance, Starkey & Gelman 1982 
tested children up to three years of age on how many items had been added to a 
container. The task involved children putting two, three or four objects into a 
container, after which some objects were either added or subtracted by the 
experimenter. The test involved the children removing the appropriate number of 
items from the container, where only one could be removed at a time. Whether the
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child reached into the container the appropriate number of times was observed. 
Children of this age were found to be successful with numbers up to four.
The research, reported in this thesis, follows on from Hughes' (1981) findings and it is 
therefore necessary to fully discuss his claims. In his study a box task was devised to 
test children on 'explicit' addition and subtraction problems eg. 'what does one and one 
make?'. Each of his five box tasks varied the degree of contextual support afforded to 
the child in the solution process. This explored 3 to 5 year olds ability to solve 
arithmetic problems both within an embedded context ( 'If there was one brick in the 
box and we put one more in, how many would that make altogether?' ) progressing to 
the same problems presented in a disembedded way or in formal code ( 'What does one 
and one make?' ). There were five small number problems (involving numbers 0 to 3) 
and four large number problems (between 5 and 8). It was found that, although 
children answered well when working with concrete objects and quite well using 
hypothetical situations giving referential support, they had difficulty when faced with 
the same problems framed in formal code. Figures showed that most children could 
answer the problems, involving previously seen concrete referents using small 
numbers, with 50% able to answer when the questions were posed within hypothetical 
situations. But this dropped to less than 10% when the same problems were phrased 
in formal code. Hughes reported large social class effects and subtraction was more 
difficult than addition with large problems more difficult than small. Intuitively, it 
might be expected that small number problems would be easier than large, but if 
children solve each kind differently this is interesting theoretically in adding to 
knowledge on how the number system is understood and manipulated (Hughes 1981). 
The findings suggest that although children may start school with the ability to perform 
simple addition and subtraction problems, this was only possible within contexts 
involving specified objects, people or events.
Theoretically, Hughes viewed the nature of the children's difficulty in terms of their 
inability to make the 'translation' from thinking in an embedded context to the 
disembedded context of formal code arithmetic. He had initially conceptualised the
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difficulty in terms of abstraction. However, it had already been established that this 
difficulty was not a failure to abstract the dimension of number from its entity in that 
children could solve novel problems when framed in a hypothetical situation. He also 
considered that it was not a failure to understand the language involved in the 
abstraction process of 'one and one makes two' since children had the ability to think 
in a disembedded way about colour and provide their own context-dependent 
framework of understanding (Hughes & Grieve 1980). For instance, in response to 
the question: 'Is red bigger than yellow?' children made sense of the situation by 
looking around the room and providing their own concrete referent to understand the 
question. The use of single word referents eg. how many is two lollipops and one 
more, was also investigated by Hughes (1983b) and Davis & Lo (1986). The 
conclusions drawn were the same in that, as long as the arithmetic problem was stated 
within a specific topic the child was successful, but when faced with formal code far 
more errors were made.
Success with problems presented within an embedded context pointed to the beneficial 
effect provided by this kind of'human sense' situation for a child's thinking (Donaldson 
1978). This kind of explanation was contrary to the Piagetian claim that any difficulty 
was due to a logical cognitive deficit. However, the difficulty of the 'human sense' 
argument lies with its circularity where successful situations are attributed to be as a 
result of a meaningful context and unsuccessful ones due to its absence. Furthermore, 
this tautology is not helpfitl empirically as how can a situation be defined as 'making 
sense' in the first place? The gap in theoretical terms is 'how' and 'why' a child is 
successful in hypothetical situations. A different way of viewing the problem is that 
success in hypothetical situations is due to correct strategic choice and failure incorrect 
strategic choice. However, it is not possible to know what strategy the children were 
using to perform the computations in the Hughes (1981) study since there was no 
strategic prompt given only a referential context. Observations from Hughes (1986) 
reported during one of his box experiments mentioned some children using visual 
imagery or fingers to represent the bricks. Children were also reported to tap on the 
box lid as though they could see through it to count the bricks inside.
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The notion of the beneficial effects of children using some kind of visual image to help 
them in the solution process is not new. The use of imagery in mathematics has been 
suggested for some time (Bruner & Kenney 1974, Grunau 1978, Resnick & Ford 
1981, Siegler & Robinson 1981, Edwards & Edwards 1992) and is seen as an 
important factor in the learning of mathematics (Skemp 1971) Mathematical 
reasoning nearly always calls for imagining in the sense o f inventiveness and often 
calls for imagining in the sense o f inventing an imagistic representation that 
transforms one's understanding o f the problem' (Perkins 1985 p. 20)
Bruner & Kenney (1974) found that imagery was a powerful tool in doing 
mathematical problems with a store of concrete images representing the physical 
objects formed as children abstracted number from the concrete referents. An 
elaborative prompt using imagery (Grunau 1978) was also found to be effective with 5 
to 6 year olds with addition problems up to TO'. However, the prompt to 'imagine' was 
to encourage the children to use a referential effect as opposed to the instruction 'to 
make a picture' in their head. Resnick & Ford (1981) cite practical apparatus as 
effective when teaching arithmetic because of its imageability rather than just relying 
on the written or spoken word. Siegler & Robinson (1982) when testing children on 
arithmetic problems prompted the children to first 'imagine a pile of oranges' with some 
being added and taken away. Moreover, Edwards & Edwards (1992) suggested the 
use of fantasy and imagery strategies to help young children in the move fi'om informal 
number reasoning to the more formalised type thinking. They posit the need for 
investigation into the role of imagery and pretence in 'building bridges' between early 
concrete number experiences and the kind of thinking required for operating within the 
'disembedded' world of formal code maths. Cowan et al (1996) reported that children 
were encouraged to use the counting principle of order-irrelevance when the 
'contextual setting' of the questioning was embedded within a 'story' context and when 
they did not have to count themselves.
More recently when investigating the translation process the importance of making 
fluent two-way translations between formal and concrete representations of the same
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problem has been identified (Hughes 1986). However, a critical question for Hughes 
was whether children could by and large make the link themselves, between an 
'embedded' and 'disembedded' context, or whether they needed to be helped. In 
exploring this dilemma Goswami (1992) alluded to the importance of considering the 
role of'analogy' in the translation process. Analogy is defined as a 'process of 
reasoning from parallel cases', ie. Figure A is to Figure B as Figure C is to Figure D. 
Figure D must bear the same relation to Figure C as Figure B does to Figure A. This 
is known as relational similarity. Analogies have been found to be important in problem 
solving, but until recently developmental psychology has not really investigated their 
use in young children. This stemmed from the Piagetian claim that the ability to reason 
by analogy did not develop until 11 to 12 years of age or until a child had reached the 
formal operational stage (Inhelder & Piaget 1958).
Goswami (1992) saw children as developing two number systems: knowledge based 
on concrete material (embedded) and that based on a symbolic system with 'weak 
mapping' between the individual elements of the two representational systems 
accounting for any difficulties experienced. She claimed that 'translation' from 
embedded to disembedded context for children should not be a problem if they 
understand the relational similarity of analogy and provided that they have a 
knowledge base in that domain. In fact, she outlined how analogy was widely used in 
teaching arithmetic, usually in the form of a concrete representation of the concept to 
be taught eg. the use of cakes when teaching fractions. The difficulty is the slow 
realisation that concrete referents represent numbers with this link needing lots of 
practice as evidenced by Stallard (1982) and Hughes (1986). Although the use of an 
analogy is seen as obvious to an adult it may not be so to young children (Holyoak, 
Junn & Billman, 1984). According to this viewpoint, a child who cannot translate 
lacks 'representational insight' - the ability to abstract the dimension of number fi'om 
its entity - which is connected to the amount of experience a child has of the relational 
similarity. Siegal & Smith (1990) found that using natural kinds of representations so 
as to make the analogy transparent eg. teddy bears, fish etc, enabled children to 
understand the relational similarity more easily.
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Hughes concluded that the way forward was not necessarily simply giving more 
concrete examples to gain generalisation, but to look at mathematics as like learning a 
new language, where children needed to see the sense of its symbolic representation. 
Research into children's understanding of written representations of number tried to 
elicit what were the minimal conditions under which a child would treat the task as 
mathematical and 'click into seeing maths as a new language'. It was found that 
children spontaneously used a tally system (based on a 'counting-type match' ) to 
represent number, as opposed to representing number with the number itself (Hughes 
1986). Davis et al 1985 found that using the phrase 'how many' had a significant 
positive effect in tuning children into writing a number. Hughes (1983b) also showed 
that even though children could be taught to use mathematical operator signs to help 
them to solve some problems in an experimental situation, they failed to generalise 
their use to other equally appropriate contexts. He concluded that perhaps the 
significant changes in the early school years is in understanding and identifying the 
different purposes underlying school tasks
1.3.2 Cultural Context
The importance of the wider social and cultural context has been stressed in the last 
ten years which echoed a theoretical shift in the latter 1980s towards the social 
cognitive perspective of Vygotsky (1962) who regarded mathematical thinking as a 
cultural tool set within a framework of a meaningful situation. The activity of 
acquiring numerical and mathematical knowledge can be qualitatively different 
according to socio-cultural or linguistic context (Vergnaud 1985 cited in Nunes et al 
1993; Durkin 1993). The connection between intellectual development and 
mathematical learning and a child's understanding of their environment was also 
stressed by Bryant (1995) & Nunes & Bryant (1996).
In the wider social context the importance of the experience a child derives prior to 
school from carers is also important. Saxe, Guberman & Gearhart (1987) found 
differences between children's competence when arriving at school in terms of social
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class with middle class children demonstrating more competence through exposure to 
more complex number activities eg. when going upstairs (how many steps would one 
more be) as opposed to simple rote counting. This therefore highlights the dynamic 
character of the interaction between the two with the children adjusting their goals and 
carers extending a child's zone of proximal development (ZPD) (Vygotsky 1978). This 
is the distance between the child's individual capacity and the ability to perform with 
the assistance (Tharp & Gallimore 1991).
This section outlines evidence derived from difficulties children encounter relating to 
linguistic and cultural context. This is with regard to the British number system and 
'street mathematics' research, which explores the informal strategies children develop 
for themselves when doing arithmetic outside school.
British Number System
As far as linguistic context is concerned, a child when confronted with the language of 
formal arithmetic, needs to adapt the words they know as these are not necessarily 
used in the same way with which a child may be familiar eg. the number 'two' sounds \  
the same as 'too' and 'to' as does number 'four' which sounds like 'for'. The functions of 
these words are different and therefore children do not necessarily map the word used 
on to the number concept (Wynn 1990; Durkin, Shire, Riem, Crowther & Rutter 
1986). In recent years, a difficulty in understanding of the British number system has 
been investigated as a factor in children's difficulties with formal code arithmetic 
(Nunes & Bryant 1996). One of the main stumbling blocks in arithmetic is now seen 
with the number words themselves and the generativity of the British number system, 
as opposed to young children's understanding of the cardinal principle (Bryant 1995).
The British number system is based on a hierarchy of decades which are counted 
generatively. This generativity is important when considering the additive composition 
of number which is essential for understanding addition and subtraction. Additive ^
composition involves understanding that bigger numbers are made up of smaller ones 
eg. the understanding that '7' is greater than '6' and that '6' is a possible subset o f '7', 
but that '7' is not a possible subset o f '6'. Linguistic cues are found to be important for
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understanding additive composition and these differ according to the way the cultural 
number system is constructed. In the British number system unlike subsequent 
decades, the teen structure cannot be derived from knowing the numbers 1-10 (eg. 
eleven, twelve, thirteen etc.). Whereas in the Chinese system, if numbers 1-10 are 
known, others can be built up ie. eleven = ten 1 and twenty-four = 2 ten 4. It is 
therefore easier for Chinese/Taiwanese children to grasp relations between the decade 
structures in the Asian conventional number systems (Miller & Stigler 1987, Durkin 
1993). Children who learn the Asian regular named-value system are also found to 
learn basic arithmetic skills more swiftly (Fuson & Kwon 1992).
Additive composition has been investigated by Nunes, Bryant, Falcao & Lima (1996) 
through the ability of young children to understand the relative values of different coins 
when paying for various items. They used a shop task where children had to pay for 
items with different denominations of money, either single pennies (Ips) or in 
combinations of TOp and Ips' or '20p and Ips'. This involved children in 
understanding additive composition through the use of combinations of coins of 
different sizes. The aim was to test if children did have more difficulty with the 'teens' 
as opposed to numbers in the 'twenties'. It was found that the children had more 
difficulty with numbers involving '11, 12, and 13' than numbers in the 'twenties' which 
pointed to the irregularity of the 'teens' (in linguistic terms eg. 11) as opposed to 21,31 
etc., which are constructed generatively in the English number system. Therefore, the 
numeration system is seen as related to the growing mastery of addition rather than 
simply more practice on one-to-one correspondence through counting. According to 
Nunes & Bryant (1996) a child's sense of counting is inadequate if they do not have a 
clear concept of the unit of number in the first place. Another study by Nunes et al 
(1996) involved the French number system which has an irregularity after 70 
(soixante-dix etc.) but found that the greater irregularity did not make the 
understanding of additive composition more difficult. However, age may be a 
confounding variable since French children start school later than English. It was 
concluded that children learn their understanding of additive composition primarily 
from small numbers and apply this knowledge meaningfully to larger numbers even if
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there are irregularities. Furthermore, it is claimed that understanding of additive 
composition comes after the understanding of cardinality and the ability to count on 
from the larger addend (Komilaki 1994).
Street Mathematics
There has been much work in recent years on what is generally known as 'street 
mathematics' which looks at how the situation, in terms of the environment, gives 
meaning to doing the arithmetic. Bruner (1976) (Wood, Bruner & Ross 1976) 
working in the Vygotskian tradition, saw the teacher as a scaffblder in the learning 
process through offering a structure for what needs to be learned. He claimed school 
learning to be distanced fi’om reality pointing to a trade-off between meaning and 
generalisability.
Ginsburg (1982) made a distinction between 'informal' and 'formal' maths with informal 
maths being that not taught in schools. Carraher, Carraher & Schlieman (1985) 
investigated how a group of 9 to 15 year old (controlled by school grade level) 
Brazilian street vendors used mathematics in their everyday lives. It was found that 
computational strategies used in the street differed to those used in school. The same 
problems yielded 98% accuracy when framed in the informal setting of the street but 
dropped to 41% when presented in pencil and paper formal code maths. Different 
algorithms were used in the street to the classroom thus demonstrating a qualitative 
difference in performance. In trying to conceptualise why children make so little 
connection between their informal and formal strategies Resnick (1982) asserted that 
street mathematics was based on a semantic approach to problem solving whereas 
school maths was syntactic. For behaviourists (Thorndike 1922) a child's difficulty 
with school arithmetic would be that the learned activity is not sufficiently skilled to 
transfer from one situation to another. The ability to separate the dimension of number 
from its entity is taken for granted in the street (Nunes et al 1993). Street mathematics 
makes more sense in that the activity is aimed at some goal. Vygotsky (1962) and 
Luria (1979) saw the differences as individualistic based on social experience with 
mathematics in the market place involving reasoning that is socially and logically
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determined. Historically in school, children learn arithmetic operations phrased in 
formal code first (eg. children doing sheets of T+l’, '2+3' etc.) and then apply them to 
real-life problem solving. Furthermore, Nunes et al (1993) found, when looking at 
strategies children used in the street, that there was no difference in logic, in that the 
children understood the conceptual invariants, but there was a difference in functional 
organisation with the way calculations were performed. This allowed children to keep 
in mind the relative values of the numbers, through working from large numbers to 
small eg. 100 divided by 4 : half of 100 is 50 and half of 50 is 25 whereas the school 
algorithm requires using the small denominator first.
In summary a child relies on different representations in and out of school. Most 
psychological theories until recently have only looked at the logical constraints of 
reasoning as opposed to the social situation. Mathematics education is currently 
recognising the need for progressively more formal representations derived from 
knowledge built outside school (Nunes et al 1993). Cheng & Holyoak (1985) have 
put forward the need for an abstract knowledge structure termed 'pragmatic reasoning 
schemas' drawn from experience, similar to how concepts like 'permission' are 
formulated. Learning needs to preserve the meaning in the classroom - going from the 
problems of real life and deducing the rules as opposed to the instructional separation 
of mathematics and its application. Arguably the 'strongest' social cognitive viewpoint 
would claim there is no ability that is devoid of making human sense of the concept 
and hence the situation.
1,4 THE ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED B Y  THE RESEARCH IN  THIS THESIS
There are three main theoretical explanations of young children's difficulty with formal 
arithmetic which have been outlined in this literature review.
1. For Piaget (1952) young children's failure at formal arithmetic is due to a logical 
cognitive deficit. Thus, Piaget would predict children would fail both in hypothetical 
situations and when presented with formal code problems. The Hughes' (1981, 1986)
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evidence has, therefore, questioned the validity of Piaget's concept of number (1952) in 
the same way as the powerfulness reported for imagery in syllogistic reasoning has 
undermined Piagetian claims concerning deductive reasoning (Dias & Harris 1988, 
1990, Leevers 1996, Leevers & Harris 1996)
2. Information processing explanations view a child's difficulty in terms of cognitive 
functioning, either in relation to insufficient cognitive capacity concerning processing 
load (Boulton-Lewis 1993, Boulton-Lewis & Tait 1994) or simply failure to keep 
track of the numbers involved in the computation (Bryant & Trabasso 1971). 
Alternatively, strategies children use to solve arithmetic problems have been 
investigated where success is conceptualised as a correct strategy choice and failure a 
result of using a faulty strategy (eg. Siegler 1996), A strength-based retrieval model, 
the Distribution of Associations Model (Siegler & Shrager 1984) has been put forward 
to account for strategy choice, which is based on the strength of associations with that 
problem or that type of problem, with little experience leading to low confidence in 
terms of accuracy of strategy choice.
3. There is a difficulty of 'matching competences to contexts' (Bryant 1985, Cowan 
1991) with the need to see the equivalence of the hypothetical context and formal code 
arithmetic in terms of problem-solving. Lack of confidence is also seen as a factor 
contributing to failure in making the most optimal strategy choice (Cowan et al 1993). 
Thus, Cowan and Siegler both claim that low experience with similar tasks or problems 
leads to low confidence which is likely to contribute to less accurate strategy selection. 
For Gelman (Greeno et al 1984, Gelman & Meek 1986) the difficulty stems from lack 
of utilisation competence to apply the arithmetical skills demonstrated in hypothetical 
situations. As opposed to competences, Hughes (1981, 1986) views failure in terms 
of the different type of thinking required when reasoning within an embedded context 
which provides a meaningful situation to the disembedded context required for formal 
code arithmetic (Donaldson 1978), the difficulty lying in making the 'translation' from 
one type of thinking to the other. This claim, therefore, draws on the central role of 
'human sense' as an explanation for children's ability in an embedded context.
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Moreover, it follows from this that being able to specify the process of the translation 
itself is of central theoretical importance. In a similar way to Hughes, Goswami 
(1992) has conceptualised the difficulty in terms of children's failure to understand the 
analogy between two different representational systems and the relational similarity 
between solving arithmetic with referential support and problems framed in formal 
code.
In terms of the wider cultural context, little connection is seen by children between 
their own informal strategies as opposed to the formal algorithms taught in schools 
(Nunes & Bryant 1996, Nunes et al 1993). Moreover, young children's lack of 
understanding of the generativity of the British numeration system is seen to affect 
their understanding of additive composition and hence their number development.
Taking all these explanations together it can be seen that the gap in theoretical terms is 
how children's competence in hypothetical situations is working. Unfortunately the 
'human sense' explanation (Donaldson 1978) provides a 'circular' argument based on a 
purely operational definition. The difficulty lies with its tautology in the fact that 
human sense can only be defined as those situations in which children are successful 
The need is to separate out the constituents of human sense and how it might work. 
According to Hughes (1981, 1986) the problem lies in the mechanism of'translating' 
from one mode of thinking to another. However, if the issue is viewed from an 
information processing perspective and if success is conceptualised as making an 
appropriate strategy choice and failure with formal code problems a result of using a 
faulty strategy then manipulating strategic choice may offer insight into when success 
and failure occur.
The research reported in this thesis starts from taking the significant findings of Dias 
& Harris (1988, 1990) for a positive effect of imagery in deductive reasoning and 
explores the effectiveness of an imagery-prompt in the solution of simple addition and 
subtraction problems. This picks up on the already suggested efficacy of using 
imagery in arithmetic (Skemp 1971, Edwards & Edwards 1992, Siegler & Robinson
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1982, Grunau 1978) together with Hughes' anecdotal evidence from his box 
experiments where some children were reported as using their imagination when 
performing the computations. Therefore, instead of allowing children to choose their 
own strategy for the solution process as Hughes (1981) did, this experimental design 
offers an explicit strategic prompt as well as the referential support provided by the 
hypothetical context. Furthermore, encouraging children to be strategic may help in 
the translation process to formal code arithmetic.
Nine experiments were undertaken testing seven hundred and eighty-two children 
(N=782) between four and just under six years of age. The first five experiments 
explored the effectiveness of an imagery-prompt in comparison to other mentalistic 
prompts including 'closing eyes' and a memory-check for the initial addend in each 
problem. The aim was to try to unpack whether strategic prompting was effective 
directly or indirectly simply by encouraging children to be strategic as opposed to 
astrategic or by suppressing an inappropriate strategy. Clearly, this is not to suggest 
that children, operating with only referential support, use no strategy but providing an 
explicit strategic prompt may encourage children to see the importance of strategy 
choice which may increase their metacognitive awareness. The sixth investigation 
explored a written presentation of the same problems in formal code notation. This 
addressed the difficulty children have in making the translation from thinking with 
referential support to the thinking required for formal code arithmetic. Experiments 
seven to nine sought to widen the discussion of strategic prompting by looking at the 
efficacy of child-initiated strategies including the use of'fingers' and an implicit as 
opposed to explicit strategic prompt.
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CHAPTER 2 
Experiment 1
The use of imagery as an explicit strategic prompt in the solution of simple
arithmetic
2.1 INTRODUCTION
This investigation was based on the findings of two independent studies - that of 
Hughes (1981) on early arithmetic and those of Dias & Harris (1988, 1990) on 
syllogistic reasoning. Hughes (1981) had found children of three to five years 
displayed considerable competence at solving simple addition and subtraction problems 
with contextual support (real or hypothetical) but had difficulty when faced with the 
same problems presented in formal code arithmetic. He therefore viewed the problem 
in terms of an inability to make the 'translation' from an embedded to disembedded 
context as opposed to from a concrete setting to abstract thought. The findings of 
Hughes have already demonstrated the importance of'context' and therefore this 
current research was not aimed at a simple context v non-context comparison. Instead 
the gap in terms of theoretical explanation is how this competence in a hypothetical 
context is working.
In a completely different area, that of deductive reasoning, Hawkins, Pea, Glick & 
Scribner (1984) found 'fantasy-type' premises, which described mythical creatures 
foreign to practical knowledge, to be effective when reasoning systematically. 
Following on from this, Dias & Harris (1988, 1990) argued the case for the strength of 
imagery in complex reasoning tasks where its use was effective in overcoming a child's 
tendency towards an 'empirical bias' when solving syllogisms. Typically young children 
respond to the world according to their real world knowledge. The explanation 
subsequently put forward by Harris (1991 p. 284) was that children possess a 
representational system which operates according to a series of default settings 
corresponding 'to current intentional states of self and current states of the world (as 
known to self)....'. These default settings remain operative unless an imagined premise
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overrides them, with the greater the number of settings requiring temporary 
suspension, the more difficult the simulation. The important part of the Dias & Harris 
findings to be adopted in this research was the success of imagery in complex 
reasoning tasks. These findings together with that of Hawkins et al 1984 have already 
questioned the psychological impact of the Piagetian claims that the thinking required 
for solving syllogisms (Piaget 1965 p. 223), viewed 'as a succession of logical 
additions and multiplications', comes about at around 10 to 11 years when nearing 
formal operational thought. While there are clear differences between syllogisms and 
arithmetic problems both involve thinking systematically based on abstract thought to 
arrive at a solution.
It was therefore decided to explore the powerfulness of imagery in the solution of 
simple addition and subtraction problems. In this sense, cueing the children to use 
imagery, when solving arithmetic presented in a hypothetical context, provided an 
extra level of contextual support or 'embeddedness' when compared to the referential 
support offered by the hypothetical context alone. Instead of simply alluding to the 
'human sense' explanation (Donaldson 1978) of children's ability when provided with 
contextual support, this research aimed to flesh out 'how' this competence may be 
working. The difficulty with the human sense explanation lies with how to 
operationalise such a concept as successful situations are ones that make sense and 
unsuccessful situations are ones that don't! The suggested beneficial effects of imagery 
also have support in mathematical research (eg. Skemp 1971, Edwards & Edwards 
1992, Hughes 1986). Moreover, any beneficial effect might enable the 'translation' to 
take place from thinking in an 'embedded' context to that of'disembedded' required for 
formal code arithmetic. In short, the basic rationale was to follow up the Hughes 
(1981) findings and explore the use of imagery in the solution of simple addition and 
subtraction problems.
Having outlined the theoretical framework it is necessary to set out a certain level of 
detail of both the Hughes (1981) & Dias & Harris (1990) original designs in order to 
deal with the current experimental design.
45
First, Hughes (1981). This work followed on from Gelman & Gallistel's (1978) 
findings which challenged the Piagetian assumption that pre-school children lacked the 
conceptual understanding for addition and subtraction. However, both the research of 
Gelman and Piaget (1952) had used an implicit-type of questioning using non-number 
word tasks eg. adding and taking away objects from a container and the children had 
to respond with the number remaining in the box (Starkey & Gelman 1982). Hughes 
used explicit questions using number words eg. 'how many is two bricks and one 
more? In his research, Hughes investigated how 60 children aged three to five years 
performed when given simple but explicit addition and subtraction problems and how 
their performance was affected by age, social class, size of number and form of task 
presentation. He used a set of tasks involving a box and 8 bricks. The children had 
received no prior training in school at arithmetic. The following problems were used:
5 small number: '7+7', '2-7', '7+2', '5-2', '7-7'
4 large number: '5+7', '<5+2' '5-7','7-2'
Five tasks, which differed in terms of the amount of context were given to the child 
ranging from seeing the bricks through to hypothetical situations and culminating in 
formal code problems. Taskl (Box Open) simply involved children in a counting task 
since the number of bricks being put into and taken out of the box could be seen 
because the lid remained open. Task2 (Box Closed) enabled the child to see the 
number of bricks going in and out of the box but the lid was closed for the final count 
thereby requiring the child to perform mental arithmetic. Task3 (Hypothetical box): 
the box and bricks were removed and the problems posed in a hypothetical context ...'if 
there was one brick in the box... etc. Task4 (Hypothetical Shop): no reference was 
made to the bricks or the box, with a hypothetical scenario in a shop, posed ....'if there
was one child in the sweet shop and one more goes in  etc. TaskS (Formal Code):
the same problems were presented in the formalised language of arithmetic eg. what 
does one and one make? (Full task instructions from the Hughes' study are 
re-produced at Appendix 1.1).
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The same problems outlined above were presented in each task and in the same order 
since only children who succeeded on smaller number problems (two or more correct 
responses) received the larger number. There was no other pre-test. All the problems 
were presented verbally by the same experimenter and each child was tested 
individually and gave the answers verbally. Piloting suggested that task requirements 
were clearest when the tasks were presented in order Taskl through to TaskS but 20% 
of children were randomly selected and the reverse order was followed. This change in 
order of presentation did not affect the results and so their scores were included in the 
analysis.
The results showed that children were able to solve these problems well provided they 
had contextual support with performance decreasing from Taskl to TaskS. This trend 
was predicted by Hughes since the amount of 'embeddedness' in terms of contextual 
support was lessening progressively at each successive task. It was found that 
performance was significantly affected by age, social class, size of number involved 
and form of task presentation. Most children were successful when the task provided 
contextual support (real or hypothetical). This reached 90% for small number 
problems in Taskl which is unsurprising since the children were simply involved in a 
counting task as the concrete referents were visible throughout. However, there was 
still 50% success when hypothetical situations were used (TaskS and Task4). A 
significant number of children, around 25%, also succeeded on large number versions 
of these embedded tasks. However, very few children, only around 10-20%, 
succeeded when the task was phrased in formal code arithmetic whether for small or 
large number problems. Children were found to be more successful with small number 
problems than larger, and with addition than subtraction. Hughes' explanation was that 
although a child arrives at school with some early competence at simple addition and 
subtraction problems these skills are context-bound and cannot be expressed in the 
context-free code of arithmetic. The problem was viewed in terms of difficulty of 
making the 'translation' from one context to another rather than the Piagetian 
explanation of a logical cognitive deficit.
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Second, shifting to look at the Dias & Harris (1990) studies where a make-believe 
paradigm was used to cue children to use their imagination to override their natural 
empirical bias when reasoning systematically. In the first experiment of Dias & Harris 
(1990) 48 children, of four to ftve-and-a-half years, were divided into eight groups; 
four of which were prompted to use imagery (through making a picture in their head) 
and four of which were not. Each of these four imagery and non-imagery groups were 
assigned to either a 'make-believe setting' and/or 'dramatic intonation' condition or 
neither. The make-believe setting involved the children in pretending to be on a planet 
where everything was different prior to the presentation of the syllogisms. Those in 
the 'dramatic intonation' condition were introduced to the first and second premises of 
each syllogism with the experimenter modulating their voice for dramatic effect. The 
first part of the task involved the subjects in a warm-up task to help understand the use 
of imagery. The experimenter asked 'Can you tell me whether pigs fly l' After the 
child's response, the experimenter said 'Canyon make a picture in your head o f some 
pigs? Close your eyes and think about some pigs, OK? Now, make the pigs in your 
head start to fly. Canyon make them fly?’ The experimenter then asked a 
manipulation check question: 'Now, those pigs in your head, are they in the air or are 
they on the ground?' If the child's answer to this manipulation check was 'in the air' 
the experimenter moved on to state the first premise of the syllogism eg. All pigs fly, 
Alfie is a pig. Does Alfie fly? There were two measures of response - the reply to the 
syllogism and the justification given.
The results showed that all of the three cues improved performance when reasoning 
contrary to real-world knowledge. But the imagery prompt was found to produce 
significantly more correct responses to the syllogisms when compared to the 
'make-believe setting' or 'dramatic intonation' alone and also to yield the most correct 
theoretical justifications. Dias & Harris argued that the use of imagery resulted in a 
child's ability to suppress their dependence on real world knowledge when reasoning 
systematically. There was also evidence for an additive effect when imagery was 
presented together with the make-believe setting and dramatic intonation. A second 
experiment was undertaken to widen the age range to include six year olds with only
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the imagery prompt given thereby omitting the 'make-believe' setting and dramatic 
intonation conditions. It was found that six year olds generated more correct 
responses than five year olds, albeit this was not statistically significant. However, 
clear age differences emerged with regard to the justifications given with the six year 
olds able to state the logical necessity of the premises when compared to the younger 
children.
Turning to the research reported in this thesis, the experimental paradigm adopted was 
a partial replication of the Hughes (1981) study involving the use of some of his box 
tasks in the solution of addition and subtraction. The experimental design of the first 
investigation replicated three tasks from the original study: 'Box Closed’,
’HypotheticalBox’ and 'Formal Code’ as opposed to the original five tasks but with 
two independent groups - Imagery (those who were cued to use imagery when solving 
the arithmetic) and Hypothetical (those who did not receive the imagery instructions). 
The other two tasks from the original study - Taskl (Box Open) and Task4 
(Hypothetical Shop) - were omitted. The 'Box Open' task was simply a counting task 
and this investigation was concerned with mental arithmetic and cueing of imagery 
needed reference to previously seen concrete referents and therefore the 'Hypothetical 
Shop' was also omitted.
In the present experiment, therefore, there were three tasks and it was decided to use 
teddies instead of bricks. This was due to the suggested benefit of using natural kinds 
of analogies, instead of blocks, for teaching children arithmetic since young children 
already understand that pictures of animals represent the real thing eg. animals, fish 
etc. (Siegal & Smith 1990). Following on from this, Goswami (1992) suggests the use 
of toy animals instead of diennes blocks for teaching children number development. 
Moreover, teddies are familiar to children through their make-believe play.
Taskl (’Box Closed’)
Both groups. Imagery and Hypothetical, completed this task which provided a baseline 
performance for assessing the repeated measures effect of each successive task. The
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children could see the teddies going in and out of the box but needed to do mental 
arithmetic in the solution process as the lid was closed.
Taskl ('Hypothetical Box')
This involved the experimental manipulation where the Imagery group was cued to 
'make a picture in their heads' in addition to the contextual support afforded by the 
hypothetical context. The Hypothetical group received exactly same the instructions 
as the Hughes' study. Therefore, both groups were given the same referential context 
provided in the Hughes' study but instead the Imagery group was explicitly directed to 
use a specific strategy when solving the problems. The children did not see the 
teddies in this task and therefore if the children were using some kind of visual image 
the first task made the process easier.
Task3 ('Formal Code')
The Imagery group was given a minimal prompt to encourage them to draw on their 
previous imagery strategy when presented with the formal arithmetic. The premise 
being that if there proved to be beneficial effect of imagery in the hypothetical context 
this might enable 'translation' to take place when undertaking the problems presented in 
formal code. This manipulation was to provide the litmus test to verify if there was a 
difference between the groups in terms of any carry-over effects for the imagery 
prompt.
The Hughes (1981) findings would predict that the higher the level of contextual 
support the more successful the children will be at arithmetic thereby making Taskl 
('Box Closed') the easiest task, followed by Task2 ('Hypothetical Box') with TaskS 
('Formal Code') as the most difficult. It was also predicted that those children in the 
Imagery group, who were offered an explicit strategy for solving the problems, would 
be more successful than the Hypothetical group at solving the problems both in Task2 
and Tasks where no explicit prompt was given.
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The Hughes study had tested 3 to 5 year old children, while the Dias & Harris (1990) 
findings were for 4 to 6 year olds. It was therefore decided to test children of 4 to 5 
years. This was to balance the arithmetical demands of the tasks together with those 
of cueing imagery. The sample was divided into two age groups - those in pre-school 
and those in their first term of Infant School. It was predicted that the school-age 
children would outperform the pre-school children. The problems used were the same 
as the Hughes (1981) study apart from the omission of'1-T. This was in consideration 
of the errors young children make due to the difficulties with questions involving zero 
(Hughes 1986) and in order to balance the size of problem (small v large) and type of 
problem (addition v subtraction) to four so as to provide ANOVA statistical analysis in 
terms of problem-size and problem-type comparisons. The pre-schoolers only received 
the small problems since piloting found that many could not answer any of the large 
number problems and became dispirited. The order of the problems was kept constant, 
replicating Hughes. It was predicted that small number problems would be answered 
more successfully than the larger problems (Cowan 1979, Gelman & Gallistel 1978, 
Young & McPherson 1976, Hughes 1981) and also that addition problems would be 
answered more successfully than subtraction (Klein & Starkey 1988).
2.2 METHOD
Subjects
All subjects used throughout the research reported in this thesis were from a broadly 
middle class background. Fifteen Infant Schools and four playgroups were used within 
a 7 mile radius of Walton-on-Thames.
For this first experiment, one hundred and thirty one children (N=131), 67 girls and 64 
boys aged 4 to 5 years acted as subjects. Sixty-six attended local pre-school 
playgroups and sixty-five were in their first term at an Infant school. The children 
were divided into two age groups: 'Pre-school (from playgroups), aged 4:0 - 4:9 
years with a mean of 4:4 years (n=66) and 'SchoolAge’vAio were in their first term of
51
Infant school, aged from 4:10 - 5:2years with a mean of 5:0 years (n=65). The 
Pre-school group comprised 30 boys and 36 girls and the School Age group comprised 
34 boys and 31 girls. None of the children had received any formal school training in 
addition and subtraction at school. Within their designated age groups, the children 
were randomly allocated to the Imagery (n=67) or Hypothetical group (n=64) 
balancing for sex.
Table 2.2.1
Mean age in months (standard deviation) by age and group
Group Pre-school School Age
Imagery
Hypothetical
51.8(2.5) (n=33) 
52.5 (2.6) (n=33)
60.0(1.1) (n=34) 
60.0(1.4) (n=31)
Materials
A square box (26cm x 26cm x 12cm) fitted with a lid; 8 small teddy bears in a sitting 
position; a score sheet for each child (shown at Appendix 1.2). At the beginning of 
the tasks all 8 teddy bears were arranged in the box seated around the edge. The 
following picture shows the teddies and the box.
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Procedure
All subjects throughout this research were tested individually by the author. After a 
brief familiarisation period the child was shown a box with the 8 small teddy bears 
inside arranged in a sitting position. All experiments involved the child in solving a 
pre-designated number of simple addition and subtraction problems. All experiments 
shared an identical Taskl (Box Closed) condition which was an exact replication from 
the Hughes (1981) study. Throughout each experiment all sample instructions for 
addition and subtraction problems are outlined for problem T+T and '2-1' respectively. 
All children were given a pre-test of counting to eight using one-to-one 
correspondence. Failure to complete this resulted in their exclusion from the 
experiment.
For this experiment each of the three tasks was given in order Taskl, Task2 and Task3 
and was completed consecutively at one sitting. Each task consisted of the following 
number problems.
Small number: i+ i, 2-1,1+2, 3-2
Large number: 5+1, 6+2, 8-1, 7-2
The children completed the problems in the same order as set out above (beginning 
with small number problems and following on to large number problems)."%he 
younger age group completed only the small number problems as already explained in 
the Introduction. The problems were presented and answered verbally.
TASK 1 - BOX CLOSED (Both groups)
*The Experimenter started with one teddy in the box, visible to the child and then 
closed the lid. She then added one more teddy to the box in such a way that the child 
was able to see her adding the teddy but could not see how many teddies were in the . 
box altogether. As the teddy was added, the experimenter said, 'Now I'm putting one 
more teddy in the box. How many teddies are in the box now?' For subtraction 
problems, the child was first shown the number of teddies in the box eg. two for the
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problem 2-1, and then saw the experimenter taking one of the teddies out but could 
not see how many teddies remained in the box. As the teddy was taken out the 
experimenter said, 'Now I'm taking one o f the teddies out o f the box. How many 
teddies are left in the box now?' *
*..* taken from Hughes (1981) 'Can Pre-school Children Add and Subtract?'
TASK 2 - HYPOTHETICAL BOX 
Imagery Group
The teddies and the box were put aside and the child was asked to close their eyes and 
make a mental image of a teddy as follows+: 'Let's pretend. Can you make a picture 
o f the teddies in your head? Close your eyes and think about the teddies. Ok, now 
make the teddies sit down around the table as we saw them in the box'. The 
Experimenter then asked a manipulation check question to verify that the child 
understood and was able to make a picture in their heads: 'Those teddies in your head 
- are they sitting or standing?' If the child replied 'standing' the process was repeated. 
In order to proceed to solving the problems the child had to reply that they were 
'sitting'. The child was then asked: 'Can you see one teddy', on receiving an 
affirmative reply, he/she was asked 'if one more teddy comes along, how many are 
there now?'. For subtraction problems, the verbal instructions were of the form: 'Can 
you see two teddies', on receiving an affirmative reply, the child is asked i f  one goes 
away, how many are left?'.
+ the instructions to the child to make a mental image of the teddies were taken from 
Dias & Harris (1990) 'The Influence o f the Imagination on Reasoning by Youngs 
Children'.
Hypothetical Group
The experimenter put the teddies and box aside and asked: I f  there was one teddy in 
the box and I  put one more in, how many teddies would be in the box altogether?' 
For subtraction problems these followed the format of asking 'If there were two teddies 
in the box and I  took one out, how many would be left?' These instructions followed 
(exactly) Hughes' instructions for the Hypothetical Box Task.
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TASK 3 - FORMAL CODE 
Imagery Group
Children were asked formal code problems as follows: 'What does one and one 
make?' For subtraction problems: eg. 2-1, 'What does two take away one make?' 
Prior to being given the first problem (1+1) the children were cued to remember their 
teddies. {'Canyou remember those teddies?').
Hypothetical Group
Children were simply asked formal code problems, with no prompts, as follows: 'What 
does one and one make?' For subtraction problems: eg. 2-1, 'What does two take 
away one make?'
TREATMENT OF RESULTS
Throughout the whole research reported in this thesis all the children were given a 
score of 1 for each correct response and 0 for each incorrect response on each task 
presented. Results were analysed using a Mixed ANOVA design on each subject's 
total task score which involved summing the number of correct responses. All 
ANOVAS were run initially to test for any sex effects and as there were none sex was 
pooled when reporting the results. The Mixed ANOVAs had group and age as 
between-subject factors and task and type (addition v subtraction) as within-subject 
factors. Experiment 1 also had 'size' (small v large number problems) as a 
within-subjects factor. Planned comparisons were carried out on significant main 
effects and significant two-way interactions involving group by age and group by task. 
All Source of Variation tables for each experiment are shown in the Appendices.
2.3 RESULTS
All the children were given a score of 1 for each correct response and 0 for each 
incorrect response on each of the 3 tasks (Taskl, Task2 and Task3). A sample score 
sheet is at Appendix 1.2. Therefore for small number problems the maximum correct 
response score was 4 and the minimum 0 and for both large and small number 
problems the maximum correct response score was 8 and the minimum 0 thereby 
producing a total possible range of scores from 0 to 8.
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SMALL NUMBER PROBLEMS
All children, Pre-school and School Age, (N=131) completed the small number
problems, whereas only the School Age group completed large number problems.
Therefore, the analysis for small number problems was treated separately. A 3-way
ANOVA was carried out on the subjects' total correct scores with age (2) and group
(2) as between-subjects factors and task (3) as a within-subjects factor. The mean
total number of correct responses by group, age and task are shown in Table 2.3.1 and
illustrated in Fig 2.3.1. The Source of Variation tables are shown at Appendix 1.3. 
Table 2.3.1
Experiment 1
Mean correct responses (out of 4) for each task by age and group
(standard deviation in brackets)
Imagery = Imag; Hypothetical = Hypo; N=131
Pre-school School Age
Imag (n=33) Hypo (n=33) Imag (n=34) Hypo(n=3T
Taskl 3.42(0.83) 3.58(0.71) 3.68 (0.59) 3.61(0.67)
Task2 2.33(1.43) 2.79(1.34) 3.50 (0.93) 2.45(1.29)
Tasks 2.03(1.19) 1.64(0.96) 2.65(1.30) 1.87(1.18)
lug 2.3.1 Mean correct responses (out of 4) for each task by age and group
N=131
Pre-school' scores are at the front o f the chart and 'School Age' at the back.
Task 1 Task 2 Task 3
Hypo B  Imagery
There was a significant main effect of group (F=4.83, df=l, 127 p<0.05) in the 
predicted direction with the Imagery group performing better than the Hypothetical
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overall. Age was also significant (F=6.68 df=l,127 p<0.05) with the School Age
gaining higher scores than the Pre-school. There was also a highly significant
interaction of age and group (F=7.58 df=l,127 p<0.01) shown at Fig 2.3.2, with
School Age children in the Imagery group doing significantly better than those in the
Hypothetical (Fisher's LSD post-test t=2.06 df=l,127 p<0.025) but with no significant
difference between the Pre-school Imagery and Hypothetical groups.
Fig 2.3.2
Experiment 1
N=131 Interaction of age by group
3.4
3.2
S 2.8
2.6
2.4 -------HypothMical
Pre-school School Age
As far as within-subject factors were concerned, there was a highly significant effect of 
task (F=82.66 df=2,254 p<0.001). Planned orthogonal contrasts were carried out on 
task and it was found that: there was a significant difference between Taskl and 
Task2 (F=I55.31 df= 1,127 p<0.001) and this was in the predicted direction with 
Taskl scores being higher than those for Task 2; there was also a significant difference 
between Task 2 and Task 3 (F=31.50 df=l,127 p<0.001) and this again was in the 
predicted direction with Task 2 scores being higher than those for Task 3. There was 
a significant interaction of group and task (F=3.51 df=2,254 p<0.05) shown at 
Fig 2.3.3. The planned comparisons using Fisher's LSD post-test showed the Imagery 
group gaining significantly more correct responses than the Hypothetical group in both 
Task2 (t=1.76 df=l,254 p<0.05) and Task3 (t=3.41 df=l,254 p<0.001). A significant 
three-way interaction of age, group and task also emerged (F=4.35 df=2,254 p<0.05). 
This was reflected in the high performance of the School Age Imagery group in Tasks2
57
and 3 relative to the Pre-School Imagery group and the Hypothetical children. None 
of the other interactions was significant.
Fig 2.3.3
Experiment 1
N=131
Interaction of group by task
3.5
5 2.5
Imagery Hypo
LARGE AND SMALL NUMBER PROBLEMS
Only the School Age (N=65) completed both large and small number problems. A 4- 
way ANOVA was carried out with group (2) as the between-subject factor and task
(3), type (2) (addition v subtraction) and size (2) (small v large) as within-subject 
factors. The mean number of correct responses are shown at Table 2.3.2 and Source 
of Variation tables at Appendix 1.3.
Table 2.3.2 Experiment 1
Mean correct responses (out of 8) for each task by group
(standard deviations in brackets)
N=65
Imagery (n=34) Hypothetical (n=31)
Taskl 6.03(1.42) 5.87(1.67)
Task2 5.94 (2.06) 4.13 (2.47)
Tasks 4.68 (2.61) 3.39 (2.19)
All the main effects were significant. The effect for group (F=5.96 df=l,63 p<0.05) 
was in the predicted direction with the Imagery group doing better overall than the
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Hypothetical group. For within-subject factors there was a highly significant effect of 
task (F=31.94 df=2,126 p<0.001). Planned orthogonal contrasts showed a significant 
difference between Taskl and Task2 (F=49.13, df=l,63 p<0.001) with Taskl scores 
being significantly higher than those for Task2, and between Task2 and Task3 
(F= 16.55 df=l,63 p<0.001) with Task2 scores being higher than Task3. There was 
also a significant interaction of group and task (F=6.20 df=2,126 p<0.01) shown at Fig
2.3.4 with again the planned comparisons using Fisher's LSD post-test showing the 
Imagery group scoring significantly more correct responses than the Hypothetical 
group in both Task2 (t=10.65 df=l,126 p<0.001) and Task3 (t=7.59 df=l,126
p<0.001).
Fig 2.3.4
Experiment 1 
Interaction of group and task (N=65)
6.5
5.5
2  4.5
3.5
Imagery Hypo
There was a significant effect of type (F=25.01 df=l,63 p<0.001) with the addition 
problems being more correctly answered than subtraction as expected. Subtraction 
scores were lower on all tasks than addition scores with a marked difference between 
Task2 and Task3. There was a significant effect of size (F=54.71 df=l,63 p<0.001) 
with small number problems gaining more correct responses than large number 
problems. The mean number of correct responses by type and size are shown at Table 
2.3.3.
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Table 2.3.3
Experiment 1
Means (out of 4) for each task by group, type and size
Imagery = Imag; Hypothetical = Hypo; N=65
TYPE SIZE
Addition Subtraction Large Small
Imag(Hypo) Imag(Hypo) Imag(Hypo) Imag(Hypo)
Taskl 3.17(2.94) 2.85(2.94) 2.35(2.26) 3.67(3.62]
Taskl 3.15(2.45) 2.80(1.68) 2.44(1.68) 3.51(2.45]
Tasks 2.65(2.20) 2.03(1.20) 2.00(1.52) 2.68(1.88]
In addition, there was a significant interaction of task and size (F=9.96 df=2,126 
p<0.001) shown at Fig 2.3.5 with small number problems gaining successively less 
correct responses on Task2 and Task3 when compared to Taskl and large number 
problems scoring a similar level of success on all three tasks. There was also a 
significant interaction of task and type (F=6.79 df=2,126 p<0.01) shown at Fig 2.3.6 
with performance on subtraction problems worse than addition for all tasks and a 
larger differential performance between subtraction than addition on Task2 and Task3. 
Fig 2.3.5
Experiment 1 
Interaction of task by size (N=65)
4
3.5
<g 3 
S 2.5
2
1.5 Task2
Small Large
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Fig 2.3.6 Experiment 1 
Interaction of task by type (N=65)
3.5
2.5
Add Subtract
Finally, the analysis showed a significant three way interaction of task by type by size 
(F=3.84 df=2,126 p<0.05). This was attributable to more correct responses within 
Task2 than Task3 for small number subtraction problems when compared with other 
type and size problems. A table of the mean total number of correct responses by task, 
type and size is shown at Appendix 1.4.
PROBLEM ANALYSIS
In order to look more closely at the group effects an analysis was carried out at the 
individual problem level. A 3-way ANOVA with group (2) and age (2) as 
between-subjects factors and task (3) as a within-subjects factor was carried out for 
small number problems (T+T, T+2', '2-1', '3-2'). For school age children a 2-way 
ANOVA was carried out with group (2) as a between-subject factor and task (3) as a 
within-subjects factor on large number problems ('5+1', '6+2', '8-1', '7-2'). All Source 
of Variation tables are at Appendix 1.5 together with the means at Appendix 1.6.
There was a significant group effect for problems '2-1' (F=5.45 df^l,127 ?<0.05) and 
'3-2' (F=7.00 df=l,127 P<0.01). This reflected better performance of the Imagery 
group over Hypothetical. Although there were no significant group effects for the large 
number problems, it can be seen from the means that the Imagery group performed 
better than Hypothetical in subtraction for '8-1' and '7-2'.
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Summary of Results
There was a significant positive impact of cueing the use of imagery in the solution of 
arithmetic when compared with hypothetical contextual support, with the school age 
children being more sensitive to the prompt than the pre-school. Overall the school 
age children did better than the pre-school. There was a main effect of task with 
Taskl gaining significantly more correct responses than Task2, which in turn 
generated higher scores than TaskS, when problems were presented in the formal code. 
Addition problems yielded more correct responses than subtraction, although there 
was evidence that the imagery prompt was helping particularly with the subtraction 
problems. Small number problems were more easily answered than the larger ones.
2.4 DISCUSSION
While young children can perform simple addition and subtraction problems with 
specific objects and hypothetical events they have been found to have great difficulty 
solving these problems when phrased in formal code arithmetic (Hughes 1981). The 
aim of this investigation was to examine whether the use of imagery, which has been 
found to have a beneficial effect on logical reasoning by young children (Dias & Harris 
1988, 1990) could help children when doing arithmetic. Significant findings were 
reported in terms of experimental effect, age, problem-type and problem-size.
The key results were those that related to the experimental effect: the cue to use 
imagery when solving the arithmetic problems. In both analyses of small number 
problems and small and large number problems, the children in the Imagery group 
gained significantly more correct responses over all three tasks relative to the 
Hypothetical group. The group by task interaction on both sets of analyses showed 
the beneficial effect of the experimental manipulation relative to hypothetical in Task2. 
Furthermore, this effect was found to generalise to the same problems phrased in 
formal code arithmetic. The results from the analysis of all eight problem^ undertaken 
by the older children only, together with the significant age effect found on the small 
number problems, suggested that the imagery prompt was particularly sensitive to the
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older age children. This supported the findings of Dias & Harris (1990) for four to six 
year olds, when it was found that the older performed better than younger, albeit this 
was only in terms of the justifications they could give for their answers to the 
syllogisms. The overriding question was whether a combination of imagery together 
with hypothetical context improved performance or whether this simply reflected older 
children being better at using imagery. The fact that older children do better than 
younger is in line with Hughes' findings that number development is proceeding rapidly 
between the ages of four and five years suggesting that this period should not be 
viewed as a more or less homogeneous stage in developmental terms and in turn 
suggests that Piaget (1952) underestimated a child's cognitive ability. Furthermore, 
imagery is a purely mental strategy, albeit based on a concretised image, as opposed to 
a simple counting strategy using physical objects, which made the findings even more 
striking. There was no interaction of group and size or group and type hinting that 
the imagery instructions were not specifically impacting on small as opposed to large 
problems or addition as opposed to subtraction.
As far as task effects were concerned both groups of children, Imagery and 
Hypothetical, performed at a similar level in the baseline Taskl (Box Closed). This 
showed little difference in basic number competence between the two groups and acted 
as a good baseline of performance. Although the children were pre-tested for counting 
ability the fact that the children had received no prior formal school instruction in 
addition and subtraction makes these results significant. It showed that young children 
can carry out simple operations with number. However, this kind of evidence does not 
necessarily indicate that the conceptual invariants underlying addition and subtraction 
were understood. Over all three tasks there was a significant task effect on both small 
and large number problems in the predicted direction which reflected the level of 
contextual support that each task provided. Where there was a concrete setting in 
Taskl involving the real teddy bears, children attained more correct scores than when 
given hypothetical problems about the teddies in Task2. Performance was lowest when 
problems were posed without reference to the teddies at all (TaskS Formal code). 
These findings supported those of Hughes who found that children were the most
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competent where they could see everything in his first task, and still showed a high 
scoring level when the problems were presented with contextual support within 
hypothetical scenarios, but could not translate this competence when faced with the 
same problems presented in formal code arithmetic. Unlike Hughes, in this experiment 
the task effect was also sensitive to the imagery-prompt presented at the same time as 
the hypothetical context, thus adding to previous findings for beneficial effects of 
contextual support (Donaldson, 1978; Hughes, 1981).
The main aspect of this experiment was that there was an overall group effect of 
cueing the use of imagery in the solution of arithmetic. It is not possible to say at this 
stage by what exact mechanism the experimental effect was working, whether directly 
or indirectly. Further research is needed to unpack this since there was minimal 
evidence for what strategy the children were actually using. There are three possible 
explanations are as follows:
First, imagery may have a direct influence with children doing exactly as instructed and 
forming a mental image of the teddies to represent the absent ones. This may be by 
literally making a picture of the teddies and anecdotal evidence from this experiment 
reported a child actually doing this by making an image of a teddy 'wearing an orange 
top and yellow skirt'. Alternatively, the children may make their own mental model to 
represent the numbers in the problems. If this were the case it is the 'visual' prompt 
which was critical and not the teddies themselves. The tendency for children to trust 
visual cues rather than counting in the standard conservation of number task is well 
documented (Michie 1984, Cowan 1987b, Fuson 1991). In this way the visual 
representation may act as an additional representational tool perhaps facilitating a 
subitizing process and/or verbal counting. In which case the findings would support 
the claims of Estes et al (1989) that young children can construct mental images when 
asked to do so and they can report accurately on their use of such imagery as 
illustrated by the number of correct responses given by the children to these problems. 
Use of the imagination is therefore seen again as much more than simply a device for 
escaping from reality and points to its versatility and powerfulness as a tool in a child's
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thinking across differing cognitive domains (Hawkins et al 1984, Dias & Harris 1988, 
1990). Moreover this fiarther underpins the Hughes (1981) findings for children 
arriving at school with arithmetical skills which are context-bound with the 
effectiveness of imagery-prompt improving performance in relation to the hypothetical 
context. This pinpoints the sensitivity of young children in terms of the particular kind 
of contextual support offered in hypothetical situations.
A second explanation is that children show improved performance due to the 
imagery-prompt work indirectly by perhaps blocldng an inappropriate strategy or 
motivating the child to be strategic as opposed to astrategic. In a similar way to the 
findings of Dias & Harris (1988, 1990) for deductive reasoning, where children 
adjusted their default setting to suppress their empirical bias thereby freeing themselves 
to reason fi*om premises that contradicted their known reality. When solving 
arithmetic, using imageiy may have allowed children to suppress an inappropriate 
strategy. It is difficult to answer this without knowing more about the nature of 
children's spontaneous strategies in solving mental arithmetic which was addressed in 
future experimentation. It is also not possible to say at what level of processing this 
suppression might impact: at a surface level thereby allowing children to directly 
model the problem, using a 'key word' process (Briars & Larkin 1984) based on 
syntactic structure, or at a deeper level, thereby either prompting a more accurate 
choice of counting strategy. Furthermore, it may have worked indirectly by giving the 
children increased confidence, if the cue to use imagery agreed with their own strategy 
choice (Bryant 1982, Cowan et al 1993).
A third possibility is that success was a by-product of some other aspect of the task 
instructions other than the imagery-prompt. First, the use of teddies may have 
increased motivation or allowed children to understand the purpose of the task and the 
intentions of the experimenter, thence allowing them to know when it was necessary to 
apply their knowledge (Bryant 1985). Although Hughes (1981) used bricks in his ' 
study it was decided in this research that teddies might be more sensitive for cueing the 
children to use their imagination, through their own experience in play and also Siegal
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& Smith (1990) had suggested children benefiting from being shown natural kinds of 
representations when learning analogy. Moreover, the use of familiar toys in previous 
research has already demonstrated that children were more able to make sense of the 
standard number conservation task when a 'naughty teddy' was introduced to spread 
out the counters in the array (McGarrigle & Donaldson 1975), than when compared to 
the results of a classic Piagetian task. A follow-up experiment of a comparison 
between bricks v teddies, whilst cueing the use of imagery, will seek to unpack 
whether success for the imagery prompt is merely a by-product of using teddies.
Secondly, the instruction that children should make an image in their head, with their 
eyes closed, may have enhanced concentration for the Imagery group in Task2 and 
Tasks. Perhaps through closing their eyes, the children were able to shut out any 
extraneous 'noise' in order to choose the most effective strategy or in order to make a 
more accurate computation. The experimental instructions, including asking the 
children to close their eyes, followed those of Dias & Harris (1990) where the degree 
to which a child did or did not close their eyes was not controlled. In this experiment 
it was found that some of the children were distracted by the prompt. Further 
investigation is needed to look at this aspect of the procedure both to assess its relative 
importance, if any, so as to eliminate any possible confounding factor.
As far as the rest of the results of this investigation were concerned there was a 
significant age difference, which supported Hughes (1981) claim that even within a 
fairly narrow age range (14 months) significant differences on small number problems 
were still found. This suggests quite marked developmental changes in children's 
understanding about number in the pre-school years and adds weight to claims by 
Gelman & Gallistel (1978) and others that number competence does not require formal 
school training and develops in early childhood (Fuson 1988, Cowan 1991, Baroody 
1992, Nunes & Bryant 1996).
Previous findings for problem-size effects were supported in that children find large 
number more difficult than small number problems (eg.Gelman & Gallistel, 1978;
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Ashcraft & Battaglia, 1978; Cowan, 1979; Hughes, 1981, 1986; Ashcraft, 1995, 
Nunes et al 1996; Nunes, Schlieman et Carraher 1993) Although this is unsurprising, 
the degree to which this represents different underlying cognitive abilities is of interest.
One suggestion is that young children quantify small number arrays by subitizing (eg. 
Klahr 1973, Starkey & Cooper 1995). Subitizing is the direct visual apprehension of a 
given numerosity. The effect of directly invoking the use of a visual representation 
through asking a child 'to make a picture o f the teddies in their head’ might have made 
subitizing even more effective for small number problems. Perhaps this process was 
used on the smaller problems (1+1, 2-1, 1+2, 3-2) since they did not include numbers 
more than three, whereas the larger numbers, all involving numbers above five, 
required verbal counting. The evidence from the present study cannot answer this 
question directly but does confirm the relative difficulty of large numbers.
Another explanation is that small numbers are learned before larger ones as children 
learn and practise counting from one. This would support the findings of Gelman & 
Gallistel (1978) in terms counting ability where children learn to count from one and 
have lots of practice of smaller numbers before moving on to larger ones. Nunes et al 
1996 also found when investigating the British numeration system that young children 
learn their understanding of the additive composition of number from small numbers 
and then apply this knowledge meaningfully to larger numbers.
Looking at problem-type effects, the fact that addition is easier than subtraction is well 
established in the literature (eg. Hughes, 1981, 1986, Fuson 1988, Klein & Starkey 
1988) The interesting aspect is whether they are solved differently. The problems 
presented in these tasks in terms of semantic structure were of the easiest ’change’ 
(Carpenter & Moser 1983) involving one quantity simply being transformed to another 
by adding to it or subtracting from it. According to Hughes, there are no a priori 
grounds for thinking that addition is likely to be easier than subtraction, seemingly it is 
just as hard to add elements to an image as to subtract. This seems plausible when 
using direct modelling strategies with concrete referents, since items are moved away
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and the process simply requires counting the remaining items which is the same for 
addition. However, when using mental arithmetic in subtraction, which was required 
in these tasks, it was necessary to count down from the minuend to the subtraend or 
count up from the subtraend to the minuend. The counting on process was therefore 
likely to be easier than the counting down process in that a child would have more 
experience of counting up the number scale than counting down and counting forwards 
is easier than going backwards. Therefore, when doing mental arithmetic, addition 
would be easier than subtraction. Although there was no type by group effect the 
imagery-prompt markedly improved performance on subtraction problems in Task2. It 
could be that an imagery-prompt made subitizing more efficient for small number 
problems, as already discussed, or it could be the effect was working at the margin of 
competence facilitating the increased complexity demanded in subtraction problems.
In summary, a significant positive impact of using imagery in the solution of simple 
addition and subtraction problems was found with school age children performing 
better than pre-school. Evidence pointed to the experimental effect being the most 
sensitive on the more difficult problems, particularly subtraction. It may be that the 
significant changes in a child's thinking is their ability to understand the demands of the 
task as opposed to the acquisition of numerical skills (Cowan 1991) and when to apply 
these skills (Greeno et al 1984, Bryant 1985). There were a number of areas to follow 
up in terms of unpacking how the experimental effect, of cueing the use of imagery, 
was working. The powerful effect demonstrated by the imagery prompt was 
particularly sensitive to age with older children being more facilitated by this type of 
prompt. Given the relatively small age range of the sample pointed to following up 
this developmental trend through exploring an older age range of children up to nearly 
six years old. This picks up on Dias & Harris (1990) follow-up experiment testing 
children up to six years of age. Methodologically, it was also necessary to look at the 
procedural aspect concerning the additional prompt of asking the children to close 
their eyes, as opposed to keeping them open, when using imagery to solve the 
arithmetic.
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CHAPTERS
Experiment 2
The effectiveness of imagery: developmental and task presentation effects
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The rationale behind this second investigation was to explore the powerfulness of the 
imagery-prompt in terms of any developmental trend since the first experiment had 
shown the school age children to be more sensitive to the use of imagery than the 
pre-schoolers. These findings together with the age differences reported by Dias & 
Harris (1990) pointed to the usefulness of following up this developmental aspect 
when trying to unpack how the success children achieve in a hypothetical context may 
be working. It is clear that older children are better at arithmetic than younger shown 
from the baseline Taskl testing. But the more significant difference in impact of the 
imagery-prompt for the school-age children, compared to pre-schoolers, cannot be 
accounted for, by simply alluding to their enhanced numerical competence through 
being older since the hypothetical group of the same age made more errors. Therefore, 
it was decided to test another group of children who were in their first term at Infant 
school, who formed the 'younger' group, with an 'older' group consisting of children in 
their second and third terms of Infant School who were around five-and-a-half years 
old. However, it was acknowledged that unlike the younger age these older children 
would have received some basic school instruction in addition and subtraction and the 
choice of problems needed to take this into account. According to the Dias & Harris 
findings, it was predicted that the older group of children would be likely to be even 
more sensitive to the imagery prompt than the younger who displayed such sensitivity 
in the first experiment. The same experimental design was used as in Experiment 1 
with two independent groups - 'Imagery' and 'HypotheticaX. Following on from the 
findings from the first experiment, it was predicted that the Imagery group would gain 
significantly more correct responses than the Hypothetical.
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In addition to following up the developmental aspect, the second aim of this 
investigation was to address a methodological issue arising from the design of the first 
experiment which had followed the Dias & Harris (1990) instructions for cueing 
imagery with eyes closed. In the previous study how, and for how long, children chose 
to 'close their eyes' was not controlled. Some children opted to put their hands over 
their eyes and some children were clearly distracted by the instruction. In the original 
Dias & Harris (1990) study no comment was made as to the outcome of children 
closing their eyes. It was, therefore, necessary to discount any possible confounding 
which may have arisen through the inconsistency with which this instruction was 
implemented and at the same time explore whether the success of the imagery-prompt 
was attributable to any attentional enhancement resulting from having eyes closed. 
Comparatively little research has looked specifically at effectiveness for visual imagery 
with 'eyes closed' as opposed to 'eyes open' but no difference was found by Narchal & 
Broota (1988) when testing young adults. Therefore, the aim in the current 
investigation was to compare the use of imagery in the solution of arithmetic with 'eyes 
open' as opposed to 'eyes closed'. This also necessitated inclusion of testing the 
hypothetical instructions with 'eyes closed' to negate any positive impact being a result 
of simply closing eyes. To this end, half the children from each experimental group 
(imagery and hypothetical) were randomly allocated to an 'eyes open' condition with 
the other half to an 'eyes closed' condition thereby making four groups in all: Imagery 
(eyes open and eyes closed) and Hypothetical (eyes open and eyes closed). If the 
findings from the first experiment were attributable to the powerfulness of imagery 
itself, as opposed to the additive effect of'closing eyes' combined with imagery, it was 
predicted that there would be no difference between the two imagery groups. On the 
other hand, if success was attributable to simply the attentional enhancement of closing 
eyes this would result in all those children with 'eyes closed', both imagery and 
hypothetical, gaining significantly higher scores than 'eyes open'.
A third consideration centred around the choice of arithmetic problems. Owing to the 
older sample of children in this investigation, it was necessary to increase the difficulty 
of the arithmetic problems to include the addition and subtraction of 'three'. In the
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first experiment the most difficult computation was the addition and subtraction of 
'two'. This was a key design factor since the findings thus far for the beneficial effect of 
imagery on subtraction problems suggest that imagery may be particularly effective on 
problems children find more difficult. Moreover, the problems used in this experiment 
were also to be kept constant, throughout each successive experiment in this research 
project, to allow comparison between each different strategic prompt. As a result of 
piloting, ten problems, instead of eight, were used with five addition and five 
subtraction. This increased the cell-size for statistical analysis of problem-type. The 
problems were:'1+1', '2-1', '1+2', '3-2', '2+3', '4-3', '5+2', '6-2', '6+1', '7-1'. None 
of these problems involve numbers or computations of over 8 allowing the pre-test of 
counting to eight to continue as a yardstick for subject eligibility, with the most 
difficult problems in the middle of the series and some easier ones at the end. The small 
number problems of '1+1', '2-1', '1+2', '3-2' were those from Experiment 1 but all the 
remaining problems were different in order to discount success being attributable to 
the property of any particular problem. The choice of '2+3', '4-3' for the problems 
involving a computation of'three' only dealt with numbers under five. The order of 
presentation of the ten problems was kept constant for each child thereby following the 
design of Hughes (1981) and the previous experiment. This also allowed 
between-group comparisons with each successive prompt to be investigated in 
subsequent experiments.
Piloting also suggested a minor design modification be made to the imagery-prompt 
instructions. The instructions to cue the imagery-prompt through asking children 'to 
make a picture in their heads remained the same' but the wording used for each 
arithmetic problem was modified to be directly comparable to the Hypothetical group 
instructions. This was to discount any effectiveness of imagery being a by-product of 
the difference in understanding of the wording of each computation.
In summary, this second experiment included two age groups: 'younger' and 'older' 
and four groups: 'Imagery' v 'Hypothetical {eyes closed v eyes open). Unlike 
Experiment 1 there were only two tasks: Taskl (Box Closed) followed by Task2
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(Hypothetical Box). The formal code post-test used in the first experiment was 
omitted owing to the increased number of problems being used. The following 10 
problems already outlined were presented to each child in the same order. Taskl was 
completed by all four groups which provided baseline performance with Task2 where 
the experimental manipulations took place. In line with previous findings, it was 
predicted that Taskl would generate more correct responses than Task2 owing to the 
enhanced contextual support. Assessment of problem-type effects was analysed 
through an Individual Problem Analysis owing to the increased number of 
between-subject factors of group, age and condition (eyes closed v eyes open) and the 
difficulty of interpreting interactions from a 5-way ANOVA. However, in contrast to 
the first experiment the Individual Problem Analyses from this experiment, and each 
subsequent investigation, will be laid out in a separate chapter after all the empirical 
work has been reported so as to give a clear interpretation of each problem across each 
different strategic prompt.
3.2 METHOD
Subjects
Two hundred and forty-one children (N=241), 127 girls and 114 boys aged 4 to 5 
years acted as subjects. All attended Infant school with 120 being in their first term and 
121 in their second and third terms of the Reception class. The children were divided 
into two age groups: ’Younger\ those in their first term, aged 4:9 - 5:2yrs with a mean 
of 4:1 lyrs (n=120) and 'Older', those in their second and third terms, aged 5:3 - 
5:9yrs with a mean of 5:5yrs (n=121). The younger group comprised 55 boys and 65 
girls and the older comprised 59 boys and 62 girls.
Within their designated age groups the children were randomly allocated to each of 
the four groups: Hypothetical (Eyes open) (n=59) and Hypothetical (Eyes closed) 
(n=63) and Imagery (Eyes open) (n==58) and Imagery (Eyes closed) (n=61).
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Table 3.2.1
Mean age in months (standard deviation) by group and condition
N=241
Group (condition) Younger Older
Hypothetical (Eyes open) 
Hypothetical (Eyes closed) 
Imagery (Eyes open) 
Imagery (Eyes closed)
59.0(1.4) (n=28) 
59.5(1.3) (n-33) 
59.2(1.4) (n=28) 
59.0(1.4) (n=31)
65.1 (2.6) (n=31) 
65.3 (2.8) (n=30)
65.2 (2.3) (n=30) 
65.7 (2.4) (n=30)
Procedure
The materials of the teddies and the box were the same as those used in the first 
experiment for this and each subsequent experiment. The score sheet is shown at 
Appendix 2.1. After completing the pre-test of counting to eight using one-to-one 
correspondence the child was introduced to the notion of'playing a game to help do 
some sums'. Each of the two tasks was given in order Taskl followed by Task2 and 
was completed at one sitting consisting of the following 10 number problems:
'1+1', '2-1', '1+2', '3-2', '2+3', '4-3','5+2', '6-2', '6+1', '7-1'
Each child completed the problems in the same order as set out above beginning with 
'1+r and finishing with '7-1'. The problems were presented and answered verbally. 
The author is the Experimenter throughout the experiment.
TASKl - BOX CLOSED (All groups)
Taskl was identical for all four group and the instructions are shown in Experiment 1 
on page 53.
TASK2 - HYPOTHETICAL BOX 
Hypothetical (Eyes Open)
The Experimenter put the teddies and box aside and said: 'If there was one teddy in 
the box and we put one more in, how many teddies would be in the box altogether?' 
For subtraction problems 'If there were two teddies in the box and I  took one out, how 
many would be left?' These instructions were exactly the same as those for 
Experiment 1 for the Hypothetical group.
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Hypothetical (Eyes Closed)
The Experimenter put the teddies and box aside and said that for this part of the task 
they need to closer their eyes. 'Can you close your eyes for me whilst I  ask you some 
questions?' The instructions then followed exactly those for the Hypothetical (Eyes 
open).
Imagery (Eyes Open)
The teddies and the box are put aside and the child is asked to make a mental image of 
a teddy as follows: ' Let's pretend. Can you can you make a picture o f the teddies in 
your head? Think about the teddies. Ok, now make your teddies sit down as we saw 
they did in the box'. *The Experimenter then asked a manipulation check question to 
verify that the child understood and was able to make a picture in their heads: 'Those 
teddies in your head - are they sitting or standing?' If the child replied 'standing' the 
process was repeated. In order to proceed to solving the problems the child had to 
reply that they were 'sitting'. The Experimenter then said 'Let'spretend that there is 
one teddy in the box, i f  we put one more in, how many are there altogether now?' For 
subtraction problems, the verbal instructions were of the form: Let's pretend that 
there are two teddies in the box, i f  we take one out, how many are left?'
Imagery (Eyes Closed)
The teddies and the box are put aside and the child is asked to close their eyes and 
make a mental image of a teddy as follows: 'Can you make a picture o f the teddies in 
your head? Close your eyes and think about the teddies. Ok, now make your teddies 
sit down as we saw they did in the box'. The instructions then followed (exactly) those 
for the Imagery (eyes open) group from * to end.
3.3 RESULTS
Each child was given a score of 1 for each correct response and 0 for each incorrect 
response on each of the two tasks giving a maximum correct score of 10 and a 
minimum score of 0. A 4-way ANOVA was carried out on subjects' total correct 
scores with age (2), group (2) - Imagery v Hypothetical - and condition (2) - Eyes
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closed V Eyes open - as between-subjects factors and task (2) as a within-subjects 
factor. A Source of Variation table is shown at Appendix 2. The mean total number of 
correct responses by group, condition, task and age is shown at Table 3.3.1.
Table 3.3.1
Experiment 2
Means (out of 10) for each task by group, condition and age
(standard deviations in brackets)
N=241
HYPO
Taskl
Taslt2
Eyes Open Eyes Closed
Younger
(n=28)
7.00(1.89)
5.25(2.76)
Older
(n=31)
6.10(1.60)
4.52(2.37)
Younger
(n=33)
6.58(2.03)
5.15(2.72)
Older
(n=30)
7.40(1.71)
6.60(2,80)
IMAGERY Younger Older Younger Older
(n=28) (n=30) (n=31) (n=30)
Taskl 6.79(2.04) 7.27(1.84) 6.19(1.74) 7.87(1.96)
Tasli2 4.29(2.59) 6.00(3.04) 4.68(2.86) 6.83(2.82)
There was no overall significant main effect of group (F=0.38 df=l,233 p=0.54) but 
there was a main effect of condition equal to the 5% significance level (F=3.7 df= 
1,233 p=0.05) with 'eyes closed' getting more correct responses than 'eyes open' and a 
significant main effect of age (F=9.78 df^l,233 p<0.01) with the older group gaining 
higher scores than the younger. There was also a significant interaction of age and 
group (F=6.40 df=l,233 p<0.01) shown at Fig 3.3.1 with the older Imagery group 
scoring significantly more correct responses than the older Hypothetical group 
(Fisher's LSD post-test t=2.05 df=l,233 p<0.025) but with no significant difference 
between the two younger groups (Fisher’s LSD post-test t=l .24 df=l,233 NS). This 
showed the cue to use imagery to be more sensitive to the older age children. The 
repeated measures design of the experiment also takes into account any group 
differences in baseline scoring in Taskl when analysing whether there is any significant 
difference between the group means over the two tasks. Therefore, the lower number 
of correct responses recorded in Taskl for the older Hypothetical (eyes open) group is 
accounted for in the statistical analysis.
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Fig 3.3.1
Experiment 2 
Interaction of Age by Group (N=241)
7,5
® 6.5 S
Older Younger
There was also a significant interaction of condition by age (F=6.78 df 1,233 p<0.05), 
shown at Fig 3.3.2, with again the older group doing significantly better with their eyes 
closed than open (Fisher's LSD post-test t=3 df=l,233 p<0.01) but the younger groups 
of children showing no difference in performance whether closing their eyes or keeping 
them open (Fisher's LSD post-test t=0.44 df^l,233 NS).
Fig 3.3.2
Experiment 2 
Interaction of condition by age (N=241)
7.5
6.52
Older Younger
As far as the within subject factors were concerned there was a highly significant effect 
of task (F=106.38 df=l,233 p<0.001) with as predicted Task 1 being more correctly 
answered than Task 2. There were an interaction of age by task (F=4.76 df=l,233 
p<0.05) shown at Fig 3.3.3 with older children on Task2 generating higher scores than
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the younger children and an interaction of condition by task (F=4.08 df=l,233 p<0.05) 
shown at Fig 3.3.4 with 'eyes closed' gaining more correct responses in Task2 than
eyes open 
Fig 3.3.3
Fig 3.3.4
Experiment 2 
Interaction of age by task (N=241)
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Experiment 2 
Interaction of condition by task (n=241)
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3.4 DISCUSSION
The aim of this investigation was two-fold. First, to follow up on the age finding from 
Experiment 1 where school-age children were found to be more sensitive than the 
pre-school to an imagery-prompt when solving arithmetic problems. This had 
supported the age sensitivity reported by Dias & Harris (1990) when cueing imagery in 
the solution of syllogisms. Secondly, to explore a procedural issue arising from the 
instruction in the imagery-prompt for the children to close their eyes.
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Not surprisingly, the older children did significantly better than younger overall which 
supported the age differences reported in Experiment 1, where school age children did 
better than the pre-school. This pointed to quite marked changes in young children's 
arithmetical performance over a relatively small period of time. However, counter to 
prediction there was no main group effect overall which failed to replicate the findings 
from Experiment 1. However, there was a significant interaction of age and group 
with older children from the Imagery group doing significantly better than the younger. 
This need not necessarily be viewed as an artificial difference due to the poorer 
baseline scoring of the older Hypothetical (eyes open) group since there was less 
percentage drop from Taskl to Taskl for the older Imagery group and the repeated 
measures Anova design takes into account differences in baseline scoring. In fact it 
was the differential impact of this age interaction pulling in opposite directions with the 
younger Hypothetical group doing better in Taskl than the older Imagery which 
resulted in the failure to find a group effect. Nevertheless, the age differences in 
strategic prompting reported in this experiment together with those from the preceding 
study, where the older the child, the more likely they are to be sensitive to an 
imagery-prompt, suggested a differential impact of this type of prompting over a very 
small age range of four to nearly six years old. Therefore, the findings for the older 
children still supported the powerfulness of imagery use in cognitive functioning and 
the greater sensitivity for the older children (Dias & Harris 1988, 1990). Moreover, 
the findings for positive impact of an imagery-prompt have since been replicated for 
the younger age children ( Hewlett 1996).
In trying to account for the failure to replicate the findings for the school age children 
in Experiment 1 (younger children in this study were the same age as the school age) 
any spurious school effects can be discounted since sampling ensured that both 
Imagery and Hypothetical groups were taken from the same schools. It was possible 
that the change in problems or slight modification in task instructions may have 
accounted for the difference but if the cue to use imagery is robust then the impact 
should not be word-specific. Within such narrow age ranges, one possibility is that the 
children in the first experiment were actually operating at the competence level of an
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older child in spite of having received no formal school tuition. From this study, it 
appears that the younger Hypothetical group was operating at a level more similar to 
the older group of five-and-a-half year olds of with a mean of 5.3 in Taskl compared 
to 5.6 for the older children. This contrasts with means of 4.5 and 6.4 for the younger 
and older children respectively in the Imagery groups
Looking at the difference in condition (Eyes open v Eyes closed) there was an overall 
effect of condition equalling the 5% level of significance with 'eyes closed' gaining 
more correct responses than 'eyes open'. There was also an interaction of age and 
condition with older children generating more correct responses than younger, thereby 
illustrating again the older children's sensitivity to this type of strategic prompt. 
However, the most important finding was that there was no impact of condition 
experienced at the group level with no significant interaction of condition by group. It 
was, therefore, unlikely to be a confounding effect connected with 'closing eyes' which 
was responsible for the significant effect of imagery reported in Experiment 1. This 
supported the findings of Narchal and Broota (1988), where neither closing or keeping 
eyes open proved to be more effective when testing young adults in visual imagery. 
Intuitively, it might be expected that younger children would be helped more by some 
kind of additive strategy provided by closing eyes or an imagery-prompt. One 
possibility is that the older age children are more used to using 'prompts' and the 
testing situation. Alternatively, it might simply be that older children actually kept 
their eyes closed throughout and were less distracted by this instruction, thus 
increasing concentration and making a correct strategy choice more likely. However, 
the older children were still receiving a significant impact with their eyes open in the 
Imagery group indicating that both prompts, whether it be imagery or closing eyes, 
were effective. When considering both these explanations it still cannot be discounted 
that the Hypothetical group actually used the same strategy as that cued by imagery 
but the difference between the two Hypothetical group scores suggests this to be 
unlikely.
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The key finding so far for explicit strategic prompting was for individual variability 
dependent upon the different levels of contextual support received and the age of the 
child. This may be of a minimal type provided by the base-level hypothetical context 
involving reference to the teddies only, or of an additive type, where the minimal 
conditions are presented together with a prompt to keep eyes closed, use imagery or 
both. This finding was remarkable as the minimal instructions of hypothetical context, 
which acted as the control, provided a very conservative measure since all 
experimental manipulations required the children to use mental strategies rather than 
concrete materials. The critical difference between those children receiving the 
strategic prompts, and those in the control hypothetical group, was that the latter need 
to initiate their own strategies for solving the sums instead of being told what to do. 
However, it cannot be known that children did actually use the prompt. As far as the 
variability reported for those children in their first term at school over these first two 
experiments, the theoretical focus of asking children to do arithmetic before they have 
been taught inevitably means that some instructions will be more detrimental to some 
than others. This may be in terms of lack of numerical ability or difficulty in matching 
competences to contexts (Greeno et al 1984, Gelman & Meek 1986, Bryant 1985) or 
lack of confidence in knowing when to apply known strategies (Cowan et al 1993).
It is still not possible to know whether the effectiveness of the imagery-prompt for the 
older children is working directly with the children making some kind of visual mental 
model to represent the absent teddies. However, the possibility that it was the additive 
effect of combining 'closing eyes' whilst making a picture of the teddies can be 
discounted owing to the lack of group by condition interaction and the fact that the 
Imagery (Eyes closed) group was not significantly better than all the other prompts. 
This therefore added weight to the findings from Experiment 1 for the positive effect 
of imagery. As already outlined the effect of such strategic prompts, whether 'closing 
eyes' or 'imagery' may have worked indirectly by encouraging children to be strategic 
as opposed to astrategic or simply by suppressing an inappropriate strategy, whether 
this be based on faulty verbal counting or any other mechanism. The premise being 
that any 'additive' prompt', whether through deeper processing of the problems, made
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a more efficient or accurate strategy choice more likely. But none of the findings to 
date can discount a simpler explanation that such strategic prompts acted as a memory 
aid, perhaps in terms of lessening the processing load (eg. Halford 1993, 
Boulton-Lewis 1993, Boulton-Lewis & Tait 1994). Furthermore, it may be that the 
difficulty lies with remembering the numbers to compute in much the same way as 
Bryant & Trabasso (1971) found for transitive inference where failure was due to 
forgetting the original premises.
As far as task effects were concerned, again there was a positive finding for the higher 
degree of contextual support of Taskl over Task2. This added to the beneficial effects 
for the higher level of concrete context presented in Taskl, which involved seeing the 
teddies, when compared with the instructions involving the hypothetical scenario of 
Task2 (eg. Hughes 1981, Donaldson 1978). There was also a condition by task effect 
with 'eyes closed' doing better in Task2 than 'eyes open' but no group by task effect. 
This may be due to the older children in the Hypothetical group who received the 
prompt to close their eyes bridging the gap between the two groups. There was also a 
significant interaction of age and task with the younger children showing greater 
deterioration in Task2 over Taskl compared to the older where there was less 
contextual support. This would be expected since the older children were more 
sensitive to the contextual support offered by the hypothetical context.
In conclusion, the findings from this second investigation are remarkably clear in spite 
of the conservative control task of the hypothetical context: the positive effect of 
either cueing imagery or an instruction to 'keep eyes closed' when solving the problems 
for the older children. The findings for the younger children contrast with the previous 
experiment and their variability in performance needs to be considered in the light of 
the experimental effect impacting on the more difficult problems and in this sense 
perhaps at a child's threshold of competence. The next chapter addresses the question 
of whether any type of strategic prompt is simply working as a memory-aid. However, 
first a small study was undertaken to explore whether success of the imagery-prompt 
was a by-product of the teddies themselves through some enhanced 'imagery' effect.
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Therefore, cueing imagery with 'bricks', which Hughes (1981) used in his original study 
when investigating hypothetical contextual support in arithmetic, was contrasted with 
the results of the imagery-prompt using teddies.
Experiment 3
Does the Imageability of task materials affect the influence of an
imagery-prompt?
3.1.1 INTRODUCTION
This small investigation set out to test with the use of bricks whether the children were 
as sensitive to 'making a picture in their head' when using another concrete referent. It 
was decided to use bricks to mimic the Hughes (1981) investigation. Teddies had been 
chosen initially because of the reported benefits of using natural kinds of 
representations (eg. teddy bears, fish etc.) for teaching children the analogy between a 
picture as a representation of the real thing (Siegal & Smith 1990). Moreover, 
children are familiar with playing with teddies in their make-believe play. There were 8 
bricks: two red, two green, two blue, two yellow. If it was the powerfulness of the 
imagery itself which was the key factor found by Dias & Harris (1988, 1990) when 
testing deductive reasoning, then it was not predicted that there would be a significant 
difference between using teddies and bricks.
The current experimental design included the same two tasks as in the main 
Experiment 2: Taskl (Box closed) followed by Task2 (Hypothetical Box). The same 
10 problems were presented to each child in the same order. The same task and 
problem-type effects as those found in the previous two experiments were predicted 
with Taskl gaining more correct responses than Task2 owing to the enhanced 
contextual support and addition problems being more correctly answered than 
subtraction. Unlike the main Experiment 2 there was only one age group tested, which 
was the younger age children since it was this age group which had taken part in the 
previous two investigations and displayed the variability in performance from one to 
the other. In the event of any significant difiference being found in this age group it
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was intended to sample the older age group from the main Experiment 2. The only 
difference in experimental manipulation when cueing the use of imagery was that the 
children were asked to make a picture of the 'bricks' in their heads instead of teddies. 
The results using bricks were compared with the younger Imagery (eyes open) data 
from the main Experiment 2. The cue to prompt the children to close their eyes was 
not implemented since the imagery group results being used for comparison purposes 
with any subsequent strategic prompts were to be those where the children kept their 
eyes open. These were also considered as providing the most conservative measure 
for comparison purposes.
3.1.2 METHOD
Subjects
Twenty-four children, 10 girls and 14 boys aged 4 to 5 years acted as subjects. All 
were in their first term at an Infant school. The children were aged from 4:6 to 5:2yrs 
with a mean of S.Oyrs. The children were all allocated to the 'Bricks' group (n=24). 
The performance of this Bricks group was compared with that of the Younger Imagery 
(Eyes open) group (n=28) of Experiment 2.
Table 3.1.2
Mean age in months (standard deviation) by group
Group Younger only
Teddies 59.2 (1.4) (n—28)
Bricks 59.8 (2.2) (n=24)
Procedure
The procedure followed exactly the same format as Experiment 2 and the following 
problems were presented in the same order to each child. The only difference being 
that the Bricks group used bricks instead of teddies to help solve the sums.
'1+r, '2-1', '1+2', '3-2', '2+3', '4-3', '5+2', '6-2', '6+1', '7-1'
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The author was the Experimenter throughout the experiment and the child completed 
both tasks at one sitting. Both Bricks and Teddies groups completed Taskl (Box 
Closed) as outlined in Experiment 1 followed by Task2 (Hypothetical Box).
Materials
8 coloured bricks (two blue, two red, two green & two yellow) together with 8 small 
teddy bears and a square box.
TASK2- HYPOTHETICAL BOX 
Teddies Group
This was the children from Experiment 2 younger Imagery (eyes open) group and the 
instructions are shown on page 74.
Brides Group
The Experimenter said; ' Let's pretend. Can you make a picture o f the bricks in your 
head? Think about the bricks’. The Experimenter then asked a manipulation check 
question to verify that the child understood and was able to make a picture in their 
heads: 'Those bricks in your head - are they coloured ones like we had in our box?
On giving an affirmative reply the Experimenter then said 'Let'spretend that there is 
one brick in the box, if  we put one more in, how many are there altogether now?' For 
subtraction problems the verbal instructions were of the form: 'Let's pretend that there 
are two bricks in the box, i f  we take one out, how many are left?' In the event of a 
negative reply the process was repeated a second time and a second failure resulted in 
the experimenter prompting: 'our bricks were coloured ones, weren't they? Canyon 
make them coloured ones?'.
3,1.3 RESULTS
A 3-way ANOVA was carried out on subjects total correct scores with group (2) as a 
between-subjects factors and task (2) and type (2) as within-subjects factors. The 
Source of Variation table is at Appendix 2.1.1. There was no significant group effect 
and the total mean correct responses by group and task are shown at Table 3.1.3(1).
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Table 3.1.30)
Experiment 3 
Means (out of 10) for each task by group
(standard deviations in brackets)
N=52
Taskl Task2
Bricks (n=24) 7.13(1.85) 4.63(2.90)
Teddies (n=28) 6.79(2.04) 4.32(2.61)
As far as within-subjects factors were concerned there was a significant effect of Task 
(F=50.88 df= 1,50 p<0.001) with Taskl baseline data being answered more correctly 
as expected. There was also a main effect of type (F=5.99 df=l,50 p<0.05). The 
following Table 3.2 shows the mean total number of correct responses by type 
(addition v subtraction) which shows that addition problems were more correctly 
answered than subtraction.
Table 3.1.3(2)
Experiment 3 
Means (out of 5) for each task by group and type
(standard deviations in brackets)
N=52
Taskl Task2
Add Subtract Add Subtract
Bricks 3.54(1.02) 3.58(1.06) 2.50(1.56) 2.13(1.65)
Teddies 3.61(1.10) 3.18(1.12) 2.32(1.63) 2.00(1.31)
3.1.4 DISCUSSION
The rationale behind this investigation was to explore whether the reported significant 
effect when cueing imagery in the solution of simple addition and subtraction problems 
was attributable to some kind of enhanced imagery effect of the teddies themselves as 
concrete referents.
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The main finding was of no significant difference when cueing the use of imagery with 
teddies or bricks as the concrete referents. This result discounted the significant 
difference between the results from the imagery and hypothetical groups reported in 
the previous two experiments as merely a by-product of using teddies to help solve 
arithmetic problems. This kind of evidence adds weight to the notion that it was the 
powerfulness of the imagery-prompt itself whether working directly or indirectly which 
was the key factor.
The task and problem-type effects supported those found in the previous two 
experiments with Taskl gaining higher scores than Task2 thus pinpointing the 
effectiveness of the additional contextual support of the baseline task where the 
children see the concrete referents. The fact that addition gained higher scores than 
subtraction was unsurprising and there was no group by type interaction indicating that 
the cueing of imagery with bricks as opposed to teddies was not working differently 
when adding or subtracting.
In conclusion, this small study has discounted success of the imagery-prompt being a 
result of some specific characteristic relating to the use of'teddies' in terms of their 
possible enhanced imageability when compared to another concrete referent like 
bricks.
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CHAPTER 4
Experiment 4 
The role of memory in simple arithmetic
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The rationale of this study was to explore the extent to which memory might be involved 
in the effectiveness found for explicit strategic prompting in the previous two 
experiments. This was both in terms of an imagery-prompt and the instruction to solve 
the problems with eyes closed. It may be that both these different prompts were simply 
acting as a facilitator in terms of working memory by ensuring the children remembered 
the numbers to compute.
It is clear that memory plays an important role in problem solving (Greeno 1973; Logie 
& Baddeley 1987; Logie, Gilhooly & Wynn, 1994), whether it be reasoning tasks or 
arithmetical computations, with temporary storage of information during calculation 
always required. In terms of cognitive capacity, too high a processing load (Halford 
1993, Boulton-Lewis 1993, Boulton-Lewis & Tait 1994) may be placed on the child 
when needing to hold the numbers to compute in their head whilst working out the 
answer. This could result in errors simply being a result of forgetting the numbers to be 
computed as has been claimed by Ganetsou & Cowan (1995) as an alternative 
explanation as to why the children in the Hughes (1981) study were not as successful 
when the addends were invisible compared to when they were visible. Moreover, Cowan 
& Renton (1996) found that putting numerals representing the invisible addends, 
alongside the box, negated any benefit of seeing the concrete materials themselves and 
provided a memory-check for the numbers in the computation. This was a striking 
finding in that 5 year old children were found to be slightly more accurate when the 
addends were invisible. Clearly, these results contrast with Hughes' and give a primary 
role to memory.
In a similar way when investigating transitive inference, Bryant & Trabasso (1971) found 
4 year old children were able to reason inferentially about quantity (if A>B>C then A>C)
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provided they could remember the initial premises (A>B and B>C). The experimental 
design introduced five stimuli (A>B>C>D>E), as opposed to the traditional three with 
the crucial transitive inference B>D, which negated the possibility of a child using a 
'keyword technique' through identifying 'A' as always the 'larger' variable instead of using 
inferential reasoning. Bryant & Trabasso undertook a thorough training period to ensure 
the children could remember the direct comparisons after which each was tested for 
transitivity. Four year olds were found to yield 0.78 probability for giving the correct 
B>D comparison correct with five year olds 0.88 and six year olds 0.92. Subsequently, 
Oakhill (1984) also found that reducing demands on working memory facilitated 
performance on transitive inference tasks. Moreover, Judd & Bilsky (1986, 1989) 
explored the use of memory-aids in problem-solving tasks with mentally retarded and 
non-mentally retarded individuals, and found memory aids facilitated retention but not 
necessary comprehension or accuracy.
The aim of this investigation was therefore to compare a memory-prompt with the 
base-level hypothetical context in the same way as the imagery-prompt had been 
contrasted. Piloting showed that giving a memory-prompt, through testing for the 
retention of both numbers or the final number of each problem led to confusion and lots 
of perseverative 'don't know' answers and therefore a memory-prompt for the initial 
number of each computation was undertaken. This was achieved by reminding children 
of the initial number through a contextual cue of seeing the experimenter put the initial 
number of teddies in the box ('/'/w putting one teddy in the box', where the experimenter 
placed the teddy in the box in front of the child and closed the lid. 'How many teddies did 
I  put in the box?). The children were still involved in mental arithmetic and did not see 
the teddies in relation to the second number of each problem whereas in Taskl (Box 
Closed) the teddies were seen in respect of both addends. Previously, piloting had 
shown that simply giving a verbal prompt within a hypothetical context for the initial
number {'If there was one teddy in the box. How many teddies did I  say were in the
box?) led to the majority of children not understanding the demands of the task thus 
highlighting the difficulties children have in understanding task demands which might 
seem obvious to adults.
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Performance with a memory-prompt was compared with that reported for the 
hypothetical context as was done with the imagery-prompt and the instruction to solve 
the problems with eyes closed. If performance in the hypothetical context was being 
affected by failure to remember the initial number in some or all computations this would 
suggest that those children receiving a memory prompt would gain higher scores than 
those presented with the hypothetical context instructions. As far as exploring the age 
differences reported so far, the same two age groups of children were tested as were 
used in Experiment 2: those children in their first term at Infant school who were around 
five years old ()yotinger') and those in their second and third terms who were around 
five-and-a-half years old {'older'). The evidence at this point highlights the greater 
sensitivity of the older age children to strategic prompting, whether it be imagery or 
closing their eyes, and this would predict that the older children might be more sensitive 
to a memory-prompt than the younger. On the other hand, if the younger children's 
difficulty is remembering the initial number then this might indicate that a 
memory-prompt would help the younger children to bridge the gap between them and 
their older counterparts.
In summary, there were two groups; Memory and Hypothetical The results from the 
memory-prompt were compared with those of the Hypothetical (eyes open) group from 
Experiment 2 since the Memory group were to be prompted with their eyes open. The 
same two tasks were used: Taskl (Box Closed) followed by Task 2 (Hypothetical Box) 
where the experimental manipulation took place with the same 10 problems presented in 
the same order as in Experiment 2. It was predicted that the previous findings for the 
beneficial effect of contextual support would be supported with Taskl gaining higher 
scores than Task2. As far as problem-type effects were concerned if children's sensitivity 
to the memory-prompt yielded a similar impact on both addition and subtraction 
problems it would be predicted that addition would still yield higher scores than 
subtraction. However, if it were more effective with the more difficult problems, this 
might point to no significant difference between the type of problem since the benefit 
would hit the subtraction problems and bridge the gap between them and addition.
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4.2 METHOD
Subjects
Fifty-eight children, 26 girls and 32 boys aged 4 to 5 years acted as subjects for the 
Memory condition. All attended Infant school with 28 in their first term and 30 in their 
second and third terms of the Reception class. The children were randomly selected from 
a number of schools with balancing for sex and were divided into two age groups: 
'Younger', those in their first term, aged 4:9 - 5:2yrs with a mean of 4:1 lyrs (n=28) and 
'Older' those in their second and third terms, aged 5:3 - 5:9yrs with a mean of 5:6yrs 
(n=30). The younger group comprised 16 boys and 12 girls and the older group 
comprised 16 boys and 14 girls. The performance of this group (n=58) was
compared with the Hypothetical group (Eyes open) (n=59).
Table 4.2.1
Mean age in months (standard deviation) by group
N=117
Age Younger Older
Memory 59.3 (1.4) (n=28) 66.1(1.8) (n=30)
Hypothetical 59.0(1.4) (n=28) 65.1 (2.6) (n=31)
Procedure
The materials of teddies and the box were the same as used in the previous experiments. 
After completing the pre-test of counting to eight using one-to-one correspondence the 
child was introduced to the notion of'playing a game to help do some sums'. Each of the 
two tasks was given in order Taskl followed by Task2 and consisted of the same 10 
number problems as in Experiments 2 and 3. Both tasks were completed at one sitting.
'1+r, '2-1', '1+2', '3-2', '2+3', '4-3', '5+2', '6-2', '6+1', '7-1'
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Each child completed the problems in the same order as set out above beginning with 
'1+r and finishing with '7-1'. The problems were presented and answered verbally. The 
author is the Experimenter throughout the experiment.
TASKl - BOX CLOSED (Both groups)
Taskl was identical for both groups and the instructions were set out in Experiment 1 on 
page 53.
TASK 2 - HYPOTHETICAL BOX 
Memory group
The Experimenter put one teddy in the box in front of the child and put the lid on, saying: 
'/ am putting one teddy in the box. How many teddies did I  put in the box? After the 
child had responded with the correct reply (the process was repeated if an incorrect 
response was given and a prompt by the experimenter if there were a second failure) The 
experimenter asked 'If I  put one more in, how many teddies would be in the box 
altogether?' For subtraction problems the verbal instructions were: 'I am putting two 
teddies in the box. How many teddies did I  put in the box? 'If I  took one out how many 
teddies would be left in the box?'
Hypothetical group
This group were those children in Experiment 2 from the Hypothetical (Eyes open) 
group and therefore the instructions are on page 73.
4.3 RESULTS
A 4-way ANOVA was carried out on the subjects' total correct scores over the 10 
problems with age (2) and group (2) as between-subjects factors and task (2) and type 
(2) - addition v subtraction - as within-subjects factors. The Source of Variation table is 
shown at Appendix 3. The mean number of total correct responses by group, task and 
age is shown in Table 4.3.1 and illustrated in Fig 4.3.1.
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Table 4.3.1
Experiment 4
Mean correct responses (out of 10) for each task by age and group
(standard deviations in brackets)
N=117
Memory Hypothetical
Younger Older Younger Older
(n=28) (n=30) (n=28) (n=31)
Taskl 6.75 (2.03) 8.03(1.43) 7.00(1.89) 6.10(1.60)
Task2 6.07 (2.21) 7.53 (2.16) 5.25 (2.76) 4.52 (2.37)
Fig 4.3.1
Mean correct responses (out of 10) for each task by age and group
(Taskl scores are shown at the front o f the bar chart and Task2 at the back) 
N=117
Memory Hypothetical
Younger ^  Older
There was a significant main effect of group (F=16.26 df=l,I13 p<0.001) with the 
Memory group gaining more correct responses than the Hypothetical group. There was 
no overall main effect of age but there was a significant interaction of group and age 
(F=10.23 df=l,113 p<0.01), which can be seen from Fig 4.3.1 above. Planned 
comparisons showed this interaction to be largely attributable to the highly signficant 
difference in performance between the older Memory and Hypothetical groups (Fisher's
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LSD post-test t=3.86 df=l,l 13 p<0.001) with the Memory group outperforming the 
Hypothetical since there was no significant difference found between the younger 
Memory and Hypothetical groups (Fisher's LSD post-test t=0.37 df=l,l 13 NS). 
However, younger children scored more correct responses than the older children in the 
Hypothetical group although this was not statistically significant (Fisher’s LSD post-test 
t= l. 11 df=l,l 13 NS). Therefore, no overall age difference was due to the stronger 
performance of the younger Hypothetical group and the facilitatory effect of the 
memory-check for the younger children.
As far as within-subject factors were concerned there was a highly significant effect of 
task (F=40.08 df=l,l 13 p<0.001) with Taskl being more correctly answered than Task2. 
There was also a significant interaction of group and task (F=9.13 df=l,l 13 p<0.01) as 
shown at Fig 4.3.2 with the Memory group almost sustaining their initial baseline Taskl 
scoring in Task2 which was greater than the Hypothetical group in either task.
However, it was found that the Memory group gained significantly more correct 
responses than the Hypothetical in Taskl (Fisher's LSD post-test t=3.11 df=l,l 13 
p<0.01) but there was an even more highly significant difference between the groups in 
Task2 (Fisher's LSD post-test t=7.07 df=l,l 13 p<0.001).
Fig 4.3.2 
N=117
Experiment 4 
Interaction of Group by Task
7.5
5.5
4.5 ------Memory Hypo
Task 1 Task 2
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There was no main effect of type and Table 4.3.2 gives the mean number of total correct 
responses by group, age, task and type. It can be seen that the Memory group scored a 
similar number of correct responses for both addition and subtraction in both Taskl and 
Task2 when compared with the Hypothetical group. There were no significant 
interactions of type.
Table 4.3.2 Experiment 4
Mean correct responses (out of 5) by age, task, group and type
(standard deviations in brackets)
N=117
Taskl
Tasli2
MEMORY «-55 HYPOTHETICAL «-5P
Add Subtract
Young Old Young Old 
3.39(1.17) 4,13(0.94) 3.36(1.19) 3.9(0.89) 
3.11(1.34) 3.83(1.32) 2.96(1.2) 3.7(1.06)
Add Subtract
Young Old Young Old 
3.46(1.23) 2.97(0.88) 3.54(1.03) 3.13(1.15) 
2.82(1.57) 2.48(1.29) 2.43(1.57) 2.03(1.3)
4.4 DISCUSSION
The key question behind this experiment was to see if the significant impact of cueing 
imagery and an instruction to keep eyes closed whilst solving the computations was 
simply effective in relation to performance in a hypothetical context as a 
memory-prompt. This was based on the premise that failure may simply be due to 
children forgetting the numbers they need to compute. In the same way failure to be able 
to make the 'translation' from an hypothetical context to the disembedded context 
required for formal code arithmetic (Hughes 1981, 1986) may also be partly due to a 
failure to remember the numbers involved in the formal code computation.
A memory-prompt was given to ensure the children had remembered the initial addend of 
each computation. This prompt was found to have a highly significant beneficial effect 
on performance allowing a number of children to sustain their initial baseline Taskl 
performance in Task2. Therefore, simply ensuring a child has remembered the initial 
addend improved children's performance in relation to those solving the problems 
with only the referential support of the hypothetical context. This evidence
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supports the findings for transitive inference of Bryant & Trabasso (1971), Oakhill 
(1984) and Judd & Bilsky (1986, 1989) for the use of memory-aids in problem-solving 
tasks. Moreover, Cowan & Renton (1996) have also reported a positive effect of 
providing a memory-check for the numbers to be computed in problems involving 
invisible addends. This therefore questions whether Hughes' claims for children 
performing better with visible addends is attributable to their enhanced contextual 
support or the fact that they do not need to remember the numbers to be computed as 
suggested by Ganetsou & Cowan (1995). Furthermore, Cowan & Renton found that 
providing a memory-check for invisible addends ensured children of 5 years were able to 
perform as well, if not better, than when solving problems involving visible addends. The 
positive impact of providing a memory-check for the initial addend has since been 
replicated by Howlett (1996) for the younger age of children in this experiment.
There was no main overall age effect due to the strong performance of the younger 
children, both in terms of those receiving the memory-prompt and hypothetical context 
instructions. Unlike the imagery-prompt evidence reported in the previous experiment 
both age groups of children were found to be sensitive to this memory-prompt.
Moreover, the importance of memory cues as opposed to attention cues has already been 
reported for 4 to 5 year old children in concept learning with children of over 6 years of 
age preferring attention cues than memory cues (Pishkin & Rasmussen 1974). By 
ensuring the memory trace for the initial number was firmly made prior to mentioning the 
second number of the computation, either made a child's response more accurate through 
using the correct numbers in the computation or lessening the effort expended in trying 
to keep track of the numbers in the solution process. This may have allowed a child to 
be strategic as opposed to astrategic, to make a better strategy choice or suppress an 
inappropriate strategy.
In trying to establish how this memory-prompt may be working, unlike an 
imagery-prompt it is possible to say that the prompt is working directly since the initial 
number of each computation was checked by the experimenter for retention. Thus, these 
findings suggest that previous findings for failure at formal code arithmetic may have
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been partially attributable to memory failure. Moreover, if a memory-check lessened the 
effort in keeping tracking of the numbers in the solution process this supports the current 
claims for too high a processing load leading to failure in addition and subtraction 
(Halford 1993, Boulton-Lewis 1993, Boulton-Lewis & Tait 1994). What role the central 
executive fiinction, as mooted by Ashcraft (1995) to possibly be responsible for the 
'keeping track' mechanism, plays in this process needs to be investigated.
One explanation which cannot be discounted is that the instructions of the 
memory-prompt involve the children in seeing the teddies again in Task2. This was 
because piloting had shown that the children could not understand the task demands 
when given a simple verbal memory-prompt using the hypothetical context instructions. 
Such an hypothesis suggests that effectiveness may in part be attributable to this 
enhanced contextual support since the prompt falls somewhere between Taskl (Box 
Closed), where the children see everything, and Task2 (Hypothetical Box), where the 
children see nothing. Whether or not this is a factor, the critical concern is that the 
results derived from this memory-prompt, unlike either the imagery-prompt or 
hypothetical context or eyes closed results, reflect a memory-check for the initial addend 
of each computation. Moreover, this prompt did not allow the children to see the teddies 
in relation to the second addend and it was still necessary for them to use mental 
arithmetic.
As far as task effects were concerned the previous findings for contextual support are 
supported with Taskl gaining significantly higher scores than Task2 in spite of good 
performance in Task2 for the memory group. This was shown by the significant 
interaction of group and task with the memory group performance over both tasks better 
than the hypothetical group.
There was no significant main effect of type although the p-value reported was p=0.07. 
This was owing to the strong performance of the memory-prompt for subtraction. In fact 
the findings for type were remarkably clear in that there were no interactions whatsoever 
and therefore this pointed to no particular link between type and the other variables.
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These findings for the sensitivity for the strategic prompt on subtraction problems 
underpinned the results from the first experiment for the imagery-prompt and are further 
addressed by the Individual Problem Analysis to be reported at the end of all the 
empirical chapters.
In summary, there was a beneficial effect for both ages of offering an explicit 
memory-prompt, through testing retention of the initial number of the computation, when 
compared to the base level hypothetical instructions. Therefore the younger children 
were sensitive to the memory-prompt as well as the older children, unlike the imagery or 
'closing eyes' prompts in the previous experiments where the older age were found to be 
most sensitive. These findings suggested that ensuring children of four to five years have 
remembered the initial number of each computation is of critical importance when testing 
performance on explicit addition and subtraction problems. The previous findings for the 
beneficial effect of contextual support were again replicated with the first task generating 
higher scores than Task2. However, in contrast to the previous results the 
memory-prompt was found to lead to similar results for both addition and subtraction 
with no problem-type effect found.
At this point in the research there is now mounting evidence that any type of explicit 
strategic prompt is effective as opposed to leaving the child to initiate their own strategy 
which was the case for those operating within the hypothetical context. Effectiveness of 
each different type of prompt has been found to be variable with the memory-prompt the 
most successful for all children tested. It is possible that all such strategic prompts are 
working indirectly in a similar way, irrespective of type, by encouraging children to be 
strategic as opposed to astrategic or through suppressing an inappropriate strategy. The 
next chapter set out to explore whether memoiy and imagery are independent by testing 
a combined (memory + imagery) prompt or whether there is an additive effect.
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CHAPTERS 
Experiment 5
A comparison of individual and combined strategic prompts
5.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter reports an experiment which explores whether the effects of imagery and 
memory prompting are independent. In Experiment 1 a significant facilitatory effect of 
imagery was reported for both ages of children - pre-schoolers and those of school age in 
their first term at school. In Experiment 2, however, the impact of imagery was only 
found to be significant for the older children, those of five-and-a-half years of age, who 
were in their second and third terms of school. In Experiment 4 providing a 
memory-prompt for the initial addend of each problem was found to be effective for both 
age groups of children. Therefore, this investigation sought to compare a combined 
(memory + imagery) prompt with each of the single memory and imagery prompts. The 
aim was to explore if the effectiveness of imagery and memory was independent or 
whether any strategic prompt was working in much the same way simply encouraging a 
child to be strategic as opposed to astrategic or suppressing an inappropriate strategy. If 
a combined prompt proved to be more effective than each of the single prompts this 
pointed to memory and imagery working independently. However, it cannot be 
discounted that imagery is still effective because the process involved in 'making a picture 
in your head' offers some extra memory enhancement through the manipulations involved 
in cueing imagery.
Unlike the four previous experiments this was an experiment which provided a 
comparison between three explicit strategic prompts as opposed to the previous 
investigations where an explicit prompt was contrasted against only the referential 
support of the hypothetical context. Therefore, any improved performance provided by 
the combined prompt, would be striking since each of the single prompts has proved 
effective for those older children of around five-and-a-half years old. The situation, as 
far as the younger age children of around five years are concerned, is not as
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straightforward owing to the failure to replicate the findings with the imagery-prompt 
over the first two experiments. Moreover, the younger children's increased sensitivity to 
the memory-prompt points to forgetting the initial addend as probably being the more 
critical factor. Therefore, this evidence suggests that the combined prompt is likely to be 
more effective than the single imagery-prompt for these younger children.
In the previous experiment. Experiment 4, children were unable to understand a verbal 
memory-prompt presented within a hypothetical context for the initial addend of each 
problem. However, contrary to those findings, piloting showed that the children had no 
difficulty in understanding the demands of the task of repeating the initial number of the 
problem after being cued in the normal way to making a picture of the teddies in their 
head: 'Let's pretend that there is one teddy in the box. How many are we pretending
are in the box?  I f  we put one more in, how many are altogether in the box now?'
This was a remarkable outcome given the previous findings and adds further weight to 
the claims of (Hawkins et al 1984, Dias & Harris 1988, 1990) for the powerful effect of 
imagery in syllogistic reasoning when young children need to reason systematically. 
Moreover, it suggests that understanding mental arithmetic is easier when based on some 
'concretised' image.
In summary, this investigation followed the same experimental design of previous 
experiments with two tasks: Taskl (Box Closed) followed by Task2 (Hypothetical Box) 
where the experimental manipulation took place and the same 10 problems. It was 
predicted that the previous findings for the positive effect of contextual support would be 
replicated. There were three groups - Combined (Memory-^Imagery), Memory and 
Imagery - and the same two age groups, younger and older. The evidence so far 
suggests that explicit strategic prompts are more effective on the more difficult problems 
particularly subtraction. Therefore, given the comparison in this study is between three 
different types of prompt, it is unlikely that addition problems will gain significantly 
higher scores than subtraction.
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5.2 METHOD 
Subjects
Sixty-two children, 28 girls and 34 boys aged 4 to 5 years acted as subjects for the 
Combined (Memory 4-Imagery) group. All attended Infant school with 30 in their first 
term and 32 in their second and third terms of the Reception class. The children were 
randomly selected from a number of schools with balancing for sex and were divided into 
two age groups; ^Younger\ those in their first term, aged 4:9 - 5:2yrs with a mean of 5:0 
years (n=30) and 'Older\ those in their second and third terms, aged 5:3 - 5:9yrs with a 
mean of 5:5yrs (n=32). The younger group comprised 17 boys and 13 girls and the 
older group comprised 17 boys and 15 girls.
The performance of this Combined (Memory -^Imagery) group (n=62) was compared 
with the Imagery (eyes open) (n=58) fi'om Experiment 2 and \hQ Memory (n=58) from 
Experiment 4.
Table 5.2.1
Mean age in months (standard deviation) by group
N=178
Group Younger Older
Imagery 59.2(1.4) (n=28) 65.2 (2.3) (n=30)
Combined (Mem 4- Imagery) 59.9(1.4) (n=30) 64.9(1.8) (n=32)
Memory 59.3 (1.4) (n=28) 66.1(1.8) (n=30)
Procedure
The same materials of the teddies and the box were used. After completing the pre-test 
of counting to eight using one-to-one correspondence the child was introduced to the 
notion of'playing a game to help do some sums'. Each of the two tasks was given in 
order Taskl followed by Task2 and consisted of the same 10 number problems as in 
Experiments 2, 3 and 4. The testing was completed at one sitting.
'14-1', '2-1', '14-2', '3-2', '24-3', '4-3', '54-2', '6-2', '64-1', '7-1'
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Each child completed the problems in the same order as set out above beginning with 
T +r and finishing with 7-1'. The problems were presented and answered verbally and 
the author is the Experimenter throughout this experiment.
TASKl - BOX CLOSED (Ail groups)
The instructions were identical for all three groups and the instructions were set out in 
Experiment 1 on page 53.
TASK 2 - HYPOTHETICAL BOX 
Combined (Memory+Imagery) group
In this condition the child was given the memory prompt for the initial number together 
with the imagery instructions. The Experimenter put the teddies and box aside and the 
child was asked to make a mental image of a teddy as follows: ' Let's pretend. Canyon 
make a picture o f the teddies in your head? Think about the teddies. Ok, now make 
your teddies sit down as we saw they did in the box. ' The Experimenter then asked a 
manipulation check question to verify that the child understood and was able to make a 
picture in their heads: 'Those teddies in your head - are they sitting or standing?' If the 
child replied 'standing' the process was repeated. In order to proceed to solving the 
problems the child had to reply that they were 'sitting'. The Experimenter than said 'Let's 
pretend that there is one teddy in the box. How many are we pretending are in the box? 
On receiving the correct reply, the Experimenter asked 'If we put one more in, how many 
are there altogether in the box now?' The process was repeated if a child failed to give 
the correct number back first time and if there was a second failure the Experimenter 
prompted with the initial number. For subtraction problems, the verbal instructions 
were: 'Let'spretend that there are two teddies in the box. How many teddies are we 
pretending are in the box? On receiving the correct reply, the Experimenter asked 'If we 
take one out, how many are left in the box?'
Imagery group
This was the same group of children as for Imagery (eyes open) in Experiment 2 and 
therefore the instructions for this task are on page 74.
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Memory group
This was the same group of children as in Experiment 4 and therefore the instructions for 
this task are on page 91.
5.3 RESULTS
A 4-way ANOVA was carried out on the subjects' total correct scores with age (2) and 
group (3) as between-subjects factors and task (2) and type (2) - addition v subtraction - 
as within-subjects factor. The Source of Variation table is shown at Appendix 4. The 
mean total correct response scores for both age groups by task and group are shown in 
Table 5.3.1 and illustrated in Fig 5.3.1.
Table 5.3.1
N=178
Experiment 5
Mean correct responses (out of 10) for each task by age and group
(standard deviations in brackets)
Imagery Memory+Imagery Memory
Younger Older Younger Older Younger Older
(n=28) (n=30) (n=30) (n=32) (n=28) (n=30)
Taskl 6.79(2.04) 7.27(1.84) 5.8(1.89) 7.34(2.18) 6.75(2.03) 8.03(1.43;
Task2 4.32(2.61) 6.0(3.04) 5.5(2.4) 7.72(2.04) 6.07(2.21) 7.53(2.16;
Fig 5.3.1 (Taskl scores are shown at the front o f the bar chart and Task2 at the back)
Imagery Mem (Imagery)
Young S  Older
Memory
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There was a significant main group effect (F=3.89 df=2,172 p<0.05). Planned 
comparisons using Fisher's LSD post-hoc tests showed a difference equal to the 5% level 
(t=1.64 df=l,172) between the Memory and Imagery groups with the Memory group 
gaining higher scores. However, there was no significant difference between the 
Combined (Memory+Imagery) and either the Imagery (t=0.73 df=l,172 NS) or Memory 
(t=0.93 df=l,172 NS) groups. There was also a significant main effect of age (F=24.71 
df=l,172 p<0.001) with the older group doing better than the younger.
There was a significant main effect of task (F=27.85 df=l,172 p<0.001) with a highly
significant interaction of group and task (F= 13 .49 df=2,172 p<0.001) illustrated at Fig
5.3.2. Planned comparisons using Fisher's LSD post-test showed the combined prompt
enabling children to sustain their initial baseline Taskl performance in Task2 compared
to a significant deterioration by both the Memory (t=2.03 df=l,172 p<0.025) and
Imagery (t=6.45 df=l,172 p<0.001) prompts over the two tasks. There was also a highly
significant difference between the Combined prompt and the Imagery prompt in Task2
(t=5 df=l,172 p<0.001) compared to no significant difference in the baseline Taskl
(t=1.59 dfi=l,172 NS). The Memory group were found to gain significantly more correct
responses than the Combined prompt in Taskl (t=2.83 df=l,172 p<0.01) but with no
difference in Task2 (t=0.66 df=l,172 NS).
Fig 5.3.2 Experiment 5
Interaction of group and task (N=178)
7.5
5.5
Imagery Mem (Imagery) Memory
Task 1 Task 2
103
There was a significant effect of age by task (F=5,01 df=l,172 p<0.05), which can be 
seen from the bar chart at Fig 5.3.1, with older children nearing their baseline Taskl 
performance in Task2 and the younger group making a more marked deterioration. This 
drop in performance was attributable to those in the single imagery group since those 
receiving the combined prompt more or less sustained their initial performance in Task2 
and there was only a small drop for the single memory group.
There was a significant main effect of type (F=14.77 df=l,172 p<0.001) with addition 
problems being more correctly answered than subtraction. Table 5,3.2 gives the mean 
total correct response scores for each group by age, task and type. There was a 
significant interaction of group, task and type (F=1.05 df=2,172 p<0.01) with the 
Combined prompt sustaining or improving performance in subtraction in Task2 
compared to a deterioration by the single prompts.
Table 5.3.2
Experiment 5
Mean correct responses (out of 5) by age, task, group and type
(standard deviations in brackets)
N=178
YOUNG Imagery Memory ^Imagery Memory
Add Subtract Add Subtract Add Subtract
Taskl 3.61(1.1) 3.18(1.12) 3.07(1.23) 2.73(0.94) 3.39(1.17) 3.36(1.19;
Task2 2.32(1.63) 2.0(1.31) 2.77(1.31) 2.73(1.34) 3.11(1.34) 2.96(1.2)
OLD Add Subtract Add Subtract Add Subtract
Taskl 3.93(0.91) 3.33(1.24) 3.88(1.34) 3.47(1.11) 4.13(0.94) 3.9(0.89)
Taskl 3.2(1.52) 2.8(1.75) 3.81(1.26) 3.91(1.09) 3.83(1.32) 3.7(1.06)
5.4 DISCUSSION
The aim of this experiment was to explore the possibility of an additive effect of 
combining the single memory-prompt with the single imagery-prompt. There are two 
possible explanations. First, that both the memory and imagery prompts are equivalent 
and work in the same way by simply encouraging children to be strategic as opposed to
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astrategic or by suppressing an inappropriate strategy. This would result in no significant 
difference between a combined prompt and either of the single prompts. Secondly, that 
imagery and memory are independent and the effect of combining the two leads to an 
additive effect thereby giving a more beneficial overall impact.
The results reported a significant main overall group effect which post-hoc testing 
showed was primarily due to the significant difference in performance between the single 
memory and imagery prompts with those receiving the memory-prompt gaining higher 
scores than those in the imagery group. This evidence suggested that ensuring a child 
has remembered the initial number of a computation was more important than cueing the 
use of imagery alone and leads to children getting one and half more problems correct 
than when using imagery. There was no significant difference overall between either of 
the single prompts (memory or imagery) and the combined prompt. But the performance 
of the older children in the combined (memory + imagery) group was better in Task2 
than Taskl with the younger group almost sustaining their initial performance shown by 
the significant group by task interaction. Therefore, it is necessary to be cautious when 
interpreting these findings and consider the fact that all these groups were receiving an 
explicit strategic prompt over and above the base-level hypothetical context and so 
combining two prompts was unlikely to double the impact. However, this combined 
prompt does give the highest mean overall of all the interventions, if you take into 
account it representing the lowest percentage drop for the younger age children. A 
statistically significant difference between the combined prompt and either of the single 
prompts would necessitate a huge additive effect. It is also possible that the additive 
effect resulted in some ceiling effects. Therefore, the combined prompt enabled children 
to perform at a similar level in Task2 to when seeing real objects as in Taskl. Perhaps 
once children begin to use mental arithmetic to solve these kinds of computations, 
strategic support on more difficult problems is more helpful in an abstract mode through 
mentalistic strategies as opposed to suggesting use of concrete referents. This would 
support the claims that lots of practice with practical apparatus is not necessarily of the 
greatest benefit for understanding arithmetic (Lesh, Behr & Post 1987). Moreover, it 
also adds to the findings of Stallard (1982) and Hughes (1986) that many older children
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of around 7 to 8 years were unable to use concrete referents to represent simple formal 
code problems even though they could efficiently work through pages and pages of 
formal arithmetic. This type of evidence clearly questions the traditional Piagetian notion 
that direct experience is necessary for grounding of numerical concepts (Piaget 1953).
As far as overall age effects were concerned, there was a significant impact of age with 
older children gaining more correct responses than the younger but no age by group 
interaction reflecting the greater sensitivity of the younger children to both of the 
prompts involving memory. The significant interaction of age and task showed the older 
children to be more sensitive to the experimental manipulations in Task2 thereby 
underpinning the positive effect for the use of explicit strategic prompts for the older 
children adding weight to the findings fi'om the previous three experiments. Also the 
greater success of the younger children for both type of memory-prompt suggests that 
children of this age experience some difficulty in memorising the numbers during the 
computation. Therefore, giving a memoiy-check for the initial addend is likely to be the 
strategy which would yield the most consistent improved performance over baseline 
Taskl testing. Furthermore, if a conservative impact of memory is conceived fi'om the 
results of the single memory-prompt, owing to the fact that the children see the teddies 
again in Task2, then the results for the combined prompt are even more remarkable since 
this was a totally mentalistic strategy. For, it cannot be discounted that the results for the 
memory-check could in some way be attributable to the extra referential support of 
seeing the teddies again in Task2, which was discussed in the previous chapter, whereas 
the combined prompt involved the memory-check being given within a hypothetical 
scenario. Therefore, provided children were first explicitly cued to use imagery and were 
in 'pretence mode' they were able to respond to the memory-check question for the initial 
addend of each problem posed within a hypothetical context. This was in direct contrast 
to the findings from the previous experiment where the single memory-prompt 
instructions were not understood when presented within a hypothetical context.
However, if the impact of the single memory prompt was due to the extra referential 
support provided by seeing the teddies again, this points to the powerfulness of some 
'concretising' image. This together with the positive findings for the combined prompt
106
suggests children might use some visually-based image. Perhaps using imagery enabled 
the children to suspend their current reality thereby understanding the task demands and 
respond literally to the repetitive questioning involved when the memory-check was 
asked for the initial number of each computation. Furthermore, this sensitivity of 
children to using imagery, when reasoning arithmetically, further supports the findings of 
Hawkins et al (1984) and Dias & Harris (1988, 1990) for the powerfulness of the 
imagination in analytical reasoning tasks
The differential impact of the combined prompt in relation to either of the single prompts 
also provides some evidence that memory prompting and imagery are independent. 
Therefore, the explanation that any strategic prompt works in the same way by 
encouraging a child to be strategic or suppressing an inappropriate strategy can be 
discounted. However, it cannot be claimed that this indicates the two types of prompt 
are mutually exclusive since the imagery instructions involve a number of manipulations 
which may have some beneficial impact on memory. Such findings again support those 
for Cowan & Renton (1996) who also found that by removing the need for the children 
to remember the invisible addends of a computation improved their performance and 
proved to be more accurate than when they could see the objects. One outstanding 
question is how the differences in the effectiveness of imagery-prompt reported so far in 
this research, relating to the younger five year old children, might be explained. There 
seem to be three main explanations.
First, the findings for the positive impact of all strategic prompting reported so far, 
whether it be memory, 'closing eyes', imagei*y or the combined prompt are not 
incompatible with the recent findings of Leevers & Harris (1996) and Leevers (1996). 
Their follow-up work on the Dias & Harris (1988, 1990) findings compared the 
effectiveness of imagery on young children's syllogistic reasoning with simply instructing 
the children to think about the syllogisms when solving them. Both strategic prompts 
were equally successful for the four year old children tested, with both interventions 
encouraging the children to adopt an analytic strategy. This was shown by the greater 
number of justifications given according to the logic of the premises when compared
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with a control group who received the syllogisms with no instruction. It was concluded 
that both instructions improved reasoning by pinpointing contexts to children where it is 
beneficial to reason analytically. Subsequently, Leevers (1996) reported that by 
instructing children to treat the premises of the syllogisms as reality, resulted in subjects 
responding equally well to those instructed to use imagery, even if the children were 
exposed to an empirical bias in initial testing. Moreover, these results were found to hold 
true when children were tested a week later. Leevers claimed that although children 
might implicitly use their imagination it was the 'explicitness’ of instructing the children to 
override their real world knowledge which was the crucial factor. This suggests that 
simply instructing children to be 'strategic' when solving addition and subtraction 
problems might be equally effective to the imagery-prompt and may encourage the 
children that this is a context where they are required to reason analytically.
Secondly, the reported benefits of using imagery in mathematics have often been 
suggested (Skemp 1971, Edwards & Edwards 1992, Resnick & Ford 1981, Siegler & 
Robinson 1982, Siegler 1987). However, an imagery-prompt may only be effective for 
those who would opt to use such a strategy, in increasing confidence in their choice 
(Bryant 1982, Cowan et al 1993). According to Logie et al 1994, when referring to the 
Siegler & Shrager (1984) choice-model the extent to which visual imagery is 
spontaneously used in arithmetic is debatable but it possibly 'offers one of a number of 
strategies available and that only some individuals would choose to use imagery' (p. 398).
Finally, when offering an explicit strategic prompt to aid children in their computation 
process it cannot be assumed that this is what they actually do. A final possibility is that 
the differences in significance for the imagery-prompt are due to the fact that children 
tend to use multiple strategies when performing addition and subtraction (eg. Siegler 
1987a, 1996). Perhaps they might opt for imagery one trial and not another. A 
Distribution of Association model (Siegler & Shrager 1984) was hypothesised where 
strategy choices are viewed as subject to individual past experience with that 
computation: the more experience with a computation or indeed arithmetic itself the 
greater confidence and greater likelihood of a good strategy choice. Since these children
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have received no formal instruction in arithmetic their performance is likely to be more 
variable than the older age group. There is also a greater likelihood of a failure to realise 
the efficiency of one strategy as opposed to another or less confidence to use strategies 
they know when having to make their own choice (Fuson 1988, Cowan et al 1993). 
Moreover, clearly individual differences play a part in strategy choices and performance 
at arithmetic, since as reported in Experiment 2 there has since been a replication of the 
imagery-prompt with this younger age of child (Howlett 1996).
As far as overall task effects were concerned the previous findings for the beneficial 
effect of contextual support were replicated. The significant main effect of type was 
again attributable to addition being more correctly answered overall than subtraction 
which was contrary to prediction. However, the combined prompt was particularly 
effective for subtraction for both ages with the younger children sustaining their Taskl 
performance in Task2 and the older children making an improvement. The overall 
significance was mainly attributable to the single imagery-prompt which yielded a marked 
difference between type with addition being better than subtraction. The impact of the 
combined strategy on subtraction problems may point to additive strategic prompting 
working most effectively on the more difficult problems suggesting its impact to be at a 
child's threshold of arithmetical competence.
In summary, current findings from all the investigations undertaken so far tend to support 
the beneficial effect of giving children an explicit strategic prompt when doing mental 
arithmetic. As a child moves from five to six years they are more sensitive to such 
elaborated prompts, whether it be a memory-check, imagery-prompt or simply closing 
their eyes, whereas at around five years of age when adopting a mentalistic strategy 
ensuring the numbers of the problem are remembered leads to a more consistent positive 
result. The beneficial effect of encouraging a child to use an explicit strategic prompt on 
more difficult problems was also found. For example, there was strong performance in 
subtraction problems particularly for the combined prompt. When combining the 
memory and imagery prompts, there was found to be an additive effect pointing to 
imagery and memory operating independently. However, this is not to say that the two
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are mutually exclusive. However, whether or not children actually use some visual mental 
model when performing the computation is debatable. The fact that the children were 
able to understand the memory-prompt presented within a hypothetical scenario task 
provided they had first been cued to use imagery and failed to do so without this prompt 
suggests they may have been using some visual strategy. However, performance could 
still be based on making a subitizing strategy more likely, or even more effective, since 
subitizing could have been utilised for 6 out of the 10 problems which only involve 
numbers up to and including 5 (Starkey & Cooper 1995). Furthermore, a follow-up 
study is needed to pick up on the Leevers & Harris (1996) and Leevers (1996) findings 
prompting children simply to be 'strategic’ when solving the addition and subtraction 
problems. If this were effective, it would emphasise the importance given to activities 
encouraging efficient strategy use when children learn arithmetic (eg. Thornton 1978, 
Baroody 1984b, Thornton 1988) where children are taught strategies and also 
encouraged to devise their own 'thinking strategies' to make connections and construct 
relationships between numbers when working out novel ways of solving arithmetic.
At this point in the research it was decided to widen the investigation to compare a 
formal written presentation of the problems with the informal presentation of the 
hypothetical context. This also followed up on the memory findings since presenting the 
problems in written formal code notation clearly removed the need to remember either of 
the numbers. Testing children’s performance with formal code problems also explores 
the difficulties of children have in the 'translation' process when presented with formal 
code arithmetic (Hughes 1981) and supported by the first experiment reported in this 
research. The aim was to present the problems written in formal code notation whilst at 
the same time providing the referential support of the hypothetical context. This was to 
make the link between the formal notation and the concrete referents, to which they 
referred, instead of using the formalised language of arithmetic.
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CHAPTER 6 
Experiment 6
An investigation of the 'translation* process with written formal code notation
6.1 INTRODUCTION
The rationale behind the final four experiments was to widen the perspective when 
investigating the effects of explicit strategic prompting. The experimental paradigm 
adopted in the previous experiments was the verbal presentation of arithmetic 
problems whereas this experiment changed the focus to a written presentation in 
formal code notation. This provided an opportunity to investigate the effect of a 
formal as opposed to the more informal presentation provided by the hypothetical 
context instructions, which enabled exploration of the 'translation' process when 
moving from performing arithmetic with referential support to presentation of formal 
code notation. Furthermore, it afforded a follow-up on the memory findings from 
Experiments 4 and 5 since a written presentation removed the need for the children to 
remember either of the numbers to be computed. Therefore, the aim was to compare 
performance using a written presentation with that using the base-level hypothetical 
context where those in the written condition received exactly the same verbal 
instructions as those in the hypothetical condition. The only difference between the 
two groups was the extra written format received by those doing the written 
presentation.
The theoretical findings underlying this experiment centre around young children's 
difficulty when presented with formal code arithmetic. The Hughes' findings (1981) 
which show that children can perform simple arithmetic when provided with contextual 
support were replicated in Experiment 1 of this research where both imagery and 
hypothetical groups performed well. However, results from the first investigation 
showed a significant difference between the two groups, when presented with the same 
problems in formal code. This demonstrated that explicitly cueing an imagery strategy.
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over and above the baseline hypothetical support, enabled translation between the two 
types of thinking to be significantly more effective. Hughes (1986) went on to outline 
this difficulty of'translation', between the two different types of thinking, to be a 
two-way problem since he found older children failed to be able to translate back from 
a written to concrete representation. When asking 5-7 year olds to represent formal 
code problems with bricks he found that instead of direct modelling of the 
computation, the children either simply represented the 'answer' to the problem using 
bricks or used the bricks to construct an image of the numbers even including the 
operator signs of'plus' and 'minus'. His findings supported those of Stallard (1982) on 
6-10 year olds where more children were found to be competent, when representing 
sums with blocks, with sums written conventionally (2+2=) than with the less 
conventional box-type sums (2+?=4). Stallard also found the successful children to be 
those whom the teacher deemed to be 'good with numbers' irrespective of their age and 
their stage in the school curriculum. Goswami (1992) classed this failure of 
'translation' outlined by Hughes as an inability of children to understand that using 
concrete referents provided them with analogies for representing formal code sums.
She also distinguished between two systems of knowledge about number - 'concrete' 
and 'written' - with the problem being 'weak mapping' between the two.
The problems children have when transferring from an informal to formal structure in 
arithmetic have also been investigated through the 'street mathematics' research 
(Carraher et al 1985, Nunes et al 1993). Brazilian children were found able to solve 
complex computations when encountered whilst selling in a street market but failed 
when faced with the same problem written in a formal school algorithm. Nunes et al 
(1993) distinguished between two different practices in arithmetic performance - 'oral' 
and 'written' - which were not attributable to differences in any conceptual invariants 
when solving the problems but differences in functional organisation of the symbolic 
systems themselves. Responses from oral computations allowed the solver to retain 
the sense of the computation throughout the process through preserving the relative 
values of the numbers being computed, eg. 100-78 is solved verbally by counting up, 
whereas the school algorithm uses the decomposition process working from the units
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through to tens and thence to hundreds. According to Nunes et al, street mathematics, 
which is set within a social context, made more sense and was goal directed whereas 
school mathematics involved the learning and memorising of a set of steps in order to 
solve a sum. This model is based on a skills-first principle leading on to understanding 
of the basic principles underlying such computations (eg. Briar & Siegler 1984).
When investigating young children's competence in understanding the written 
symbolism involved in addition and subtraction, there was also found to be a mismatch 
between the system of arithmetical symbols young children need to learn and their 
spontaneous written conceptualisations. Pre-school children spontaneously represent 
number in an iconic or pictographic form, similar to a tally system (Hughes 1986) 
preferring not to use symbolic representation until at least 6 year of age. Sinclair 
(1991) saw this as failure to understand the cardinal meaning of a written numeral. 
Allardice (1977) also found young children to more easily represent quantity than 
addition and subtraction problems. The difficulty children have in interpreting operator 
signs (Stallard 1982, Hughes 1986) has been attributed to a failure to understand them 
in terms of the relationships between numbers instead simply seeing them as a prompt 
to do something (Sinclair 1991) eg. given an answer to the problem. Hughes (1983b) 
developed a tin-game to investigate whether children could be trained to use operator 
signs if given a reason to. In this game children needed to communicate how many 
items had been added to and taken away from the tin and they learned how to do this 
through use of the 'plus' and 'minus' operator signs. But when the game was finished 
this learned skill was not found to generalise to other situations. In this experiment, 
the offering of contextual support through using the verbal instructions of the 
hypothetical context, together with the written presentation, provided a similar 
intervention to Hughes' experiment since it was making a link between the formal code 
notation and the teddies, recording how many were being put in and taken out of the 
box. Taking all this evidence together, suggests those children, who receive the more 
informal instructions provided by the referential support of the hypothetical context 
alone, will do better than those who receive the formal written presentation.
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The other facet involved in the written presentation was to follow up on the positive 
effect found in the previous two experiments for a memory prompt. Clearly an 
outcome of a written presentation of the problems in formal code was the removal of 
the need for the children to keep track of the numbers to be computed during the 
calculation. If the difficulty children experience when asked formal code arithmetic 
verbally (eg. 'what does one and one make?') is a by-product of a failure to be able to 
remember the numbers of the problem as Bryant & Trabasso (1971) and Oakhill 
(1984) found when investigating transitive inference then providing a written 
presentation will negate this. Given the positive findings for the impact of a 
memory-check, for the initial number of each computation, found to-date and provided 
the children understand the link between the written notation and the teddies then 
those children receiving the written presentation should do better than those who 
receive only the verbal hypothetical context instructions.
In summary, the current experimental design included two groups: Written - those 
who received the written presentation together with verbal instructions and 
Hypothetical - those who received the verbal presentation only. Both groups were 
required to pass the standard pre-test of counting up to 8 using one-to-one 
correspondence carried out in previous experiments but the Written group was 
required to take an additional pre-test of number recognition up to 8. Operator signs 
were not pre-tested since children were more familiar with '+' as an addition sign 
rather than 'and' and not all would have been introduced to the subtraction sign '-'.
Only the older age children (5 years plus) were tested. The same 10 arithmetic 
problems were presented with the same two tasks: Taskl (Box Closed) followed by 
Task2 (Hypothetical Box).
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6.2 METHOD 
Subjects
Fifty-eight children, 28 girls and 30 boys, aged 5 years acted as subjects. All attended 
Infant school and were in their second and third terms of the Reception class. The 
children fonried one age group aged 5:3 to 5:9 years with a mean of 5:7 years (n=58). 
The children were randomly selected from a number of schools with balancing for sex. 
The performance of this Written group (n=58) was compared with that of the older 
Hypothetical (eyes open) group (n=31) from Experiment 2.
Table 6.2.1
Mean age in months (standard deviation) by group 
N=89
Group Older only
Written 66.5 (2.3) (n=58)
Hypothetical 65.1 (2.6) (n=31)
Materials
8 teddies and a box (24cm x 24cm x 12cm) and a score sheet. Eight sheets of paper 
with numbers from one to eight written on each sheet. 10 sheets of paper with each of 
the 10 problems written in formal code notation.
Procedure
After completion of a pre-test of counting the 8 teddies using one-to-one 
correspondence, the children from the Written group (n=58) were given a second 
pre-test of number recognition. The numbered sheets were shown individually, in 
random order, and the children were asked to name the number. Failure at any number 
resulted in exclusion from the experiment. The child was then introduced to the notion 
of'playing a game to help do some sums'. Each of the two tasks was given in order 
Taskl followed by Task2 and consisted of the same 10 number problems, as in 
Experiments 2, 3, 4 and 5 and were completed at one sitting.
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T+1', '2-1', '1+2', '3-2', '2+3', '4-3', '5+2', '6-2', '6+1', '7-1'
All children completed the problems in the same order as set out above beginning with 
'1+r and finishing with '7-1'. The problems were presented and answered verbally by 
both the Written and Hypothetical groups. The author is the Experimenter throughout 
this experiment.
TASKl - BOX CLOSED (Both groups)
This was identical for both groups and the instructions were set out in Experiment 1 on 
page 53.
TASK 2 - HYPOTHETICAL BOX 
Hypothetical group
This group (n=31) were those children in Experiment 2 from the older Hypothetical 
(eyes open) group reported in Experiment 2 and the instructions are on page 73.
Written group
The Experimenter put the box aside and showed the child individually each of the 10 
problems presented in written formal code notation and said. 'If there was one teddy in 
the box (whilst pointing to the number 1 ie. the initial addend of the sum '1+T) and 
(pointing to the addition operator (+) sign) we put one more in (pointing to the final 
number o f '1'), how many teddies does that make altogether? For subtraction 
problems, if  there were two teddies in the box (pointing to the number '2' in the 
problem '2-1') and we took one away (pointing to the 'subtraction operator sign' and 
the number '1'), how many would be left?'
6.3 RESULTS
A 3-way ANOVA was carried out on the subjects' total correct scores on the 10 
problems with group (2) as a between-subjects factor and task (2) and type (2) 
(addition v subtraction) as within-subjects factors. The Source of Variation table is 
shown at Appendix 5. The mean number of correct responses by group and task are 
shown in Table 6.3.1 shown overleaf.
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Table 6.3.1
Experiment 6
Mean correct responses (out of 10) for each task by group
N=89 Written Hypothetical
(n=58) (n=31)
Taskl 7.57(1.87) 6.1(1.6)
Task2 6.62(2.83) 4.52(2.37)
There was a significant main effect of group (F=15.79 df=l,87 p<0.001) with the 
Written group gaining significantly more correct responses than the Hypothetical with 
a drop of 13% for the Written and 26% for the Hypothetical from Taskl to Task2.
As far as within-subject factors were concerned there was a highly significant main 
effect of task (F=29.86 df=l,87 p<0.001) with Taskl being more correctly answered 
than Task2 and a significant main effect of type of problem (F=18.8 df=l,87 p<0.001) 
with addition being more successfiilly answered than subtraction. The mean number of 
correct responses by group, task and type are shown below at Table 6.3.2.
Table 6.3.2
Experiment 6
Mean correct responses (out of 5) by group, task and type
N=89 Written Hypothetical
Add Subtract Add Subtract
Taskl 4.02(1.08) 3.55(1.05) 2.97(0.88) 3.13(1.15)
Tasli2 3.72(1.42) 2.9(1.64) 2.48(1.29) 2.03(1.3)
There was a significant interaction of group and type (F=7.54 djf=l,87 p<0.01) shown 
at Fig 6.3.1 which shows the Written group scoring more correct responses both for 
addition and subtraction compared with the Hypothetical group across both tasks with 
a larger differential performance by the Written group. There was also a highly 
significant interaction of task and type (F=7.93 df=l,87 p<0.01) shown at Fig 6.3.2 
highlighting a bigger deterioration fi-om Taskl to Task2 for subtraction (21%) when 
compared with addition (8%) scores.
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6.4 DISCUSSION
This investigation looked again at children's difficulty when presented with arithmetic 
in formal code outlined by Hughes (1981, 1986) and also followed up the findings for 
the significant impact of memory when young children are doing arithmetic. 
According to the Hughes's viewpoint the children in the Hypothetical group should 
have gained more correct responses than those in the Written. However, if the
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findings for memory were robust this would have predicted a better performance by 
the Written group where the need to remember the numbers was removed.
The results showed the Written group performed considerably better (p<0.001) than 
the Hypothetical group thus discounting any consideration of this significant difference 
being a by-product of the poorer baseline Taskl scoring of the Hypothetical group. 
Therefore, the formal written presentation proved more effective than the more 
informal presentation of the hypothetical context instructions alone. Moreover, these 
findings point to the difficulty children have when faced with written formal code sums 
as not necessarily being with the written symbolism (Hughes 1986, Stallard 1982). 
Further weight is also added to Hughes (1983b) findings in his 'tin game' experiment 
where children were able to understand and use arithmetical written notation provided 
they understood the reason for it and how such written symbols were used to convey 
meaning. In the same way, this experimental design introduced the formal code 
problems to the Written group with a referential context so that it was understood that 
each number was referring to the number of teddies with the operator signs signifying 
the number being added or taken away from the box. This picks up on Bryant's (1985) 
claim that the important thing for children to understand is 'when' to employ what they 
have already learned. This also offers support for the ability to help children in the 
'translation' process of solving addition and subtraction problems with contextual 
support as opposed to formal code problems with no referential support ('what does 
one and one make?'). The only difference between the two groups was the written 
support experienced by the Written group because the verbal task instructions were 
exactly the same in terms of the referential support for both groups. However, the 
written presentation was a visual presentation and possibly this could have prompted a 
visual strategy. But, the most compelling explanation for the enhanced performance of 
the Written strategy, given the previous findings in this research, may be success is a 
by-product of removing the need for a child to keep track of the two numbers to be 
computed thereby perhaps lessening the processing load during calculation.
The notion of success being a by-product of memory, questions whether what Hughes
(1981) described as a failure to translate when moving from an embedded to
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disembedded context and Greeno et al (1984) and Gelman & Meek (1986) coins as 
failure in utilisation competence may simply be a by-product of failing to remember the 
numbers to compute. This is supported by the findings fi-om the previous two 
experiments for the positive effect of providing a memory-check for the initial addend. 
Furthermore, it supports those of Cowan & Renton (1996) for the success with 
invisible addends provided they were provided with a numerical representation of the 
unseen items and also those of Bryant & Trabasso (1971) with regard to transitive 
inference. However, any part played by memory in the performance of the Written 
group is complex when comparing performance of the memory-prompt for the initial 
addend only which was undertaken in Experiment 4. For the memory-prompt, there 
were total mean correct response scores of 8.0 and 7.5 (out of 10) for Taskl and 
Task2 respectively, compared to 7.6 and 6.6 for the Written group where both 
numbers were 'prompted'. Therefore, checking for retention of the initial addend of 
each sum was more effective than when the children did not need to remember either 
of the numbers. This indicates that there is not necessarily a linear relationship 
between cognitive load and performance since removing the necessity to keep track of 
either numbers in the computation did not benefit performance more than providing a 
memory-check for only the initial addend. However, it has already been highlighted 
that success of the memory-prompt could in some way be attributable to the referential 
support of'seeing the teddies' again in Task2. Therefore, a follow-up experiment is 
needed to control for memory as a by-product of the written presentation. A third 
group of children could be tested who were provided with a memory-check of the 
number of teddies, being put into and taken out of the box, through being shown the 
respective numerals, instead of the written formal code notation.
As far as task effects were concerned, there was again fiirther support for the enhanced 
performance of children when provided with contextual support with Taskl being 
more correctly answered than Task2 for both groups. The addition problems were 
more correctly answered than subtraction, with the significant interaction of group and 
type showing a bigger differential in Task2 between addition and subtraction for the 
Written group compared to Hypothetical. However, this may simply reflect the poorer
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performance of the Hypothetical group overall. The poorer Hypothetical group 
baseline Taskl scoring was also attributable to failure at addition as opposed to 
subtraction problems. The interaction of task and type showed addition as more 
successful than subtraction, with the bigger difference in Task2 showing that the 
experimental manipulation was more successful with addition. This is an interesting 
finding given the results for the combined prompt showed an impact on the subtraction 
problems. It may be that these results reflect the difficulty children have working with 
the subtraction operator signs. However, it is unsurprising that children find 
subtraction more difficult than addition when using mental arithmetic since 'counting 
down' is more difficult than 'counting up' (Carpenter & Moser 1983) and all Task2 
instructions only provide a referential context as opposed to seeing the concrete 
materials as in Taskl. To this extent, it may be that offering an explicit strategic 
prompt is more effective with subtraction problems since this experiment provided no 
prompt only a written presentation.
In summary, the findings in our previous experiments for enhanced performance the 
greater the contextual support were again supported. Children were also found to be 
more successful with a formal presentation as opposed to an informal one, when 
offered the facilitatory effect of contextual support, to make the link between the 
written numbers and their respective entities, the absent teddies. This is a striking 
finding. However, it cannot be discounted owing to the prior findings for the 
effectiveness of a memory-prompt, that the written representation also removed the 
need for the child to keep track of the numbers and that this may in some way have 
accounted for this superior performance.
The next chapter makes a complete shift in focus to look at child initiated strategies 
when solving simple addition and subtraction problems. Whether young children are 
normally astrategic, simply volatile in their computational execution, use inappropriate 
strategies or whether they build on previously learned strategies, any attempt to 
understand strategy usage needs to consider strategies which children use 
spontaneously.
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CHAPTER 7
The effect of child-initiated strategies in solving arithmetic
The first experiment reported in this chapter aims to compare performance of two 
explicitly prompted counting-support strategies: the use of 'fingers* v 'counters'. This 
approach is based on the idea of direct modelling of the problem with the use of 
concrete referents for working out arithmetical computations (Carpenter & Moser
1983). Unlike the previous investigations so far, this allows a comparison of a 
child-initiated strategy (fingers) with a school-driven strategy (counters). It gives the 
children 'permission' to use a strategy which they often choose to use spontaneously 
both in this research and that of others (Hughes, 1981, Starkey & Gelman 1982, 
Siegler & Robinson 1982, Siegler & Jenkins 1989). This experimental design also had 
the added benefit of discounting consideration as to whether the children acted directly 
upon the explicit strategic prompt since both usage of fingers and counters was overt 
as opposed to the mentalistic strategies used to-date. The second experiment 
investigated whether the children would choose to treat the task as a counting task, 
instead of using mental arithmetic, if concrete referents were available but not 
explicitly prompted. According to Piagetian theory children of 4 to 5 years should find 
treating the task as a counting task easier than mental arithmetic, which is likely to lead 
to more correct responses in the arithmetic. Having obtained a measure of 
performance for the children when explicitly prompted to use concrete referents in the 
first experiment, a comparison is made with the number of correct responses given in 
the second experiment. Both experiments tested the same two age groups of children 
as in previous investigations. A third experiment explored the use of'counters' with a 
younger age of child, those of four-and-a-half years.
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Experiment 7 
The effectiveness of 'fingers* v 'counters'
7.1. INTRODUCTION
A Vygotskian (Vygotsky 1978) social-cognitivist theoretical viewpoint, which stresses 
the role of culture in the learning environment, would claim an investigation into the 
use of'fingers' v 'counters' in arithmetic, provides a comparison of two cultural tools 
used by children in number development. The importance of cultural tools in this 
regard has also been underlined by research of Fuson & Kwon (1992). The present 
experiment also provided feedback on whether the often child-initiated strategy of 
fingers works equally as well as the school-driven strategy of using counters. Use of 
fingers has been termed as an informal strategy, which children develop in their natural 
environment (Ginsburg 1977, Van Devender 1986), irrespective of the instruction they 
receive at school. Informal strategies which have been found to be more effective than 
formal school methods (Nunes et al 1993) are sometimes claimed to bear little relation 
to those taught in school (Carpenter & Moser 1983). Therefore, these findings would 
predict that children are likely to perform better with the informal strategy of 'fingers' 
compared to the formal strategy of 'counters'.
The use of concrete referents in the learning of arithmetic is firmly rooted in 
psychological theory. Svenson & Sjoberg (1983) outlined a developmental 
progression in arithmetic beginning with not being able to solve the problem, to 
moving on to use concrete referents to represent the absent objects (also serving as an 
external memory aid) and thence to mental arithmetic where working memory acts to 
replace any external memory aid. In short, the role of concrete referents is as a 
facilitator of accurate counting, an external memory aid thereby imposing less work on 
working memory or acting as a back-up strategy when the computation is too difficult 
for direct retrieval or mental arithmetic (eg. Siegler 1996).
The use of concrete objects in the early years, as an aid to learning mathematical 
concepts, has been widely advocated (Bruner 1962, Piaget 1965). In number 
development, Piaget (1952) viewed the child as unable to reason abstractly until
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reaching the concrete operational stage of development at around 6 to 7 years. In this 
way, the child is seen to move from concrete to semi-concrete 
(iconic-pictures/diagrams) to abstract thinking. Hughes (1986) cited 'fingers' and 
'counters' as an iconic representation, similar to a tally system, based on the use of 
one-to-one correspondence between a finger and the absent concrete referent. This 
theory would suggest that children should perform better with both fingers and 
counters when compared to the other mentalistic strategic prompts already 
investigated in the previous experiments.
More recently it has been questioned whether such practice, with concrete referents, is 
necessarily the only critical factor leading to conceptual understanding of addition. For 
example, others claim that in order to understand the principles of commutativity and 
subtraction being the inverse of addition, practice with understanding the additive 
composition of number is advocated (Kornilaki 1994, Nunes et al 1996). Moreover, 
Goswami (1992) claimed that the use of concrete referents to represent each number in 
arithmetical computations was teaching through analogy. According to Piaget this 
does not develop until a child reached formal operational thought at around 11 years. 
Furthermore, this kind of understanding has been shown to be slow to develop by 
Holyoak, Junn & Billman 1984. Others have also questioned whether direct modelling 
using concrete referents is necessarily the most effective strategy once a child has 
begun to use mental arithmetic or direct retrieval of number facts (Stallard 1982, 
Hughes 1986). Cowan et al (1996) also found when investigating the 
order-irrelevance principle in counting that physical counting by the child themselves 
did not necessarily lead to more correct responses. These findings would, therefore, 
suggest the opposite, that performance when using concrete referents would not 
necessarily be superior to the mentalistic strategies investigated so far. Instead other 
factors, such as the ensuring the children can remembers the number to be computed 
and the importance of offering support with strategy choice, may be more beneficial 
than lots of practice with practical apparatus.
This experiment was, therefore, concerned with concrete referents as a facilitator of 
accurate counting. Importance of counting in a child's number development is widely
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accepted (Gelman & Gallistel 1978, Michie 1984b, Fuson 1988, Cowan 1991, Sophian 
1992, Nunes & Bryant 1996) as opposed to the lesser emphasis assigned to it by 
Piaget and this was extensively outlined in the Literature Review. The differing 
theoretical viewpoints as to what develops first, whether conceptual understanding or 
procedural competence have also been discussed. According to Gelman & Gallistel 
(1978) the underlying principles of counting (one-to-one correspondence, stable order, 
cardinality, order irrelevance and abstraction) precede procedural competence in 
counting which is in turn followed by utilisation competence. Failure when presented 
with formal code problems is attributed to an inability to tap this utilisation 
competence (Greeno et al 1984, Gelman & Meek 1986). In direct contrast. Briars & 
Siegler (1984) adopted a skills-first approach seeing counting development inducted 
from adult teaching through imitation, practice and reinforcement which in turn leads 
to conceptual understanding. Others adopt a mutual-development view where 
understanding of number-word counting evolves gradually and in conjunction with 
counting-skill development (Baroody & Ginsburg 1986, Fuson 1988). The skills-first 
viewpoint predicts that the children should perform best, in whichever strategy (fingers 
or counters) with which they have received the most practice.
With specific reference to the use of the child's own fingers in counting tasks, the 
degree to which using fingers can be truly defined as an inherently child-spontaneous 
strategy is open to question. Flegg (1984) viewed 'fingers' as a universal practice 
owing to its cross-cultural usage with contemporary Brazilian tribes using words 
meaning 'finger' and 'double finger' for one and two (Popp 1978). The Oksapmin, a 
tribe of Papua, New Guinea, use a system of number representation based on counting 
body parts. The influence of fingers is also shown in the British number system, 
through the decade system, with this hindu-arabic numeration system having its origin 
in the fingers of two hands (Van Devender 1986). Apart from any evolutionary basis, 
children also have plenty of opportunity of observing others using their fingers whilst 
counting in their natural environment (Ginsburg 1977, Hughes 1986) eg. parents/carers 
making a link between the abstract and concrete with fingers in order to help 
pre-school children to keep track of numbers in a nursery rhyme (eg. 3 currant buns in 
the baker's shop). Moreover, it has also already been stated that children are found to
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spontaneously use fingers when needing to count (Hughes 1981, Starkey & Gelman
(1982), Siegler & Robinson 1982, Siegler & Jenkins 1989). This finding has also been 
supported in this current research where children still used fingers when explicitly 
prompted to use other strategies. Using fingers to teach early mathematical concepts 
has been found to be successfiil with many young children (Fuson & Secada 1986, 
Zaslavsky 1979) and counting up with fingers in subtraction is seen to build a good 
understanding between addition and subtraction (Fuson & Secada 1986). However, in 
school at present there exists an inconsistent attitude by teachers concerning the status 
of finger usage when teaching arithmetic resulting in finger counting often being used 
surreptitiously eg. under the table (Ginsburg 1977, Van Devender 1986). Our 
previous experiments also support this phenomena in that some children spontaneously 
used their fingers when explicitly cued to use another strategy. In contrast, daily use 
of other concrete referents when counting eg. multi-link, diennes blocks, counters etc. 
is consistently applied in schools as good practice.
When using their fingers in a counting task this always involves the lifting up and 
putting down of fingers (Fuson 1982), in some shape or form, based on the notion that 
the child can count to 10 verbally using one-to-one correspondence. How children 
actually manipulate their fingers tends to be idiosyncratic. Sometimes finger selection 
is random-like, where there is no particular starting finger or hand when modelling 
each problem, or it can be through using a set finger pattern eg. Chisanbop. Chisanbop 
is a Japanese finger counting system based on number patterns where a set finger 
pattern represents each number from 1 to 10. The advantages of fingers, as opposed 
to other concrete referents like counters, are viewed as the special grouping of the 
hand with an imaginable system of base 5 allowing speedy execution (Nunes & Bryant 
1996), their easy manipulation and the fact that they are always present (Hughes 
1986). The following strategies when using fingers have been observed while 
investigating children's addition and subtraction (Siegler & Robinson 1982, Siegler & 
Shrager 1984, Siegler & Jenkins 1989).
Count all fingers - the appropriate number of fingers is shown to represent each 
number of the sum and each finger is counted started from the beginning.
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Finger recognition - eg. for the sum 3+5', '3' fingers followed by '5' are lifted and a 
reply of 8 is given without counting. This may happen through kinesthetic sensation 
and is faster than counting (Siegler & Robinson 1982).
Short-cut sum - a memory aid for the 'addend' or 'minuend' when counting up or down 
respectively.
Fuson (1988) outlined a developmental progression between these solution strategies 
as: 'counting all' followed by 'short-cut sum' (counting on with entities or concrete 
referents) followed by sequence 'counting on' involving matching number words to 
representation of the second addend thereby using working memory as the memory 
aid. This experiment was only concerned with 'count all fingers' and 'finger 
recognition' since the children were explicitly prompted to model each problem with 
the concrete referents.
The same experimental paradigm and age groups of children were used as in previous 
experiments. The children were divided into two groups - 'Counters' and 'Fingers' - 
where each group was explicitly prompted to use their respective concrete referents 
when solving the problems. Unlike previous experiments both these strategies 
involved the children in a counting task in Task2 as opposed to using mental arithmetic 
and therefore the age and task effects reported in the previous experiments are unlikely 
to be supported. It is also predicted that there will be no difference between addition 
and subtraction problems since the children can solve subtraction using direct 
modelling in terms of'separating from' (Carpenter & Moser 1983) which is easier than 
having to count down when using mental arithmetic.
7.2 METHOD 
Subjects
One hundred and twenty children (N=120), 62 girls and 58 boys, aged 4 to 5 years 
acted as subjects. 60 children were in their first term of Infants school {'younger') 
with an age range of 4:10 - 5:2 years and a mean of 5:0 years and 60 in their second or 
third term of the Reception class i^oldef) aged 5:3 - 5:8yrs and a mean of 5:5yrs. The 
'Younger' group - 32 girls and 28 boys and the 'Older group' - 30 girls and 30 boys.
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The Younger and Older age groups were randomly allocated to Fingers (n==58) and 
Counters (n=62) conditions balanced for sex.
Table 7.2.1
Mean age in months (standard deviation) by group and age
N=120
Group Younger Older
Counters
Fingers
60.1(1.2) (n=32) 
59.6(1.7) (n=28)
65.4(1.4) (n=30) 
65.7(2.2) (n=30)
Materials
8 small teddy bears and a square box together with 8 small yellow counters and a score 
sheet.
Procedure
After completing the pre-test of counting to eight using one-to-one correspondence 
the child was introduced to the notion of'playing a game to help do some sums'. The 
procedure followed the same format as that of previous experiments in that there were 
two tasks - Taskl followed by Task2 - which consisted of the following 10 problems 
presented to each child verbally by the same Experimenter who again was the author;
'1+1', '2-l','l+2', '3-2', '2+3', '4-3', '5+2', '6-2', '6+1',' 7-1'
Each child completed these problems in the same order as set out above beginning with 
'1+T and finishing with '7-1' and at one sitting.
TASKl (BOX CLOSED) (Both groups)
Each group received the same instructions as shown in Experiment 1 (Imageiy v 
Hypothetical) on page 53.
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TASK 2 (HYPOTHETICAL BOX)
Fingers group
In this condition the child solved the problems using their fingers. The Experimenter 
put the teddies and box aside and said: I f  there was one teddy in the box - can you 
show me one finger - and we put one more in (use your fingers to help you). How 
many would that make altogether?' For subtraction problems, i f  there were two 
teddies in the box - canyon show me two fingers - and we took one out, how many 
would be left?' The Experimenter did not present the second number of the problem 
until the child agreed they had shown the correct number of fingers for the initial 
number. The child carried out the second finger manipulation unprompted.
Counters group
The Experimenter put the teddies and box aside. The Experimenter arranged the 
counters in a line and said: 'If there was one teddy in the box - can you show me one 
counter - and we put one more in (use the counters to help you). How many wotdd 
that make altogether?' If the child failed to use the counters spontaneously the 
Experimenter used a prompt for the first number of the problem. The child was left to 
manipulate the counters for the second number of the problem by themselves. For 
subtraction problems, the instructions followed the same format as dhovQ....'If there 
were two teddies in the box and we took one out, how many would be left?'
7.3 RESULTS
A 4-way ANOVA was carried with group (2) and age (2) as between-subjects factors 
and task (2) and type (2) (addition v subtraction) as within-subjects factors. Source of 
Variation tables are at Appendix 6.1. The means out of 10 (with standard deviations in 
brackets) are given in Table 7.3.1 below and illustrated at Fig 7.3.1
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Table 7.3.1
Experiment 7
Mean correct responses (out of 10) for each task by age and group
N=120
Taskl
Task2
Fin;gers Counters
Younger
(n=28)
6.29(1.86)
6.11(2.57)
Older
(n=30)
7.4(1.91)
7.8(2.31)
Younger
(n=32)
6.59(1.43)
8.75(1.48)
Older
(n=30)
7.1(1.58)
8.83(1.66)
Fig 7.3.1
Mean correct responses (out of 10) for each task by age and group
(Younger group scores are shown at the front o f the bar chart with Older at the back)
Fingers Counters
I Taskl KlTasi<2
There was a significant main effect of group (F=9.70 df=l,l 16 p<0.01) with Counters 
doing better than Fingers. There was also a significant main effect of age (F=8.25 
df=l,l 16 p<0.01) with, as expected, the older children scoring better than the younger. 
As far as within-subject factors were concerned there was a main effect of task 
(F=34.98 df=l,l 16 p<0.001) with Task2 being more correctly answered than Taskl. 
This is again expected since both strategies involved the children in a counting task in 
Task2 as opposed to doing mental arithmetic on Taskl. There was a significant 
interaction of group and task (F=27.85 df=l,l 16 p<0.001) with Counters doing 
significantly better than Fingers in Task2 which can be seen from Fig 7.3.1. There was 
no main effect of type but there was a significant interaction of task by type (F=4.12 
df^l,l 16 p<0.05) shown at Fig 7.3.2 with subtraction gaining more correct responses
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than addition in Task2 and less in Taskl. Table 7.3.2. shows that the Counters group 
was more successful in Task2 than the Fingers group for the younger children.
Table 7.3.2
N=120
Experiment 7
Mean correct response (out of 5) by age, group, task and type
FINGERS COUNTERS
Younger(n=28) Older (n=30) Younger (n=32) Older (n=30)
Add Sub 
Taskl 3.18(1.12) 3.12(1.06) 
Task2 3.07(1.39)3.04(1.6)
Add Sub
3.7(1.12) 3.7(1.02) 
3.83(1.44)3.97(1.07)
Add Sub
3.44(0.95) 3.16(0.88) 
4.31(0.93)4.44(0.8)
Add Sub
3.73(0.98) 3.37(0.89) 
4.3(0.99) 4.53(0.9)
Fig 7.3.2
N=120
Experiment 7 
Interaction of task and type
4.1
3.9 
« 3.8
3.6
3.5
3.4
3.3Taskl Task2
Addition Subtraction
7.4 DISCUSSION
The finding that the use of counters was significantly better than fingers, with near 
ceiling effects reported, underlined a clear difference in performance between two 
cultural tools young children use when learning arithmetic. The use of counters as 
opposed to fingers allowed the younger age children to equal the performance of their
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older counterparts in Task2 resulting in increasing their Taskl performance from 6.6 
to 8.8 total mean correct response for Task2. The older children proved more 
effective with their fingers than the younger but for both age groups there was a 
greater variability in performance with larger standard deviations than the counters 
group. These findings therefore contrast with those from 'street mathematics' research 
which has found children's informal strategies to be more effective than school 
algorithms (Nunes et al 1993).
There are two possible explanations. The first explanation is that informal strategies 
are only effective if they are child-initiated and not explicitly prompted as was the case 
in this experiment. If children had never used their fingers for counting previously then 
this strategy would be less effective. In contrast, it may be the case that all the children 
would have experience of counting out objects. This would include experience of 
'joining objects together when adding' and 'separating from' when taking things away 
(Carpenter & Moser 1983). The results for some of the younger age children when 
using their fingers indicated a difficulty with understanding the word 'more' in the 
addition problems. For instance, when solving '2+3', two fingers were lifted, and then 
when asked for '3 more' only '1 more’ finger was lifted. This difficulty was not 
matched in the counters group. Such evidence may add weight to the skills-first (Briar 
& Siegler 1984) claim that lots of practice leads to understanding which has not been 
generalised from the 'counters' setting to that of'fingers'. Alternatively, if a child is 
unfamiliar with finger usage there can be a problem of resource overload when trying 
to model the computation with their fingers.
Children tended to have their own idiosyncratic way of using their fingers. Some used 
each hand to represent each number to be computed, others used up all fingers from 
one hand before moving on to the other. Some children were able to cope well when 
one hand was involved but could not cope with both hands with sums involving 
numbers over 5 (6 out of the 28 younger age group). As far as counters was 
concerned, all children understood how to count out the appropriate number of 
counters to represent each number of the problems and to 'join them' together or 
'separate from' for subtraction. The only difficulty experienced with counters was due
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to boredom or fatigue when having to count up lots of counters for the sums involving 
larger numbers which resulted in false negatives when responding. Sometimes children 
touched the table or their nose when doing the final computation when using their 
fingers in the same way as they touched the counters when doing the computation thus 
highlighting a preference for a dual sensory aspect. All counting strategies, identified 
by Siegler & Robinson (1982), were displayed including 'finger recognition', 'count all' 
and 'short-cut sum'. Some even used fingers to back-up their counters strategy. Using 
concrete referents as a back-up strategy is claimed as a key contributor to early 
performance (Geary, Bow-Thomas, Fan, & Siegler 1993) with 20% of 7-8 year old 
children still use fingers for computing numbers involved up to 13. Intervention studies 
by Fuson & Secada (1986) have shown the effectiveness of training children to use 
fingers in a specific way and this may be more efficacious than leaving children to work 
out their own finger patterns.
A second explanation of such a difference between counters and fingers performance 
may lie in the research of Brissiaud (1992) on finger usage which claims that the use of 
fingers need not necessarily simply be an enhancement of verbal counting. According 
to Brissiaud this was evidenced by children who lifted fingers to offer an iconic 
representation of numerosity prior to being able to give the correct number tag. Two 
systems of finger counting were put forward: a gesticular/analogue and verbal/ 
analogue. Subjects who could not reply verbally with the correct number word were 
still found to display the correct number of fingers. Children have been found to use 
finger strategies without counting. These have turned out to be faster than counting 
(eg. finger recognition - Siegler & Robinson 1989) where the claim was that the 
answer was found without counting due to a kinesthetic sensation (Brissiaud 1992). 
According to Brissiaud one theory would be that this speed derives from advanced 
counting but another possibility is that 'pathway to number' affects the choice of 
counting versus finger strategies. Children who were not exposed to the use of fingers 
early on may prefer not to use their fingers whereas others may preferentially use 
fingers. This kind of claim may account for some children in previous experiments 
choosing to use their fingers, others in this experiment successful when explicitly 
prompted to use their fingers while some found the process difficult.
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Task effects showed that Task2 was more correctly answered than Taskl which was 
predicted since Task2 was simply a counting task, as opposed to Taskl which required 
doing mental arithmetic. There was no main effect of type with use of concrete 
referents allowing children to perform equally well on subtraction as opposed to 
addition. In fact some children found the subtraction easier than addition particularly 
for fingers in that they did not have to manipulate as many fingers. This is unsurprising 
in that the children need to 'count down' in Taskl whilst doing mental arithmetic but in 
the second task they could simply 'separate from' using the concrete referents 
(Carpenter & Moser 1983) thereby leaving less to count at the end. Subtraction 
problems may also have been easier in terms of manipulative skills required for finger 
usage, since the second part of the problem simply required the children to put down 
some of their fingers and count the remainder. There were no interactions of group and 
type or age and type, thereby indicating no particular impact at this level.
In order to address the theoretical question posed as to whether the use of concrete 
referents is beneficial after a certain point in a child's development, it is necessary to 
make a comparison of the fingers and counters strategies with the others used in the 
previous experiments to date. A comparison with other mentalistic strategic prompts 
used showed 'counters' being the most effective strategy for both ages with virtually 
ceiling performance generated. However, the older age children proved to be as good 
with the combined (memory + imagery) prompt as with their fingers and the younger 
group of children was as good with their fingers as with the single memory prompt 
(see Table 9.1 page 168). This points to mental arithmetic being equally effective as 
working out computations using concrete materials which questions Piagetian theory 
that children of this age are unable to think abstractly until the concrete operational 
stage. Whether lots of practice with concrete referents is efficacious in the pre-school 
years, but not once a child has begun to use mental arithmetic needs further 
investigation. Anecdotal evidence from de-briefing sessions showed nearly half the 
children reported finding Taskl easier than counting the physical objects in Task2, 
with assertions of'I do it in my head' or 'I saw the number of teddies you were putting 
in the box' or even 'because I did not have to move any of the teddies'.
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Having obtained a measure of children's performance using concrete referents the next 
experiment investigates whether children will spontaneously adopt this strategy when 
solving the same arithmetic problems if not explicitly prompted to do so.
Experiment 8 
The effectiveness of Implicit Prompting
7.1.1 INTRODUCTION
This second experiment investigated whether children would choose to treat a task as a 
counting task, instead of using mental arithmetic, if concrete referents were made 
available, but not explicitly prompted. Performance was compared to the previous 
scores generated when children were explicitly prompted to treat the task as a counting 
task using 'counters' as concrete referents. Counters had been the most successful 
strategy for both age groups when compared to the other mentalistic strategies. In 
which case, if the children treated the task as a counting task, it would be likely to 
generate higher scores than if they used mental arithmetic. Furthermore, using 
concrete referents is an overt strategy and therefore it is possible to see whether 
children adhere to the instructions. In the previous experiment some children failed to 
count the counters correctly in spite of laying out the correct number, preferring a 
mental strategy, whereas others gave the correct answer without the appropriate 
manipulation. This contrasts with the mentalistic strategies used in the previous 
experiments where it was impossible to know whether the children were acting directly 
upon instruction or whether the prompting was simply encouraging them to be 
strategic as opposed to astrategic. However, evidence from the combined (memory 
and imagery) prompt indicated that different prompts were having a differential impact. 
This current experimental design involved the children in the same two tasks as the 
previous experiments but was different to any other investigation so far since the 
strategic prompt was implicit, as opposed to explicit. To this extent, it allowed the 
children to initiate their own strategy choice.
The Piagetian viewpoint (Piaget 1970) is that intellectual change comes about through 
cognitive conflict as a result of which a child strives through assimilation and 
accommodation to regain equilibrium which brings about intellectual change.
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However, Bryant (1982, 1990) argued, as a result of his research on measurement in 
1982, that instead of cognitive conflict children leam through making a connection 
when strategies agree as opposed to disagree. However, according to Siegler & 
Shrager (1984) young children choose strategies when solving addition and subtraction 
problems in adaptive ways. The Distribution of Associations Model (Siegler & Shrager
1984) claims associations are made between problems and answers, based on past 
experience, and these influence strategy choices. For instance, for problem T+T a 
child is likely to have built up a strong association with the answer '2' and very few 
conflicting answers. This would lead to very high confidence in giving a reply o f '2'. 
Whereas for the problem '6-2' there would be lots of competing associations owing to 
the difficulty of the problem and therefore there would be less confidence and a greater 
chance of a back-up strategy being used (based on some kind of counting task). 
Moreover, Siegler & Jenkins (1989) also found that children would not necessarily 
choose an optimal strategy once learned unless there was a compelling reason. For 
instance, when solving '23-22' young children would use their newly discovered 
min-model strategy (Groen & Parkman 1972) but not necessarily on easier problems, 
like '6-4'. This evidence would predict that the more difficult the problem the more 
likely the choice of using a back-up strategy of concrete referents.
Evidence from research on the standard number conservation task has also shown that 
children are reluctant to spontaneously use counting when alternative cues such as 
length are present (Bryant 1974, Cowan 1987b, Michie 1984b). However, training 
studies in number conservation show that children can be trained to use counting 
(Gelman 1982, Cowan 1987b). Michie (1984b) claimed that children may know how 
counting gives knowledge of number, but not realise that this knowledge is more 
reliable than other knowledge about number and so use other cues, when present 
rather than count. She found that feedback about the reliability of counting positively 
influenced its usage which also underpins the efficacy of the training studies. This 
would predict that children might choose counting in this experiment to the extent that 
there was no other competing cue.
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The design of this experiment was such that the implicit prompt was provided by the 
experimenter putting out the number of teddies to represent the initial addend in each 
problem and keeping them in view of the child throughout the process. On the one 
hand, this removed the need for the children to remember the initial addend of each 
problem, and on the other hand, it also allowed them to use 'count the teddies' for the 
subtraction problems. Clearly, addition problems still needed to be computed through 
mental arithmetic but subtraction problems could be treated as a counting task since 
the initial number of teddies for each problem remained in view throughout the task. 
Although not a visual cue, like in the standard conservation of number task, 
presentation of the 10 problems alternates between addition and subtraction problems 
('1+r, '2-1', '1+2' etc.), which may interfere with strategy choice since addition 
problems have to be done through mental arithmetic.
The aim was also to further explore the issue of whether all strategic prompts work in 
the same way by encouraging a child to be strategic instead of astrategic or through 
suppressing an inappropriate strategy. If the impact is the same for each different 
prompt, this suggests that responses are likely to be better for addition than subtraction 
as has been reported in the previous experiments. On the other hand, if children 
choose to treat the subtraction problems as a counting task, subtraction scores are 
likely to be higher than addition.
In summary, the same two age groups of children were used with the same two tasks: 
Taskl (Box Closed) followed by Task2 (Hypothetical Box). All children were 
assigned to one condition -'Teddies' - and the implicit prompt was given in Task2 . It 
was predicted that if children were treating the task as a counting task subtraction 
problems would generate more correct responses than addition in Task2 with the most 
difficult subtraction problem o f '6-2' being the most likely to yield a choice of counting.
137
7.1.2 METHOD 
Subjects
Fifty-eight (N=58) children, 31 girls and 27 boys, aged 4 to 5 years acted as subjects.
28 children were in their first term of Infants school Qyounger') with an age range of 
4:10 - 5:1 years and a mean of 4:11 years and 30 in their second or third term of the 
Reception class (^oldef) aged 5:3 - 5:8yrs and a mean of 5:6yrs. The 'Younger' group 
-16 girls and 12 boys and the 'Older group' - 15 girls and 15 boys. Both age groups of 
children formed one condition known as the 'Teddies' group (N=58).
Table 7.1.2
Mean age in months (standard deviation) by group and age
Group Younger Older
Teddies 59.0(1) (n=28) 65.5(2.5) (n=30)
Procedure
The same 10 problems were presented and the procedure was the same as that used in 
the previous experiment (Fingers v Counters) shown on page 128 but the materials 
used only involved the 8 teddies and the box. The author is the Experimenter 
throughout the experiment. Taskl (Box Closed) instructions are again those shown in 
the Method section in Experiment 1, Imagery v Hypothetical on page 53.
TASK 2 (HYPOTHETICAL BOX)
Teddies group
The verbal instructions for the first addition problem ('1+1') are given and for 
subtraction problem ('2-1'). The Experimenter put the box aside and then put one 
teddy on the table in front of the child, saying 'Here is one teddy. I f  we have one 
more teddy than this, how many teddies would that make altogether? For subtraction 
problems the verbal instructions were: Here are two teddies. I f  I  took one o f them 
away how many teddies would be left?' The initial number of teddies remained in view
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to the child throughout each problem but the child was not allowed to touch or 
manipulate the teddies whilst making the computation
7.1.3 RESULTS
A 3-way ANOVA was carried out with age (2) as the between-subjects factor and task 
(2) and type (2) as within-subject factors. The Source of Variation table is shown at 
Appendix 6.2 and a table of the means (standard deviations in brackets) is shown 
below at Table 7.1.3(1)
Table 7.1.3(1)
Experiment 8
ST=58 Means (out of 5) by type and task
Add Subtract
Younger (n=28) Older (n=30) Younger (n=28) Older (n=30
Taskl 3.68(1.1) 3.77(0.97) 3.29(0.90) 3.93 (0.83)
Task2 2.46(1.32) 3.57(1.14) 3.57(1.50) 4.13 (1.20)
There was a significant effect of age (F=7.45 df=l,56 p<0.01) with older children 
doing better than younger. As far as within-subjects factors were concerned there 
were no significant effects of task owing to the better performance of both age groups 
for subtraction in Task2. There was a highly significant effect of type (F=15.23 
dfi=l,56 p<0.001) with subtraction problems scoring more correct responses than 
addition. This is in the predicted direction since the children would have needed to 
solve the addition computations through mental arithmetic as opposed to the 
subtraction problems which the children could choose to treat as a counting task.
A 2-way ANOVA was carried out on each problem (T+T, '2-T, T+2', '3-2', '2+3', '4-3', 
'5+2', '6-2', '6+T, '7-1') with age (2) as the between-subjects factor and task (2) as the 
within-subjects factor. Source of Variation tables and tables of the means are shown at 
Appendix 7.5.3 and 7.5.4. Table 7.1.3(2) below outlines the significant effects of the 
ANOVA analysis by problem.
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Table 7.1.3(2)
Individual Problem Analysis
’1+2' ’2+3’ ’5+2’ ’6+1’
Effect F-value 
Task 4.85*
Age X 7.73** 
Tsk
Effect F-value Effect F-value 
Age 4,42*
Effect F-value 
Task 5.52*
’3-2’ ’4-3’ ’6-2’ ’7-1’
Task 19.84***
Age X 12.03 
Tsk **
Age 5.34*
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
(Problems T+T and '2-T had no variance in the baseline Taskl)
The significant task effects for '1+2' and '6+T showed Taskl being more correctly 
answered than Task2. There were no task effects for '2+3' and "5+2' which may be 
attributed to children having more difficulty with these problems in the baseline Taskl. 
However, for subtraction problems there was a highly significant effect (p<0.001) of 
task for '6-2', being attributable to better performance in Task2 than Taskl. In fact for 
problem '4-3' the children generated more correct responses (0.64 and 0.80 for 
younger and older children respectively in Task2, compared to 0.61 and 0.67 in 
Taskl). There were also more significant age effects for addition than subtraction 
problems with older children outperforming younger. This again points to younger 
children bridging the gap in age in the subtraction problems by treating it as a counting 
task.
7.1.4 DISCUSSION
The significant effect of type with subtraction better than addition pointed to the 
children choosing to treat the task as a counting task since the initial addend of each 
problem was represented by the teddies themselves. These teddies remained in view to 
the child throughout the task thence making subtraction possible using concrete
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referents. The mean scores generated for subtraction matched those for 'counters' in 
the previous experiment and therefore discounted statistical significance arising as a 
by-product of poorer addition scores. Subtraction scores even showed performance to 
be better than when explicitly prompted to use 'fingers' in the previous study. Total 
mean correct response for subtraction problems using mentalistic strategies have 
mostly been worse in Task2 apart from the combined (memory + imagery) prompt. 
Therefore, children demonstrated their preference to count the concrete referents for 
the subtraction problems, in spite of the continual swapping needed between mental 
arithmetic which was required for the addition problems. This differential use of 
strategy for each type of problem underpinned children's versatility of strategy choice 
and added to the evidence obtained from the additive effect of the combined prompt, 
that different prompts work differently and children adapt their choice accordingly. 
There are three possible explanations for this.
First, arguably their familiarity with counting tasks was a well-learned and reinforced 
skill when doing arithmetic thus supporting the findings of (Gelman 1982, Michie 
1984b, Cowan 1987b). Secondly, children already have experience on a daily basis of 
the beneficial use of counting out items in terms of'accuracy' when adding and taking 
things away. Thirdly, treating the task as a counting task involved an easier modelling 
manipulation: 'separating from' as opposed to 'counting down' which is required in 
mental arithmetic (Carpenter & Moser 1983). This supports the notion of children 
choosing an easier strategy when available. Furthermore, children particularly chose to 
use the concrete referents when there was a compelling reason (Siegler & Jenkins 
1989) shown by the highly significant effect of task for the most difficult subtraction 
problem '6-2' and the better performance in Taskl for problem '2-T where that they did 
not feel the necessity of using counting for such an easy sum.
The most critical finding is that opting to count or not to count was initiated by the 
child themselves as opposed to being forced as in the previous experiments. Providing 
an implicit as opposed to explicit prompt allowed those children who did not wish to 
count to adopt an alternative strategy with results showing the younger age children 
better in this experiment than those in the 'Fingers' group of the previous experiment.
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This variability in children's strategy choices at 4 to 5 years also underlines the Hughes 
finding (1986) that while pre-school children favour an iconic representation (ie. 
concrete referents) when solving simple arithmetic, 5 year olds show 20% more 
symbolic usage than iconic and most 6 year olds prefer a symbolic representation of 
number and seldom using an iconic type. This evidence also supports that of'street 
mathematics' (Nunes et al 1993) for the efficacy of children's own strategies over more 
formal school methods. But perhaps the most important finding concerning children's 
informal strategies is that they should be child-initiated instead of adult-directed.
Experiment 9 
Comparison of Counters Performance across Age
7.2.1 INTRODUCTION
This is a small investigation which was prompted by the window of opportunity 
afforded by the recent changes in local education authority guidelines in Surrey of 
school entry age, where children begin school a term earlier at four and half years old. 
During the change-over phase this meant that these children would have experienced 
the same amount of schooling as the younger age children used in all the investigations 
so far, who were also in their first term of Infant school. This sample of children 
enabled an initial follow-up of the ceiling effect found for both age groups of children 
when tested using 'counters' as opposed to their 'fingers'. Testing an even younger age 
group, who would ordinarily still be at playschool, could pinpoint any age difference 
resulting from being 3 to 6 months younger. AJfter consideration of the weaker 
performance of the younger age children when using their fingers together with the 
sampling difficulties of obtaining a second group of children from the same schools it 
was decided to simply test the 'counters' condition. It was predicted that the very 
young age group would not perform as well as the two older groups.
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7.2.2 METHOD 
Subjects
Thirty (N=30) children, 17 girls and 13 boys with a mean age of 4:8 years (55.8 
months with standard deviation of 0.9) acted as subjects. All children formed one 
condition the 'Counters' group (N=30).
Procedure
The same 10 problems were presented to each child and the procedure and materials 
was the same as for the Fingers v Counters experiment on page 128. The author is the 
Experimenter throughout the experiment. Taskl (Box Closed) instructions can be 
found on page 53 and the Task2 (Hypothetical Box) instructions are the same as those 
for the Counters group on page 129.
7.2.3 RESULTS
A 3-way ANOVA was carried with age (3) as the between-subjects factor and task (2) 
and type (2) - addition v subtraction - as within-subjects factors. The Source of 
Variation table is at Appendix 6.3. The means out of 10 (with standard deviations in 
brackets) are given in Table 7.2.3(1) below and illustrated at Fig 7.2.3(1).
Table 7.2.3(1)
Experiment 9
Mean correct responses (out of 10) for each task by group
N=92
Very Young Young Older
(n=30) (n=32) (n=30)
Taskl 5.67(1.73) 6.59(1.43) 7.1(1.58)
Task2 6.57(2.71) 8.75(1.48) 8.83(1.66)
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Fig 7.2 3(1)
N=92
Means (out of 10) by age and task
Very young Young Old
Taskl B  Task2
There was a significant main effect of age (F=13.06 df=2,89 p<0.001). Using Fisher's 
LSD post-hoc test the older group (t= 3.56 df=l,89, p<0.001) and younger group (t= 
2.98 df^l,89 p<0.01) did significantly better than the very young age group. The 
bigger standard deviation for the very young age group showed the greater variability 
in performance of these youngest children.
As far as within-subjects factors were concerned there was a highly significant main 
effect of task (F=58.44 df=l,89 p<0.001) with Task2 being more correctly answered 
than Taskl which would be expected since the children could count out the counters 
and therefore did not have to do mental arithmetic which was demanded in Taskl. 
There was a significant interaction of age and task (F=3.13 df=2,89 p<0.05) with very 
young children scoring less well on both tasks.
There was no significant main effect of type but there was a significant interaction of 
task by type (F=14.29 df=l,89 p<0.001) shown at Fig 7.2.3(2), with Task2 being more 
correctly answered than Taskl and subtraction scoring better in Task2 in relation to 
the baseline scores of Taskl. The means by type (addition v subtraction) with standard 
deviations in brackets are shown at Table 7.2.3(2).
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Table 7.2 3(2)
Experiment 9
N =92
Mean correct responses (out of 5) by age, type and task
Very Young (n=30) Young (n=32) Older (n=30)
Add Subt Add Subt Add Subt
Taskl 3.03(1.03) 2.63(1.16) 3.44(0.95) 3.16(0.88) 3.73(0.98) 3.37(0.8<
Taskl 3.13(1.5) 3.43(1.46) 4.31(0.93) 4.44(0.8) 4.3(0.99) 4.53(0.9)
Fig 7.2 3(2)
N=92
Experiment 9 
Interaction of task and type
4.2
c 3.8
* 3.6 s
3.4
3.2
Task2Taskl
Subtract Add
7.2.4 DISCUSSION
There was a significant difference in performance between the younger and the very 
young children in the Counters group suggesting changes being more apparent 
between 4 and 5 years than 5 and 6 years. This may be in terms of young children's 
understanding of number, counting skills or even their ability to use concrete referents 
to represent absent physical objects. This would support Goswami (1992) claims that 
the ability of children to see the link between the use of concrete referents to represent 
the operation of addition or subtraction when teaching of arithmetic is not as obvious 
to a child as it may be to an adult. Alternatively, it may simply be immaturity in
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manipulative skills when counting out the counters. In terms of experience with 
understanding task demands or with one-to-one teacher/adult interaction in a learning 
situation, both groups would have been at a similar level since both had spent the same 
time at school, albeit the very young children were following a slightly different 
curriculum.
The findings for the very young children in Taskl are even more striking in that they 
demonstrate a competence in mental arithmetic involving the adding/taking of 'one', 
'two' and 'three' generating a total mean correct response score in this task of 5.6 out 
of 10 compared to 6.6 for the younger group and 7.1 for the older group. These 
findings, therefore, support those of others that young children can do quite complex 
computations by the time they reach school (eg. Resnick & Ford 1981, Hughes 1981, 
1986, Gelman 1982, Ginsburg 1982, Fuson 1988). However, it cannot be discounted 
that this mentalistic competence is as a result of some sort of subitizing since arguably 
6 out of the 10 problems could have been done through this method. The very young 
children also scored less well than the other groups in addition in Task2 relative to 
their baseline testing in Taskl which may have been attributable to more errors in 
counting as the highest numbers to be counted were present in the addition problems. 
Further testing should seek to look at the efficacy of using fingers at this age in order 
to look at Brissiaud's (1992) claims regarding two different pathways to number.
Summary
These three studies have looked at young children's solution of simple addition and 
subtraction problems using concrete referents as opposed to mental arithmetic which 
has been the subject of the previous five experiments. Children are found to be better 
when using 'counters' than their 'fingers', particularly the younger age children of 
around 5 years old. However, it may be that when children choose to initiate a finger 
strategy this would be equally effective. It was also found that use of concrete 
referents is chosen as opposed to mental arithmetic when there is a particularly difficult 
problem. A comparison of performance across three age ranges showed a difference
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of around 18 months resulting in a child getting one and half more sums correct in 
Taskl when using mental arithmetic and a difference of over two more correct 
responses in between four-and-a-half and nearly five years of age.
The following chapter takes a closer look at the empirical data for all experiments 
carried out in this research: first, in terms of an Individual Problem Analysis for each 
experiment undertaken to ascertain whether the strategic prompts are particularly 
effective on any specific problems, and secondly m  Error Analysis where children's 
patterns of response across problems are investigated in relation to positive/negative 
impact of strategic prompt with regard to baseline Taskl performance.
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CHAPTERS 
Individual Problem Analysis
8.1 INTRODUCTION
The findings thus far have pointed to the positive effect of offering an explicit strategy 
when asking 4 to 5 year olds to solve simple arithmetic problems within an 
hypothetical context. This resulted in around one to two problems being more 
correctly answered out of a possible total correct score of ten. From the analyses 
carried out on total correct response for each experiment there have also been 
consistent findings with regard to type with addition problems generating more correct 
responses than subtraction. However, evidence from the individual problem analysis 
carried out on the first experiment (Imagery v Hypothetical) pointed to strategic 
prompting being particularly helpfiil at the margin of competence with a positive effect 
on the more difficult problems, particularly subtraction. The single memory prompt 
also successfully bridged the gap between addition and subtraction performance with 
no significant difference between type albeit the p-value was equal to 0.07. For the 
combined (memory + imagery) prompt subtraction problems were more correctly 
answered than addition although this was not statistically significant. In order to 
ascertain whether any particular problems were consistently sensitive to strategic 
manipulation and to track any consistent findings throughout each successive 
experiment an individual problem analysis was carried for each experiment except for 
Experiment 3 (teddies v bricks) which acted as a control experiment. Experiment 1 
(Imagery v Hypothetical) has already been reported after the total problem analysis 
owing to the different problems presented and is therefore not part of this individual 
problem analysis. A Mixed ANOVA design was adopted according to the number of 
incorrect/correct responses (0,1) for each individual problem in each experiment. This 
followed on from the findings of Cochran (1950) and Cox (1970) when it was 
established that ANOVA could produce accurate results on binary data which had 
been scored with Os and Is.
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8.2. RESULTS
A 3-way ANOVA with group (strategic prompt according to experiment) and age 
(younger v older) as between-subjects factors and task as a within-subjects factor was 
carried out on each individual problem (T+r, '2-1', '1+2', '3-2', '2+3', '4-3', '5+2', '6-2', 
'6+r, '7-1') for experiments 2-9 inclusive. The significant findings by experiment are 
reported overleaf at Table 8.1 for addition problems and Table 8.2 for subtraction 
problems. Source of Variation tables together with tables of the means for each 
experiment are shown at Appendix 7.1.1. through to 7.5.6. inclusive.
The significant task effects reported for all experiments where mental arithmetic was 
required showed Taskl gaining significantly more correct responses than Task2 for the 
small number problems ( '1+T, '1+2', '2-1', '3-2') together with '6+1' and '4-3' as 
opposed to the two more difficult problems '5+2' and '6-2' where no task effects were 
found. This finding is unsurprising since the children are expected to find Taskl easier 
than Task2 owing to the contextual support provided by seeing the teddies themselves. 
The absence of task effects for '5+2' and '6-2' pointed to the difficulty children had with 
this problem in both tasks. When looking at Experiments 7-9, where the children were 
using concrete referents in Task2, there were significant task effects reported for each 
problem (except '3-2' and '6+1'), but these were attributable to Task2 being more 
correctly answered than Taskl. This is in the predicted direction since Task2 was 
simply a counting task.
A1 overall significant age effects showed older children performing better than 
younger. Unsurprisingly there was little age effect for the two easiest problems ('1+1', 
'2-1') with most age effects found on the more difficult problems o f '2+3', '5+2' and 
'6-2'. However, the lack of any main age effects at the individual problem level in 
Experiment 4 (Memory v Hypothetical) again demonstrated the particular sensitivity of 
the memory prompt for the younger children which had already been reported in the 
analysis of total response over 10 problems. For problem '4-3' there was only 
significant age effects reported in Experiment 2, Imagery v Hypothetical (eyes open v
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eyes closed) with older children more sensitive to both closing their eyes and the 
imagery prompt. This was an interesting finding since it indicated that both ages 
performed at a similar level in the other experiments inspite of the complex 
computation involved when 'taking away 3'.
8.2.1 Group Effects
Addition
All group effects reported supported the beneficial effects of strategic prompting over 
no prompting at all with the most significant p-values generated on the most difficult 
problems o f '2+3' and '5+2'. The most successfial prompt over baseline hypothetical 
context was the 'written' with significant group effects reported for each problem.
There was a significant main group effect for '5+2' for the memory and imagery 
strategic prompts when compared to the baseline hypothetical context. For '2+3' and 
'5+2' there were also highly significant group by age interactions for the imagery and 
memory prompts with the older children being more sensitive to the prompt than the 
younger. The significant main condition effect in Experiment 2 (eyes closed v eyes 
open) reported for '5+2' showed 'eyes closed' performing better than 'eyes open' and 
also the significant interactions of condition by age for '2+3' and '5+2' showed the older 
children to be more sensitive to the instruction to close their eyes than younger. These 
findings taken together therefore support the notion that older children seem to be 
more sensitive to any task instruction, albeit it may be that the younger children were 
distracted by closing their eyes.
As far as the use of concrete referents was concerned there was a significant effect of 
counters over fingers for '2+3' and '6+1' but not '5+2' thereby perhaps demonstrating 
the easier finger manipulation involved with putting up five fingers which would simply 
be one hand. There were no group by age interactions therefore indicating no 
particular age differences when doing addition problems using fingers as opposed to 
counters.
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Subtraction
There were more group effects found for subtraction problems when compared with 
addition thereby supporting the beneficial effect of strategic prompting on more 
difficult problems as reported in Experiment 1 (Imagery v Hypothetical). Out of the 
total 10 problems, as far as mental arithmetic was concerned, the least significant 
effects reported were for problem '6-2'. This indicated the difficulty children had with 
this problem whatever the prompt. The only significant effects yielded were attributed 
to the positive effect of strategic prompting for the older children over baseline 
hypothetical context whether it be a written or memory prompt or simply 'closing their 
eyes'. There was also a siginificant effect for the written prompt for problems '3-2' and 
"7-1'.
Contrary to Experiment 1, where there was a positive effect of imagery found on 
problems '2-1' and '3-2', there were no main group effects at all for the imagery 
prompt with only a group by age interaction for '7-1' with the older children more 
sensitive to the imagery prompt than the younger. There was a significant impact of 
condition with 'closing eyes' being most beneficial on the more difficult problems ('4-3', 
'6-2', '7-1') which again was particularly sensitive to the older children. These findings 
underpin those found for addition.
The failure to replicate the findings from Experiment 1 for problem '2-1' for the 
significant effect of imagery can be attributed to a ceiling effect with both groups 
sustaining almost totally correct Taskl performance in Task2. There was no group 
effect for problem '3-2' owing to strong performance by the older Hypothetical group 
(eyes closed) and weak performance by the younger Imagery group (eyes open).
Unlike addition problems there were more group effects reported for the positive 
effect of memory both in the single memory prompt and the Combined (memory 
+imagery) prompt with highly significant main groups effect for '2-1', '3-2' and '7-T. 
This also confirmed the findings found over 10 problems. For problem '3-2' there was 
also a group by age interaction for memory with the older children more sensitive to
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the memory prompt than the younger who faired better in the hypothetical context.
The findings for the combined prompt are impressive since this prompt was compared 
to the single memory and imagery prompts as opposed to baseline hypothetical context 
and therefore demonstrates additive value derived when combining the two single 
prompts. In fact, the means for problem '6-2' for the combined prompt showed both 
younger and older children generating better Task2 scores than Taskl (group by task 
interaction of p=0.08). For '4-3' there were no significant group or group by age 
effects for any experiment but consistent group by task interactions which indicated 
strong baseline performance in Taskl with the strategic prompt allowing the children 
to sustain or improve their initial Taskl performance in Task2. This is a remarkable 
finding owing to the difficulty of'taking away 3' and supports the lack of significant 
age effects already reported.
As for the Counters v Fingers comparison there was a significant effect of counters 
over fingers for '6-2' and '7-1' and age by group interactions for '2-1' and '6-2' with 
both ages scoring similarly in counters but older doing better with their fingers.
8.3 DISCUSSION
For all experiments the findings at the individual problem level are remarkably clear.
All group effects reported support the positive effect of strategic prompting when 
asking young children to solve simple addition and subtraction problems compared to 
asking children to solve the problems with only referential support, where they have to 
implement their own strategy choice. This supports the findings for the group effects 
reported for the analysis over 10 problems.
Consistent task effects were reported for the easier problems with the contextual 
support, offered by real objects as opposed to hypothetical, having a significant 
beneficial effect on performance. This provided a contrast to the more difficult 
problems which children found difficult to answer in the baseline Taskl. These findings
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add to those of Hughes (1981, 1986) and Donaldson (1978) for the beneficial effect of 
'embedded' context as opposed to 'disembedded'.
It is unsurprising that overall age effects showed older children finding the problems 
involving larger numbers or more complex computations easier than the younger 
children. However, the consistent group by age (and condition by age) interactions, 
which demonstrated older children being more sensitive to strategic prompting (even 
simply closing their eyes) than younger, may point to the difference in performance 
being partly due the ability of the older children to access 'utilization competence' 
(Greeno et al 1984, Gelman & Meek 1986) through being given such prompts or it 
may be that giving a strategic prompt increases their confidence. The lack of group by 
age interactions for counters v fingers (except '6-2') and the combined (memory + 
imagery) prompts showed the younger children to be more sensitive to these types of 
prompts thus enabling them to close the gap between their performance and that of 
their older counterparts. In fact the age difference only amounts to 6 to 9 months 
separating the two age groups.
The consistent group findings reported on the more difficult problems o f '2+3', '5+2' 
*6-2' and '7-1' (involving large numbers or a more complex computation) supported 
Hughes (1981) that children can solve quite complex problems without formal tuition 
provided they are in an embedded context. Strategic prompting was therefore the 
most effective when children were confronted with more difficult problems when they 
are struggling to know how to do the sum. The lack of group effects reported in 
Experiment 5 for problems '5+2' and '6-2' where the combined (memory+imagery) 
prompt was compared with the single memory and imagery prompts does not devalue 
this finding since the added value over baseline hypothetical context is already 
accounted for by the single prompts. The finding that the older children outperform 
their Taskl performance in Task2 and the younger children nearly sustain it point to 
the powerfulness of the combined prompt. Although the group effect for these 
problems failed to reach statistical significance these findings still add further weight to 
the powerfulness of strategic prompting and discounts the notion that any prompt
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works in much the same way as any other. The greater sensitivity of strategic 
prompting for subtraction problems reported for the combined prompt, together with 
the single memory prompt and single imagery prompt for older children, also 
supported the positive findings from Experiment 1. Furthermore, such prompts seem 
to work on more difficult problems since subtraction is considered to be more difficult 
than addition since counting down is more difficult than counting up (Carpenter & 
Moser 1983). The failure to replicate the findings for the younger children in 
Experiment 2, which were the same age as the 'school age' children in Experiment 1, 
may be due to ceiling effects in problem '2-1' and strong performance by this age group 
in the hypothetical group.
Most group effects reported across all problems are for the written prompt which was 
only completed by the older age children. This is a striking finding since a number of 
the more difficult problems have highly significant p-values (<0.001) which negates the 
significance of this finding being dependent on the poorer baseline Taskl scoring of the 
hypothetical group. This therefore showed that better performance was generated 
when giving a written presentation of the problems in formal code notation, as 
opposed to presenting them verbally. This was provided that the written problems 
were presented with contextual support, where the absent teddies were referred to, as 
opposed to the formal language of arithmetic. In this way, young children are able to 
cope with written formal code notation as Hughes (1983b) found in his tin game where 
he introduced the use of operator signs in a meaningfiil context. The memory aspect 
of the written prompt, whereby the need to remember the numbers to be computed is 
removed, may also be a critical factor when looked at alongside the findings for the 
memory prompts so far.
The lack of main group effects or group by age interactions for problem '4-3' is striking 
given the complexity of the computation. This may point to some kind of subitizing 
(Starkey & Cooper 1995) taking place or that these children were using the min. 
model (Groen & Parkman 1972) of counting up from 3 to reach 4. However, the 
number of group findings for '3-2 and '2-1' may detract from the subitizing explanation
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and point to the min. model (Groen & Parkman 1972) interpretation. It may be that 
the min. model is specifically chosen for '4-3' owing to the difficulty of 'counting down 
3' which supports Siegler & Shrager (1984) choice model that children will choose to 
use a particular strategy if there is a pressing reason for it.
In conclusion, the individual problem analysis across each experiment has found that 
strategic prompting is most beneficial on the more difficult problems, either those 
involving larger numbers, more complex computations or simple subtraction problems 
as opposed to addition. Such prompts are particularly sensitive to the older age 
children. The next section undertakes an error analysis assessing each child's patterns 
of response across addition and subtraction problems, where the positive/negative 
impact of each strategy is analysed in relation to their baseline Taskl performance. The 
aim is to explore whether any significant patterns of response for addition or 
subtraction problems emerge.
Patterns of Response
8.1.1 INTRODUCTION
The consistency of the experimental design, in terms of problems and their order of 
presentation, throughout each experiment afforded the possibility of exploring the 
'patterns of response' by each child across task. This provided a within-subjects 
analysis at the individual problem level as opposed to the between-subjects analysis 
provided by the ANOVA analyses undertaken so far. A within-subject analysis across 
type of problem - addition v subtraction - may produce a significant error pattern 
according to strategic prompt used. Therefore, an error analysis was carried out to 
look at the pattern of response for each problem across tasks according to explicit 
strategic prompt and type of problem (addition v subtraction). This showed the extent 
to which each of the different strategies was enhancing or causing deterioration in 
performance in relation to baseline Taskl scoring thereby also eliminating any baseline 
differences. Any statistical significance reported would be very psychologically
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significant since exploring patterns of response across five problems for each child 
provides a very conservative measure of impact.
A master data file was compiled comprising the main eight strategies (N=503) from 
Experiments 2 to 9 inclusive. Two strategies involved the children in a counting task 
using concrete referents - Fingers (n=58) and Counters (n=92). Five strategies 
involved the children in doing mental arithmetic - Imagery (n=58). Memory (n=58). 
Combined (Memory + Imagery) (n=62), Written (n==58) and Hypothetical (n=59). 
One strategy included a combination of addition and subtraction: Teddies (n^58). 
Therefore, analysis included problems (T+1', T+2', '2+3', '5+2', '6+1', '2-1', '3-2', '4-3', 
'6-2', '7-1'. The data for each child was coded to give an 'error profile' outlining 
whether the manipulation of strategic prompt given in Task2 resulted in positive or 
negative change or no change. Table 8.3 sets out the error coding for each problem. 
Table 8.3.
Error Coding
Taskl Taskl Error Pattern Error Coding
Correct Correct No change 1
Correct Incorrect Negative change 2
Incorrect Incorrect No change 1
Incorrect Correct Positive change 3
Therefore all children received an error coding of '1,2, 3,' for each problem 
undertaken, to denote their error profile according to their performance across Taskl 
and Task2. For instance, a profile of 5 'I's (11111) for addition problems indicated 
'no change' as a result of strategic manipulation over baseline performance, whereas an 
error profile of '11311' across subtraction problems would indicate 'no change' except 
for a positive change on problem '4-3'. A Configurai Frequency Analysis (CFA) (This 
CFA programme was written by Sean Hammond, University of Surrey) was carried 
out to investigate any significant error profiles or patterns of response generated across 
either addition or subtraction problems. Each type of problem was treated separately 
since inclusion of the total ten problems would result in too many possible error 
profiles.
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8.1.2 RESULTS
Addition
The following Table 8.4 showed the significant error profiles for each child (N=503) 
across the five addition problems (T+T, T+2', '2+3', '5+2', '6+1') with a bonferroni 
adjustment for p at 0.05 = 0.001.
Table 8.4
Error coding for addition problems showing positive change (3), negative change 
(2) and no change (1) from Taskl to Task2
1+1 1+2 2+3 5+2 6+1 n
1 1 1 1 1 130
1 1 3 1 1 42
1 1 2 1 1 25
1 2 1 1 1 21
1 1 1 3 1 19
1 1 1 2 1 19
One hundred and thirty children or 26% of children recorded a 'no change' response 
across the two tasks (n=130 z=49.65 p<0.001) of which 15% (n=74) achieved a 
ceiling performance by sustaining their initial correct response in Taskl when 
undertaking Task2. But twenty (n=20) of this no change group generated a profile 
getting the first two problems correct across both tasks and the last three incorrect 
which demonstrated the unidimensionality of the scale.
Further CFAs were also carried out separately for each individual strategy on addition 
problems to explore any significant effect for any strategic prompt. However, all these 
results must be treated with caution owing to the low expected frequencies for each 
profile (2 to 3) because there are so many possible error profiles compared to the 
sample size. The error profiling across all strategies generated expected frequencies 
of 6 to 7. (At the individual strategy level the bonferroni adjustment for p at 0.05 is 
equal to 0.002).
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At the individual strategy level, each strategic prompt reported a significant error 
profile o f  no change' across all addition problems. Therefore, of the 130 children 
gaining a 'no change' error profile there was a significant impact for each strategy as 
follows: Fingers (n=17 z=5.9 p<0.001). Counters (n=16 z=7.14 p<0.001). Memory 
(n=20 z=l 1.85 p<0,001). Written (n=15 z=10.33 p<0.001). Combined (Memory + 
Imagery) (n=20 z=l 1.36 p<0.001), Hypothetical (n=14 z=7.94 p<0.001). Imagery 
(n=10 z=5.6 p<0.001), Teddies (n=ll z=6.78 p<0.001).
As far as assessing the impact of strategic prompting, the significant profiles including 
positive or negative change responses reported in Table 8.4 showed that performance 
was mostly affected by a child's ability at the two more difficult problems: '2+3' and 
'5+2', which generated significant error profiles with all types of coding recorded: no 
change, positive and negative change. Taking the significant profiles for problems '2+3' 
and '5+2' in turn.
Problem '2+3'
The error profile generating the most impact was for a beneficial effect of strategic 
prompting on problem '2+3' (n=42 z=14.33 p<0.001) with no change on the remaining 
four problems. Moreover, out of this 42 children, 31 were getting the other four 
addition problems correct across both tasks except for '2+3'. At the individual 
strategy level, there was also a significant impact of this error profile for Fingers (n=7 
z= 3,01 p<0.01). Counters (n=9 z=3.21 p<0,01) and Hypothetical (n=7 z=3.20 
p<0.01). However, there was also a significant negative effect of strategy for problem 
'2+3' (n=25 z=7.51 p<0.001) although this was not attributable to any particular 
strategic prompt and the deterioration in performance from Taskl to Task2 is in fact 
predicted in the experimental design for all strategies apart from those which involved 
the children in a counting task in Task2. Furthermore, there were more children being 
facilitated than deteriorating.
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Problem '5+2'
There was both a significant positive and negative impact of strategic manipulation for 
problem '5+2' with no change on the other problems, with equal numbers of children 
enhancing or deteriorating in Task2 compared to Taskl: (n=19 z=5.10 p<0.001 and 
n=19 z=5.10 p<0.001). The only CFA at the individual strategy reporting a significant 
positive impact was Counters (n=14 z=6.02 p<0.001).
There was a significant negative impact reported on problem '1+2' with no change on 
the other four problems (n=21 z=5.90 p<0.001), but 11 of these children were getting 
the last three problems incorrect across both tasks. However, 7 of these 21 children 
received the Memory prompt which generated a significant negative profile (n=7 
z=3.14p<0.01).
Subtraction
The following Table 8.5 shows the significant error profiles for each child (N=503) 
across the five subtraction problems ('2-1', '3-2', '4-3', '6-2', '7-1') with a bonferroni 
adjustment for p at 0.05 = 0.001. As for addition problems, individual CFA analyses 
were also carried out at the individual strategy level generating the same low expected 
frequencies of 2 to 3 with a reported bonferroni adjustment for p at 0.05 = 0.002. 
Table 8.5
Error coding for subtraction problems showing positive change (3), negative 
change (2) and no change (1) from Taskl to Taskl
2-1 3-2 4-3 6-2 7-1 n
1 1 1 1 1 96
1 1 3 1 1 39
1 1 1 3 1 34
1 1 2 1 1 33
1 1 3 3 1 23
1 2 1 1 1 20
1 1 1 1 3 16
1 1 1 3 3 16
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There were more significant profiles generated for subtraction thereby indicating a 
more variable performance than for addition problems. Ninety-six children or 19% 
scored a 'no change' error profile across all five subtraction problems (n=96 z=36.76 
p<0.001) with 9% gaining a ceiling performance across both tasks. As for addition 
problems, there was again a significant impact for each individual strategy reported by 
the CFA but again with low expected frequencies: Fingers (n=10 z=5.31 p<0.001), 
Teddies (n=12 z=5.90 p<0.001). Memory (n=15 z=8.27 p<0.001). Written (n=9 
z=3.75 p<0.001). Imagery (n=12 z=7.85 p<0.001). Counters (n=I3 z=5.92 p<0.001). 
Combined (Memory + Imagery) (n=17 z=9.89 p<0.001) and Hypothetical (n=7 z=3.65
p<0.001).
The positive impact was again mostly attributable to performance on the two most 
difficult problems ('4-3' and '6-2') with no change reported for the other problems. 
However, as for addition problem '2+3' there was a significant negative profile 
generated with regard to '4-3'. Taking the significant profiles generated for problems 
'4-3' and '6-2' in turn.
Problem '4-3'
The second most significant profile (n=39 z=13.46 p<0.001) saw a significant 
improvement offered by strategy for the problem '4-3' with no change for the other 
subtraction problems, with Counters also reporting the same significant profile (n=12 
z=5.33 p<0.001) and the Combined (memory+imagery) prompt (n=8 z=3.84 p<0.001). 
However, a significant negative effect on problem '4-3' with no change on the other 
problems (n=33 z=l 1.01 p<0.001) was reported across both tasks. However, 14 of 
these 33 children generated incorrect scores for problems '6-2' and '7-1'. At the 
individual strategy level the Memory prompt also generated significance for this 
negative profile (n=10 z=4.98 p<0.001).
Problem '6-2'
There was a significant positive effect of strategy for the problem '6-2' with no change 
on the other problems (n=34 z=l 1.42 p<0.001). Counters (n=9 z=3.56 P<0.001) and
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Fingers (n=8 z=3.94 p<0.001) also generated significant CFAs for this profile. 
Moreover, there was no significant negative impact reported on this problem but there 
was a significant positive effect for both problems combined - '4-3' and '6-2' - with no 
change on the other three problems (n=23 z=6.92 p<0.001) with Counters also 
reporting this significant profile (n=12 z=5.33 p<0.001).
Other significant error profiles reported across the five subtraction problems were a 
positive change for problems '6-2' and '7-1' combined but no change on the other 
problems: (n=16 z=4.06 p<0.001) with Counters generating a significant error profile 
(n=8 z=2.97 p<0.001).
At the individual strategy level Counters scored a significant error profile for positive 
change on problems '4-3', '6-2' and '7-1' and no change on the other two problems (n=8 
z==3.97 p<0.001). This error profile was not generated across all strategies thereby 
demonstrating the beneficial effect of using concrete referents for problems '4-3', '6-2' 
and '7-1'.
8.1.3 DISCUSSION
This Error Analysis was carried out to explore whether there was any significant 
pattern of response for addition or subtraction problems and whether this was 
attributable to any particular strategic prompt. It could be that strategic prompting was 
generating a consistent pattern of response. The beneficial effect of explicit strategic 
prompts was shown by the greatest number of significant profiles generating a positive 
impact, particularly for subtraction problems, thus suggesting more sensitivity to 
strategic manipulation for this type of problem. These findings support those reported 
in the ANOVA analyses at the individual problem level, where there were also more 
significant effects generated for subtraction problems. Furthermore, a positive change 
recorded in the second task meant that giving a strategic prompt had enabled children 
to turn a failure in Taskl, where the teddies were seen, into a correct response in 
Task2 where it was necessary to use mental arithmetic for the mentalistic strategies.
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This was a remarkable finding whereas clearly, the number of significant positive 
profiles generated for those strategies using concrete referents in Task2 was expected 
since Task2 was easier than Taskl.
The most consistent pattern of response was for 'no change' over Tasks 1 and 2 for 
both addition and subtraction problems with each individual strategy generating a 
significant impact for this profile of scoring. Moreover, 20% of children sustained 
their ceiling performance of Taskl in Task2 for addition problems, compared to 9% 
for subtraction. However, at the individual strategy level the low expected frequencies 
need to be borne in mind when considering the significant patterns of response 
generated. The significant error profiles also demonstrated that some children found 
both tasks very difficult getting most problems wrong in both tasks with the 
unidimensionality of the scale demonstrated by the number of children getting the first 
problem correct and the rest of the problems incorrect in Task2.
The most significant positive patterns of response showed strategic prompting to be 
beneficial for problem '6-2' with no change reported on the other problems, and also a 
combination o f '4-3' and '6-2' with no change elsewhere, since there was no significant 
negative impact reported for either profile . The greatest number of significant profiles 
generated overall was for problems computing 'three' ('2+3', '4-3') resulting in both 
positive and negative profiles. This result supports the lack of group findings for 
problem '4-3' from the ANOVA analyses at the individual problem level. Moreover, 
the number of children reporting a ceiling score across both tasks apart from the 
impact on this problem hints that such prompts were probably having the most 
consistent effect, both positively and detrimentally, on those children who already had 
a degree of competence in arithmetic. This is interesting since statistically through this 
error analysis the weaker children in Taskl are more likely to be helped in Task2. 
However, it needs to be remembered when considering these results that the task 
design predicts that children will find Task2 more difficult when using mentalistic 
strategies, and so it is unsurprising that strategic prompting may disrupt children's 
performance on the more difficult problems.
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As far as individual strategies were concerned significant results need to be considered 
alongside the low expected fi-equencies generated. Unsurprisingly, children were the 
nio^t beneficially affected when they were simply involved in a counting task, where 
ukihg counters as opposed to fingers. The counters strategy was also found to be very 
beneficial for subtraction problems. However, it cannot be discounted that the number 
of profiles for this group may be as a result of the larger number of children in the 
sample, owing to three age groups of children being tested, instead of two. Moreover, 
there was a significant positive impact for subtraction problems for the combined 
(memory+imagery) prompt for '4-3' which may indicate that this additivç imagery 
prompt made subitizing more likely. The single memory prompt generated two 
negative error profiles for '4-3' and '1+2'. It may be that the positive imp^çt of memory 
at the group level is actually detrimental to some and very beneficial to others as 
opposed to helping a number of children a little.
In conclusion, this Error Analysis has confirmed the main empirical findjpg from the 
nine experiments reported in the preceding chapters, for the beneficial effect of explicit 
strategic prompting, particularly for more difficult computations. Finally, this positive 
effect for strategic projmpting was a very powerful finding, given the very conservative 
statistical me.asjpre, and the accuracy of such error scores provided by profiling 
patterns of response, in relation to positive/negative change over baseline Taskl 
testing.
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CHAPTER 9
SUMMARY OF RESULTS
There was a positive effect for the provision of an explicit strategic prompt when 
asking children of four to five years plus to solve simple addition and subtraction 
problems within a hypothetical context. Such strategic prompting was found to be 
effective when simply asking children to solve the problems with their eyes closed, 
making the numbers to be computed more memorable, providing an imagery-prompt 
or a combination of the two. However, there was a failure to replicate the 
effectiveness reported for the younger children in Experiment 1 with regard to the 
imagery-prompt. Each prompt made a differential impact on performance with a 
combined (memory + imagery) resulting in the best performance although this was not 
statistically significant in relation to either the single memory or imagery prompts. A 
table outlining the total mean number of correct responses for each of the main 
strategic prompts investigated is shown at Table 9.1 on page 168.
This research has also found marked age differences in children's arithmetic 
performance with the older age children more successful overall at the arithmetic than 
the younger. However, there were age differences with regard to the impact of 
strategic prompting. The older age children of five-and-a-half years, who were in their 
second and third terms of Infant school, consistently benefited from each different 
strategic prompt whereas the younger children of around five years, who were in their 
first term, were most sensitive to the provision of a memory-check for the initial 
addend of each problem. The provision of an imagery-prompt in Experiment 1 also 
enabled 'translation' to take place fi*om solving arithmetic problems with contextual 
support, to when presented in formal code. Referential support was also found to be 
effective when the older children were presented with written formal code notation.
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A further finding was that child-initiated strategies may be most effective when 
children make their own strategy choice. This was demonstrated by the 'fingers' 
strategy being less effective than the use of other concrete referents (counters) despite 
some children often choosing to use fingers themselves throughout this research. 
Children were also found to be able to adapt their strategy choice according to need. 
An implicit prompt to treat the task as a 'counting' task for the subtraction problems 
was taken up by the children and for the more difficult problems in particular.
When results are considered at the problem level, consistent problem-type effects were 
found overall with addition problems yielding more correct responses than subtraction. 
Moreover, the more difficult problems ('2+3', '4-3', '5+2', '6-2'), particularly 
subtraction, were most sensitive to strategic prompting although the most effective 
strategies of memory and combined (memory + imagery) succeeded in bridging the gap 
between the two different types.
Similarly, consistent problem-size effects with small number problems ('1+1', '2-1', 
'1+2', '3-2') gaining more correct responses than larger number problems were found.
The final chapter discusses the theoretical implications of these findings with regard 
problem-size and problem-type effects, child-initiated strategies and formal code 
arithmetic together with the main findings relating to the effectiveness of strategic 
prompting in young children's arithmetic.
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CHAPTER 10 
GENERAL DISCUSSION
10.1 Strategic Prompting
The primary aim of this thesis was to explore the effects of strategic prompts in order 
to understand more about the nature of children's understanding of arithmetic. In 
particular it is important to understand ' how' and 'why' children seem competent in 
'hypothetical situations'. One possibility is that success is a result of appropriate 
strategy choice and failure reflects inappropriate strategy choice. Whilst the 
hypothetical situation offers an implicit prompt through referential support, children 
still have to initiate their own strategy choice. Thus, offering an explicit strategic 
prompt would remove the uncertainty of choice.
The first five experiments reported in this thesis investigated the effectiveness of 
explicit strategic prompting in young children's addition and subtraction using a partial 
replication of the Hughes' 1981 study. The aim was to explore the reported 
powerfulness for the use of visual imagery for syllogistic reasoning (Hawkins et al 
1984, Dias & Harris 1988, 1990) in facilitating children's arithmetic. The positive 
impact found for the imagery-prompt in the first investigation was subsequently 
unpacked through each successive experiment. Alternative strategic prompts were 
contrasted in order to ascertain whether their effectiveness was direct or indirect.
This included instructing children to solve the problems with their eyes closed 
(Experiment 2), providing a memory-check for the initial addend of each computation 
(Experiment 4) and also a combined (memory + imagery) prompt (Experiment 5) 
explored whether the effectiveness of memory and imagery was operating 
independently.
The main finding from the research reported in this thesis is that there was a positive 
impact of giving an explicit strategic prompt, whether in terms of imagery, memory or
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simply closing their eyes, compared with a hypothetical context condition in which 
children must initiate their own strategy. This was a remarkable result since the 
hypothetical context provided a conservative comparison with children still operating 
within a context-dependent situation. The impact was particularly apparent on the 
more difficult problems ('2+3', '4-3', 5+2, 6-2). The Error Analysis which explored 
patterns of response for each child reported the most significant positive profiles for 
subtraction problems and particularly in relation to problems '6-2' and '6-2' and '4-3' 
combined.
The impact of strategic prompting was particularly effective for those children of 
around five-and-a-half years who had been introduced to some basic addition and 
subtraction in school. As far as younger age children were concerned there was a 
failure to replicate the findings of Experiment 1 in relation to the imagery-prompt with 
the most helpful strategy being a memory-check for the initial number of each 
computation. The only strategy where the younger children were able to perform at 
the same level as their older counterparts was when using 'counters'. However, this 
was not true of the four year olds who were unable to bridge the gap between 
themselves and the school age children when using counters. Perhaps this suggests 
that the move from four to five years is more significant in terms of children's number 
development than five to six years. Alternatively, the age differences, in terms of 
strategic impact, could be in terms of strategy up-take with older children more likely 
to do what they were told. Furthermore, these age differences fit with Siegler's 
(1995) overlapping wave model of development where memory-prompt waves might 
be seen to peak at an earlier age to imagery-type prompts.
The powerfiilness of imagery was supported by the significant impact of an 
imagery-prompt particularly for the older children together with its beneficial effect 
reported in Experiment 1 for the translation process when solving formal code 
arithmetic. Furthermore, all children were able to understand and make use of a 
memory-prompt when posed within a hypothetical scenario, provided they had first 
been cued to operate in a pretence mode, something they were unable to do when
170
reasoning in the normal way in Experiment 4. These findings, therefore, support those 
who have advocated the usefulness of using imagery when reasoning mathematically 
(eg. Skemp 1971, Perkins 1985, Grunau 1978, Edwards & Edwards 1992) and the 
use of visual cues in problem-solving tasks eg. standard Piagetian conservation of 
number task (Bryant 1974, Michie 1984b, Cowan 1987b). Furthermore, this evidence 
adds to that of Hawkins et al (1984) and Dias & Harris (1988, 1990), Leevers & 
Harris (1996) and Leevers (1996) for syllogistic reasoning where children were found 
able to suppress their normal dependence on real world knowledge and reason 
according to the given premises. Moreover, the failure to replicate the positive 
findings for imagery reported in Experiment 1 may reflect the findings of Leevers & 
Harris (1996) and Leevers (1996) where it was found that four year old children can 
still perform as effectively in syllogistic reasoning, as when cued to use imagery, 
provided they are simply instructed to consider the premises of the syllogisms as 
reality. Thus, according to Leevers & Harris (1996) children might implicitly use their 
imagination but it was the explicitness of instructing the children to override their real 
world knowledge which was the crucial factor. The success of the imagery-prompt 
reported in this research might be to override children's inappropriate spontaneous 
strategies or simply encourage a child to be strategic. Therefore, a crucial follow-up 
investigation needs to explore whether simply encouraging a child to be strategic 
before embarking on the solution process is equally effective as an explicit strategic 
prompt.
In short, children's competence when provided with the referential support of a 
hypothetical context was sensitive to strategic manipulation. This suggests that 
successful performance is dependent on accurate strategy choice which may be a 
crucial factor in accounting for age differences. However, there was overwhelming 
evidence that many children can be helped by ensuring they remember the first number 
in each computation. These age differences, together with the more difficult 
problems being the most sensitive to strategic manipulation, may point to prompting 
being the most effective once a child has some familiarity with arithmetic or at their 
threshold of competence. Moreover, it may be that such strategic prompting is most
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effective when a child is within their zone of proximal development, where they can 
perform with help from others but not by themselves (Vygotsky 1978).
10.2 Child-initiated strategies
Given the fact that strategic prompts have been shown to be effective it is important to 
know how children select one strategy rather than another? Is failure to make the 
appropriate choice lack of confidence or children not realising the effectiveness of one 
strategy over another? Siegler & Shrager's (1984) strategy-choice model claims that 
young children make strategy choices when doing addition and subtraction problems in 
adaptive ways according to experience and the demands of the task. For instance, 
whilst not always opting to use the quickest strategy, children will make an optimal 
choice when selection of an alternative strategy would prove very difficult (Siegler & 
Jenkins 1989). Moreover, children's failure to realise the effectiveness of counting has 
been found to be improved in the standard conservation of number task, when they see 
its efficacy or are given reinforcement (eg. Michie 1984b) and when confidence is 
increased (Cowan et al 1993). Furthermore, what is the role of child-initiated 
strategies compared to more conventional school-driven strategies? Nunes et al 
(1993) have claimed that children's informal strategies are more successful than formal 
school algorithms and Carpenter & Moser (1983) assert that children's informal 
strategies bear little relation to those learned in school. Therefore, the group of 
experiments (Experiments 7 to 9) sought to widen the discussion of strategic 
prompting by looking at the efficacy of child-initiated strategies. Furthermore, the aim 
was to explore under what conditions children would choose to make use of an 
implicit as opposed to explicit strategic prompt. In contrast to the previous 
experiments, this investigation looked at the children's use of concrete referents when 
solving simple arithmetic. It also gave children permission to use a strategy they had 
often chosen to use throughout this research - their own fingers.
The findings from the use of'counters' contrasted with those of'fingers', with children 
in the Counters group outperforming those in the Fingers group. Fingers is commonly
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thought of as a more child-initiated strategy and interchangeable with other concrete 
referents for young children learning arithmetic. Indeed, a number of children when 
cued to use alternative prompts still chose to use their fingers instead. There are two 
possible explanations for this. First, it may be that using fingers is only effective for 
those children who choose to use them, in the way that Brissiaud (1992) highlighted 
where two pathways to number develop according to a child's experience with those 
introduced to fingers preferring to use such and others who have not learned finger 
usage preferring another type of concrete referent. Alternatively, it may reflect the 
inconsistent attitude of schools and carers to the benefits of using fingers (Van 
Devender 1986) or simply be a lack of the necessary practice for competence with 
such concrete referents (eg. Threlfall 1996).
The results generated by those children who solved the problems with only the 
referential support of the hypothetical context represented the only condition where a 
child initiated their own strategy choice and no strategic prompt was given apart from 
the Written presentation. Moreover, performance in this condition was not as effective 
with any age of child when compared to the results derived from all types of strategic 
prompts. This points to children performing better with an explicit strategic prompt 
even if they do not use it. The evidence from the implicit prompt showed that young 
children can make adaptive strategy choices and this was even more likely when the 
problem was difficult (eg. problem '6-2') supporting the findings of Siegler & Jenkins 
(1989). Moreover, providing children with an implicit prompt allowed children to use 
an alternative strategy if preferred. Therefore, child-initiated strategies are probably 
most effective when children themselves opt to use them as shown by the results 
reported for 'fingers' in this research. Further research might seek to introduce a child 
to a number of strategic prompts and then leave the child to choose their own 
preferred strategy, whether it be fingers, imagery, closing eyes or a memory-prompt 
and compare its efficacy to a forced choice.
Assessing the evidence reported in this thesis in terms of how strategic prompting was 
effective can unpack how children seem competent in hypothetical situations. Factors
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affecting strategy choice can be conceptualised as offering a low level explanation 
through looking at the processes involved with 'human sense' giving a higher level 
description. One possibility is that there is a simple one-to-one relationship between 
strategic prompting and performance, either in terms of its effectiveness working 
directly, or in the same way, but indirectly.
If the effectiveness of strategic prompts worked directly, children did as they were 
instructed in the solution process, whether it be keeping their eyes closed, making a 
picture in their heads or using a memory-prompt. The only prompt for which there is 
direct evidence was the memory-prompt where there was a memory-check made for 
the retention of the initial number of each computation. As far as the imagery-prompt 
was concerned this may have worked directly with children making some kind of visual 
image but there was only anecdotal evidence to support this where children actually 
described the picture they were making in their head. However, by correctly 
answering the manipulation check question - ’are those teddies sitting or standing’ - 
pointed to a child having to make some kind of image of the teddies in order to 
respond to the question in the first place. Moreover, the children's ability to make use 
of a memory-prompt presented in a hypothetical context provided they were first cued 
to use imagery and their failure when given no prompt suggests a visually-based 
strategy may have been used. Alternatively, the success of these strategic prompts 
might have been indirect through encouraging a child to be strategic as opposed to 
astrategic or to suppress an inappropriate strategy. Being astrategic does not suggest 
that children use no strategy at all but providing an explicit strategic prompt may 
encourage children to see the importance of strategy choice which may in turn increase 
their metacognitive awareness. However, most of the evidence from this research 
mitigated against this explanation.
First, the differential impact of the combined (memory + imagery) prompt which 
proved more successful than either the single memory or imagery prompts alone. This 
pointed to memory and imagery being of independent benefit. Secondly, the adaptive 
choice made by both ages of children when confi-onted with an implicit prompt to treat
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a task presented hypothetically as a counting task. Finally, the differential age impact 
of strategic prompting with sensitivity being greater the older the child.
Taking all this evidence into account suggests that there was not a simple relationship 
between strategic prompting and performance. However, successful performance 
necessitates accurate strategy choice. In this way, effectiveness of strategy could 
increase the likelihood of an accurate choice being selected. There seem to be two 
main areas of explanation in this respect. Strategic prompting increases confidence in 
making an accurate choice by removing the uncertainty or reinforcing children’s own 
strategy, or alternatively, the resultant reduction in cognitive load or enhanced 
understanding feeds into a better strategy choice. Each of these explanations is 
discussed.
First, strategic prompts may increase the likelihood of a more accurate choice. 
According to Siegler & Shrager 1984 strategy involves a choice element where 
alternative strategies compete with one another according to some goal sketch (Siegler 
& Jenkins 1989) with not necessarily the most efficient strategy used at any one time. 
Clearly, when doing arithmetical computations it is necessary for children to realise 
they need to be accurate in their calculations. Recently, it has been suggested that 
there are two mechanisms dealing with calculation, one dealing with accuracy and one 
dealing with approximation (Dehaene & Cohen 1991). Similarly, Reyna & Brainerd 
(1993) put forward an account of essentially two forms of reasoning involved in 
mathematics: ’quantitative’ reasoning which is linked with numerical accuracy and 
'fuzzy' reasoning that is involved with estimating. Fuzzy or gist-like reasoning is seen 
as the process which develops naturally and which is adopted by adults and children on 
an everyday basis with concepts like 'more' or 'less' being used. This fuzzy reasoning 
contrasts with the quantitative reasoning needed for accuracy when doing arithmetic. It 
may be that failure to respond with the correct answer is due to activation of the 
incorrect route at this stage in the process. Evidence has shown that prompting was 
the most effective with the more difficult problems. It may be that these children
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understand the need to activate the 'accurate' route demonstrated by their accuracy at 
the easier problems but struggle with strategy selection for the more difficult problems.
Secondly, the reported effectiveness of strategic prompting on the more difficult 
problems suggests that its effectiveness may lie in increasing a child's confidence. 
Providing children with an explicit strategic prompt takes away the need to choose for 
themselves, which removes uncertainty. In fact, only modest correlations have been 
found between children's own metacognitive knowledge (children's own knowledge of 
their cognitive capacities in terms of the task demands and the strategies available) and 
their actual strategy used (Siegler & Shipley 1987). This kind of explanation supports 
the findings of Cowan et al 1993 who suggested confidence to be a key factor in 
whether children will spontaneously use counting in a standard Piagetian conservation 
of number task. Similarly, Siegler (eg. Siegler & Shrager 1984, Siegler 1996) has also 
pinpointed the importance of confidence in strategy choice, in terms of familiarity and 
past experience but with regard to long-term memory and the degree of association 
with the same problem or a similar type of problem. Whereas for Cowan, a child's 
increase in confidence is as a result of agreement between strategies with strategic 
prompting acting as a 'reinforcer' if the strategy agrees with the children's own choice 
(Bryant 1982, Cowan et al 1993).
Thirdly, it may be that the effectiveness of strategic prompting works through 
lessening the processing load imposed by the action of mapping the task of addition 
and subtraction into a mental model or representation (Boulton-Lewis 1993, 
Boulton-Lewis & Tait 1994). This might be at a surface level thereby allowing 
children to directly model the problem using a 'key word' process (Briars & Larkin 
1984) based on syntactic structure, or at a deeper level thereby either prompting a 
more accurate choice of counting strategy or facilitating meaning of the problem. The 
notion being that the more deeply the information is processed the more meaningfiil a 
task becomes. It is possible that to the extent that each strategic prompt provided an 
extra degree of embeddedness this may increase meaning when compared to the 
referential support of only the hypothetical context. In fact the additive effect found
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for the combined prompt could be attributable to deeper processing. The depth of 
processing argument was put forward by Craik & Lockhart in (1972), Craik & Tulving 
(1975) in terms of encoding and retrieval in memory. Work on paired-noun learning in 
terms of giving elaborated prompts in the encoding process by Rohwer (1973) and also 
by Grunau (1978) when solving addition problems, resulted in those receiving such 
prompts being more effective than those who did not. There was also a reported age 
difference for the work on paired-noun learning, with sensitivity developing from five 
years onwards which supports the age differences reported in this thesis.
Finally, more efficient cognitive fianctioning is likely to impact on memory ensuring 
that the numbers to be computed are less likely to be forgotten or perhaps negating 
faulty 'keeping track' (Ashcraft 1995) mechanisms. The evidence from the 
effectiveness of both the single and combined memory prompts points to the 
importance of the memory aspect of such tasks. These findings also support those of 
Bryant & Trabasso (1971) and Oakhill (1984) for the importance of remembering the 
original premises in transitive inference tasks and those of Cowan & Renton (1996) for 
memory of the addends in arithmetic problems. Future investigation could pre-test 
children according to digit span to in order to provide some measure of memory so as 
to further unpack the factors affecting strategy choice and also memory could be 
explored by repeating the problems a number of times.
10.3 Formal code arithmetic
The findings of Hughes (1981, 1986) redefined the previously held dichotomy between 
arithmetical competence in concrete situations and those requiring abstract thought 
(Piaget 1952) to competence within context-dependent (whether real or hypothetical) 
and context-independent situations. According to Hughes the child's difficulty lies in 
the 'translation' process from one type of thinking to another. The central theoretical 
importance of being able to specify this mechanism, whereby a child is able to move 
from one type of thinking to another, was identified in the literature review. The first 
experiment looked at this translation process through the use of an imagery-prompt
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and the sixth experiment looked at a written presentation of the same addition and 
subtraction problems, phrased in formal code notation, presented together with the 
referential support of the hypothetical context.
The findings reported in this thesis contrast with the findings of Hughes 1981, 1986 
and others (AUardice 1977, Sinclair 1991) for the difficulty four to five year olds have 
when presented with formal code arithmetic. Although the results of Hughes (1981) 
were replicated when children were confronted with formal code problems presented 
with no referential support, it was found that the use of an imagery-prompt in the 
solution process allowed more children to make the 'translation' from thinking in an 
embedded context to the thinking required for formal code arithmetic. Children were 
also found to be able to understand the formal arithmetical notation, provided they 
were first introduced to the problems with the same referential support offered by the 
hypothetical context. There are two possible explanations for these findings.
The first explanation is straightforward in that understanding of formal code arithmetic 
was achieved through offering referential support to enable the 'translation' process 
from thinking in an embedded context to a disembedded context, whether it be an 
imagery-prompt or introducing formal code notation within a hypothetical context.
This possibility is supported by the findings of Hughes (1983b) for his tin game where 
children were shown to be able to use the operator signs of 'plus' and 'minus' 
appropriately provided they understood their meaning. Moreover, it might reflect 
Cheng & Holyoak's (1985) claim for the need for 'pragmatic reasoning schemes' which 
preserve the meaning of the algorithms taught to children in the classroom. As far as 
the role of imageiy itself in the translation process, giving a minimal prompt to those 
using imagery to think about the teddies, may have provided the necessary bridge to 
move from one type of thinking to another. Furthermore, the written presentation may 
possibly have prompted a visually-based strategy through seeing the numerals.
In theoretical terms, the fact that performance with formal code notation can be 
improved by contextual support, suggests that the Piagetian argument for a logical
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cognitive deficit (1952) is inadequate an explanation. The findings also further 
underline Hughes' (1981) distinction between context-dependent and 
context-independent thought in number tasks as opposed to a dichotomy between the 
concrete and the abstract. Moreover, the evidence from this research showed that 
whilst counters was the most successful strategy for all ages, the purely mentalistic 
strategy of a combined (memory + imagery) prompt, was equally effective as 'fingers'. 
This questions whether the efficacy of lots of direct experience with concrete referents 
is necessary to provide children's understanding of addition and subtraction. This 
underpins the findings of Hughes (1986) and Stallard (1982) who found that older 
children have difficulty going back to an iconic representation of computations once 
they have begun to use alternative mentalistic strategies. Moreover, another area of 
research on the British number system has also made the point that practice with 
understanding the additive composition of number might be more beneficial than 
practice with traditional formal code sums eg. 1+1 (Nunes & Bryant 1996).
The second possible explanation is that the success of children with the written 
presentation may be in some way be attributable to the memory support it offered since 
the need to remember the numbers was removed. For the children who find 
memorising the numbers difficult, being able to see the numerals, would facilitate their 
performance. Such findings support those of Cowan & Renton (1996) who found that 
removing the need for children to keep track of numbers of invisible addends 
significantly benefited performance with some children outperforming their scores on 
those sums involving visible addends. A further investigation needs to contrast a 
written presentation of formal code sums presented with referential support with a 
condition where children only see the numerals representing each addend of the 
computation to tease out the memory and contextual support findings. There is also a 
need to examine a wrong answer, both in hypothetical contexts and with formal code 
problems, since this may be just a slip in computational skill or lexical ambiguity. It is 
difficulty to infer a child's understanding from their answers alone (Cowan 1991). 
Moreover, further investigation needs to provide a formal code post-test, as was 
undertaken for the imagery prompt in Experiment 1, in order to explore the extent to
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which different strategic prompts generalise which would further unpack each prompt’s 
effectiveness.
10.4 Problem-size effects
Clearly, it is unsurprising that children do better at problems involving small numbers 
than large numbers since this finding is widely reported in the literature (eg. Gelman & 
Gallistel 1978, Ashcraft & Battaglia 1978, Cowan 1979, Hughes 1981, 1986, Nunes et 
al 1993). The critical question is whether children use different strategies in the 
solution process. There are three possibilities. First, for numbers under five children 
might use subitizing (Klahr 1973, Starkey & Cooper 1995), with perhaps an 
imagery-prompt making this strategy choice more likely. The effectiveness of the 
combined (memory + imagery) prompt reported in the Error Analysis for problem '4-3' 
might offer some support for this. Moreover, it is possible that all subtraction 
problems, except '6-2 ', could have been solved through subitizing, but strategic 
prompting was found to be effective for this problem too. Secondly, it may simply be 
that children's competence with small numbers is more generalised than with larger 
ones. This is because smaller numbers are learned prior to larger ones with children 
learning addition and subtraction operations with smaller numbers first. This was 
found by Nunes et al (1996) with children's understanding of additive composition in 
relation to the generativeness of the British number system. They found children's 
understanding of smaller numbers is applied to large ones. Finally, the positive impact 
reported for memory in this research may point to errors with larger numbers being a 
function of working memory either in terms of forgetting or keeping track of the 
numbers during computation. Therefore, the success of small number problems could 
merely be that children can deal with smaller numbers more easily in terms of digit 
span (Case 1985). The consistent problem-size effects reported throughout each 
experiment in this thesis, irrespective of strategy, point to the viewpoint which reasons 
that small numbers are learned before large ones as the most likely explanation.
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10.5 Problem-type effects
The problem-type effects whereby addition generated more correct responses overall 
than subtraction, is also unsurprising and in line with empirical findings (eg. Fuson 
1988, Klein & Starkey 1988). Addition involves counting forwards whereas 
subtraction requires counting backwards or counting up from the larger addend (min. 
model Groen & Parkman 1977). However, in the current experiments, explicit 
strategic prompting was found to have the most impact on the more difficult problems, 
particularly subtraction ('2+3', '4-3', '5+2', '6-2') with the memory and combined 
(memory + imagery) prompts yielding no significant difference between addition and 
subtraction thereby bridging the gap between the two. It may be that strategies 
prompting some kind of concretised image in the solution process use direct modelling 
in the same way as when using concrete referents. Directly modelling a problem 
involves 'separating from' or 'joining together' with one quantity being transformed to 
another by adding to it or subtracting from it (Carpenter & Moser 1983). To this 
extent, subtraction would be as easy as addition and this was underpinned by the 
findings for the fingers and counters strategies where children directly modelled the 
problem with concrete referents and these were particularly successful for subtraction.
Methodologically, in this research it was decided to retain a consistent ordering of 
problem throughout each experiment, following on from the Hughes (1981) study, 
where piloting had only reversed the task presentation, and in order to keep a 
consistent ordering for the repeated measures design. Moreover, the fact that each 
problem was not of equal difficulty made it difficult to present the problems in a 
different order. However, future investigation might fiilly counter-balance order of 
problem presentation so as to eliminate effectiveness of a particular problem being 
associated with its order of presentation.
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10.6 Summary
The key issue identified in the Literature Review was to define the constituents of the 
human sense explanation for children's competence in hypothetical situations and their 
failure when confronted with formal arithmetic. Of central theoretical importance was 
to identify the mechanism of'translation' fi-om one type of reasoning to the other. In 
the light of the significant consistent positive impact found for explicit strategic 
prompting reported in this thesis, the key constituents of strategic choice have been 
identified. The next step is to map out further how children's spontaneous strategies 
relate to those introduced by adults. This would provide a springboard to explore the 
long-term effects of strategy on children's arithmetical development.
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APPENDIX 1.1
Experiment 1
The following sets out the 5 tasks taken from Hughes (1981) 'Can pre-schoolers add
and subtract?'
Each task is illustrated for the addition problem T+2'.
Taskl Box Open Experimenter (E) starts with one brick in the box, but keeps the 
lid open so that child (C) can see into the box. E then puts two 
more bricks in the box, saying Now I'm putting two more bricks 
in the box. How many bricks are in the box now?' All the bricks 
are visible to the child at all times.
Task2 Box Closed E starts with one brick in the box, visible to the child, and then 
closes the lid. E then adds two more bricks to the box in such a 
way that C sees E adding the bricks but cannot see how many 
bricks are in the box altogether. As he adds the bricks E says 
'Now I'm putting two more bricks in the box. How many bricks 
are in the box now?'
Task2 Hypothetical E puts the bricks and box aside and asks C 'If there was one
Box brick in the box and I put two more in, how many bricks would
be in the box altogether?'
Task4 Hypothetical E asks C 'If there was one child in a sweetshop and two more
Shop went in, how many children would be in the shop altogther?'
Tasks Formal Code E asks C 'What does one and two make?' For subtraction 
problems: 'What does two take away one make?
Name:
Subject Number: 
Sex:
Age: (in months):
School
Experiment
APPENDIX 1.2 
Experiment 1 
Score Sheet
Group
RESULTS ’1+1’ ’1+2’ ’5+1’ ’6+2
Task 1 
Task 2 
Task 3
’2-1’ ’3-2’ ’8-1’ ’7-2’
Taskl 
Task 2 
Task 3
APPENDIX 1.3
Experiment 1 
IMAGERGY V HYPOTHETICAL 
Small Number Problems
3 1
Analysis o f Variance 
Tests of Between Subjects Effects
S o u r e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f  M S F p - v a l u e
G r o u p 7 . 6 6 1 , 1 2 7  7 . 6 6 4 . 8 3 < 0 . 0 5
A g e 1 0 . 5 9 1 , 1 2 7  1 0 . 5 9 6 . 6 8 < 0 . 0 5
G r o u p  X A g e 1 2 . 0 2 1 , 1 2 7  1 2 . 0 2 7 . 5 8 < 0 .0 1
Tests of Within Subjects Effects
T a s k 1 5 2 . 5 4 2 , 2 5 4  7 6 . 2 7 8 2 . 6 6 < 0 .0 0 1
G r o u p  X T a s k 6 . 4 9 2 , 2 5 4  3 . 2 5 3 . 5 1 < 0 . 0 5
A g e  X T a s k 1 . 6 6 2 , 2 5 4  0 . 8 3 0 . 9 N S
G r o u p  X A g e  x  T a s k  8 . 0 2 2 , 2 5 4  4 . 0 1 4 . 3 5 < 0 . 0 5
Univariate F-tests with (1,127)
E r r o r  M S  F p - v a l u e
T 1  v T 2 0 . 7 6  1 5 5 . 3 1 < 0 . 0 0 1
T 2 v T 3 1 . 0 8  3 1 . 5 < 0 . 0 0 1
5
Large & Small Number Problems
Tests of Between Subjects Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f  M S F p - v a l u e
G r o u p 1 4 . 3 6 1 , 6 3  1 4 . 3 6 5 , 9 6 < 0 . 0 5
N=6
Tests of Within Subjects Effects
T a s k 2 9 . 8 6 2 , 1 2 6 1 4 . 9 3 3 1 . 9 4 < 0 . 0 0 1
G r o u p  X T a s k 5 . 7 9 2 , 1 2 6 2 . 9 6 . 2 < 0 . 0 1
T y p e 1 2 . 7 2 1 , 6 3 1 2 . 7 2 2 5 . 0 1 < 0 . 0 0 1
S i z e 4 1 . 5 1 1 , 6 3 4 1 . 5 1 5 4 . 7 1 < 0 . 0 0 1
Univariate F-•tests (1,63)
E r r o r  M S F p - v a l u e
T 1  v T 2 0 . 4 4 4 9 . 1 3 < 0 . 0 0 1
T 2 v T 3 0 . 4 9 1 6 . 5 5 < 0 . 0 0 1
T a s k  X T y p e 3 . 4 6 2 , 1 2 6 1 . 7 3 6 . 7 9 < 0 . 0 1
T a s k x  S i z e 5 . 5 2 , 1 2 6 2 . 7 5 9 . 9 6 < 0 . 0 0 1
T a s k  X T y p e  x  S i z e 1 . 4 2 2 , 1 2 6 0 . 7 1 3 . 8 4 < 0 . 0 5
APPENDIX 1.4
Experiment 1 
Means (out of 2) by task, type and size
N=65
Large Small
Add Subtract Add Subtract
Taskl 1.25 (0.73) 1.06 (0.79) 1.82 (0.46) 1.83 (0.38)
Taskl 1.20 (0.83) 0.88 (0.88) 1.62 (0.63) 1.38 (0.78)
Tasks 1.03 (0.87) 0.74 (0.83) 1.40 (0.66) 0.89 (0.87)
N=131
’1+ 1'
Appendix 1.5 
Experiment 1 
INDIVIDUAL PROBLEMS
Analysis of Variance
Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f M S F p - v a l u e
A g e 0 . 5 9 1 , 1 2 7 0 . 5 9 3 . 9 4 < 0 . 0 5
G r o u p 0 1 , 1 2 7 0 0 . 0 2 N S
A g e  X  G r o u p 0 . 5 7 1 , 1 2 7 0 . 5 7 3 . 8 4 = 0 . 0 5
Tests of Witliin Subject Effects
T a s k 2 . 0 8 2 , 2 5 4 1 . 0 4 9 . 9 1 < 0 . 0 0 1
A g e  X  T a s k 0 . 1 1 2 , 2 5 4 0 . 0 6 0 . 5 3 N S
G r o u p  X  T a s k 0 . 1 4 2 , 2 5 4 0 . 0 7 0 . 6 8 N S
A g e  X  G r o u p  x  T a s k 0 . 3 4 2 , 2 5 4 0 . 1 7 1 . 6 2 N S
4+2’ Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f M S F p - v a l u e
A g e 2 . 0 4 1 , 1 2 7 2 . 0 4 7 . 7 2 < 0 . 0 1
G r o u p 0 . 1 1 1 , 1 2 7 0 . 1 1 0 . 4 4 N S
A g e  X G r o u p 1 . 0 8 1 , 1 2 7 1 . 0 8 4 . 1 < 0 . 0 5
Tests of Within Subject Effects
T a s k 7 . 2 4 2 , 2 5 4 3 . 6 2 2 0 . 4 9 < 0 . 0 0 1
A g e  X T a s k 0 . 0 8 2 , 2 5 4 0 . 0 4 0 . 2 4 N S
G r o u p  X T a s k 0 . 5 7 2 , 2 5 4 0 . 2 8 1 . 6 N S
A g e  X G r o u p  x  T a s k 0 . 6 1 2 , 2 5 4 0 . 3 1 . 7 2 N S
’2 - 1’
Tests of Between Subiect Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f M S F p - v a l u e
A g e 0 . 1 1 1 , 1 2 7 0 . 1 1 0 . 5 5 N S
G r o u p 1 . 0 7 1 , 1 2 7 1 . 0 7 5 . 4 5 < 0 . 0 5
A g e  X G r o u p 0 . 1 1 1 , 1 2 7 0 . 1 1 0 . 5 7 N S
Tests of Within Subject Effects
T a s k 1 5 . 8 4 2 , 2 5 4 7 . 9 2 5 3 . 4 9 < 0 . 0 0 1
A g e  X T a s k O . I l 2 , 2 5 4 0 . 0 6 0 . 3 7 N S
G r o u p  X T a s k 0 . 6 9 2 , 2 5 4 0 . 3 5 2 . 3 4 N S
A g e  X G r o u p  x  T a s k 0 . 5 6 2 , 2 5 4 2 8 1 . 8 9 N S
• 3 - 2 ' Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f M S F p - v a l u e
A g e 0 . 5 4 1 , 1 2 7 0 . 5 4 2 . 1 1 N S
G r o u p 1 . 7 9 1 , 1 2 7 1 . 7 9 7 < 0 . 0 1
A g e  X G r o u p 1 . 7 9 1 , 1 2 7 1 . 7 9 7 < 0 . 0 1
Tests of Within Subject Effects
T a s k 1 9 . 3 2 2 , 2 5 4 9 . 6 6 6 8 . 6 7 < 0 . 0 0 1
A g e  X T a s k 0 . 4 2 , 2 5 4 0 . 2 1 . 4 1 N S
G r o u p  X T a s k 0 . 8 2 2 , 2 5 4 0 . 4 1 2 . 9 = 0 . 0 6
A g e  X G r o u p  x  T a s k 1 . 7 8 2 , 2 5 4 0 . 8 9 6 . 3 2 < 0 . 0 1
N=65
•5+1'
Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f M S F p - v a l u e
G r o u p 0 . 4 3 1 , 6 3 0 . 4 3 1 . 1 3 = 0 . 0 7
Tests of Within Subject Effects
T a s k 0 . 8 1 2 , 1 2 6 0 . 4 2 . 7 2 N S
G r o u p  X T a s k 0 . 4 2 , 1 2 6 0 . 2 1 . 3 4 N S
• 6 + 2 '
Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f M S F p - v a l u e
G r o u p 1 . 0 7 1 , 6 3 1 . 0 7 2 . 3 2 N S
Tests of Within Subject Effects
T a s k 0 . 4 8 2 , 1 2 6 0 . 2 4 1 . 6 7 N S
G r o u p  X T a s k 0 . 0 3 2,126 0 . 0 2 0 . 1 1 N S
•8-1'
Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f M S F p - v a l u e
G r o u p 0 . 7 9 1 , 6 3 0 . 7 9 1 . 7 5 N S
Tests of Within Subject Effects
T a s k 1 . 2 2 2 , 1 2 6 0 . 6 1 4 . 3 5 < 0 . 0 5
G r o u p  X T a s k 0 . 4 2 , 1 2 6 0 . 2 1 . 4 3 N S
•7-2'
Tests of Between Sub ject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f M S F p - v a l u e
G r o u p 0 . 2 9 1 , 6 3 0 . 2 9 0 . 5 9 N S
Tests of Witliin Subject Effects
T a s k 0 . 9 2 2 , 1 2 6 0 . 4 6 4 . 5 7 < 0 . 0 5
G r o u p  X T a s k 1 . 1 5 2 , 1 2 6 0 . 5 7 5 . 6 9 < 0 . 0 1
APPENDIX 1.6
Experiment 1 
Means (out of 1) for Addition problems
’1+1’ ’1+2’
Pre-sch School
Age
Pre-sch School
Age
Img(Hyp) Img(Hyp) Img(Hyp) Img(Hyp)
Taskl 0.9(09) 1(1) 0.7(0.8) 0.9(08)
Task2 0.7(0,8) 0.9(0.8) 0.5(0.7) 09(0.6)
Tasks 0.7(0,8) 0.9(0.7) 0.4(0.3) 06(0.5)
’5+1’ ’6+2’
School Age
Img(Hyp) Img(Hyp)
Taskl 08(0.7) 0.6(0.4)
Task2 0.7(0.5) 0.6(0.5)
Tasks 06(0.6) 0.5(0.4)
Means (out of 1) for subtraction problems
Taskl
Task2
Tasks
’2-1’ '3-2' ’8-1’ ’7-2’
Pre-sch School 
Age
Pre-sch School 
Age
School Age
Img(Hyp) Img(Hyp) 
1(0,9) 0,9(1) 
07(0,6) 0,9(06) 
0,5(0,4) 0,6(0,4)
Img(Hyp) Img(Hyp) 
0.8(09) 0.9(0.8) 
0.5(0.7) 0.9(0.4) 
0.4(0.1) 0.5(0.3)
Img(Hyp)
0.6(0.6)
0.6(0.4)
0.5(0.3)
Img(Hyp)
0.4(0.5)
0.4(0.3)
0.4(0.2)
N=241
APPENDIX 2
Experiment 2 
Imagery v Hypothetical (Eyes Closed v Eyes Open) 
Analysis of Variance
Tests of Between-Subjects factors
S o u r c e  o f  
V a r i a t i o n
S S d f M S F p - v a l u e
G r o u p 3 . 2 7 1 , 2 3 3 3 . 2 7 0 . 3 8 N S
A g e 8 3 . 3 1 , 2 3 3 8 3 . 3 9 . 7 8 < 0 . 0 1
C o n d i t i o n 3 1 . 5 3 1 , 2 3 3 3 1 . 5 3 3 . 7 = 0 . 0 5
A g e  X G r o u p 5 4 . 5 3 1 , 2 3 3 5 4 . 5 3 6 . 4 < 0 . 0 5
G r o u p  X C o n d i t i o n 5 1 , 2 3 3 5 0 . 5 9 N S
A g e  X C o n d l t i o u 5 7 . 7 1 1 , 2 3 3 5 7 . 7 1 6 . 7 8 < 0 . 0 5
G r o u p  X A g e  x 
C o n d i t i o n
9 . 7 3 1 , 2 3 3 9 . 7 3 1 . 1 4 N S
Tests of Within-Subjects factors
T a s k 2 6 4 . 6 4 1 , 2 3 3 2 6 4 . 6 4 1 0 6 . 3 8 < 0 . 0 0 1
G r o u p  X T a s k 1 . 0 9 1 , 2 3 3 1 . 0 9 0 . 4 4 N S
A g e  X T a s k 1 1 . 8 3 1 , 2 3 3 1 1 . 8 3 4 . 7 6 < 0 . 0 5
C o n d i t i o n  x  T a s k 1 0 . 1 4 1 , 2 3 3 1 0 . 1 4 4 . 0 8 < 0 . 0 5
G r o u p  X A g e  x  
T a s k
1 . 6 1 , 2 3 3 1 . 6 0 . 6 4 N S
G r o u p  X C o n d i t i o n  
x T a s k
0 . 0 2 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 1 N S
A g e  X C o n d i t i o n  x  
T a s k
0 . 1 6 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 1 6 0 . 0 7 N S
G r o u p  X A g e  x  
C o n d i t i o n  x  T a s k
2 . 7 3 1 , 2 3 3 2 . 7 3 1 . 1 N S
APPENDIX 2.1
Score Sheet
Name:
Subject Number: 
Sex:
Age: (in months):
School
Experiment Group
RESULTS '1+r '1+2' '2+3' '5+2' '6+1'
Taskl 
Task 2
'2-1' '3-2' '4-3' '6-2' '7-1'
Task 1 
Task 2
N=52
Appendix 2.1.1
Experiment 3
Younger Age only 
Analysis of Variance
Tests of Between Subjects Effects
S o u r c e  o f  
V a r i a t i o n
S S d f M S F p - v a l u e
G r o u p 1 . 3 4 1 , 5 0 1 . 3 4 0 . 3 2 N S
Tests o f  Within Subjects Effects
T a s k 7 9 . 6 2 1 , 5 0 7 9 . 6 2 5 0 . 8 8 < 0 . 0 0 1
T a s k  X G r o u p 0 1 , 5 0 0 0 N S
T y p e 3 . 7 9 1 , 5 0 3 . 7 9 5 . 9 9 < 0 . 0 5
G r o u p  X T y p e 0 . 5 6 1 , 5 0 0 . 5 6 0 . 8 9 N S
T a s k  X T y p e 0 . 3 1 1 , 5 0 0 . 3 1 0 . 4 2 N S
T a s k x  T y p e  x  
G r o u p
0 . 8 9 1 , 5 0 0 . 8 9 1 . 1 9 N S
N-52
•1+r
Appendix 2.1.2 
Experiment 3 
INDIVIDUAL PROBLEMS 
Analysis of Variance 
ADDITION
Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a n a t i o i i p - v a l u e
Tests of Witliin Subject Effects
T a s k
G r o u p  X  T a s k
2 . 4 8
0.01
1 . 5 0
1 . 5 0
2 . 4 8
0.01
2 2 . 4 1
0 . 1 3
< 0.001
N S
' 1+ 2 '
Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f  M S F p - v a l u e
G r o u p 0 . 1 8 1 , 5 0  0 . 1 8 1 . 1 N S
Tests of Within Subject Effects
Task 2 . 3 8 1 , 5 0  2 . 3 8 1 8 . 4 2 < 0 . 0 0 1
G r o u p  X T a s k 0 . 0 7 1 , 5 0  0 . 0 7 0 . 5 7 N S
Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f  M S F p - v a l u e
G r o u p 0 . 0 1 1 , 5 0  0 . 0 1 0 . 0 3 N S
Tests of Witliin Subject Effects
Task 0 . 9 4 1 , 5 0  0 . 9 4 5 . 8 4 < 0 . 0 5
G r o u p  X T a s k 0 . 0 1 1 , 5 0  0 . 0 1 0 . 0 9 N S
Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f  M S F p - v a l u e
G r o u p 0 1 , 5 0  0 0 N S
Tests of Within Subject Effects
T a s k 0 . 4 4 1 , 5 0  0 . 4 4 2 . 7 8 N S
G r o u p  X T a s k 0 . 0 6 1 , 5 0  0 . 0 6 0 . 3 7 N S
'2+3
'5+2
'6+1'
Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n 8 8 d f M S F p - v a U i e
G r o u p 0 . 0 1 1 , 5 0 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 2 N S
Tests of Witliin Subject Effects
T a . s k 1 . 3 6 1 , 5 0 1 . 3 6 1 0 . 2 8 < 0 . 0 1
G r o u p  X T a s k 0 . 0 1 1 , 5 0 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 8 N S
' 2- 1'
SUBTRACTION
Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f M S F p - v a l u e
G r o u p 0 . 0 1 1 , 5 0 0 . 0 1 0 . 1 1 N S
Tests of Witliin Subject Effects
T a s k 1 . 9 1 , 5 0 1 . 9 1 8 . 5 7 < 0 . 0 0 1
G r o u p  X T a s k 0 . 0 1 1 , 5 0 0 . 0 1 0 . 1 1 N S
'3-2'
Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f M S F p - v a l u e
G r o u p 0 . 1 4 3 , 2 3 3 0 . 1 4 0 . 8 6 N S
Tests of Witliin Subject Effects
T a s k 3 . 9 3 1 , 5 0 3 . 9 3 2 4 . 4 5 < 0 . 0 0 1
G r o u p  X T a s k 0 . 1 2 1 , 5 0 0 . 1 2 0 . 7 5 N S
'4-3'
Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n 8 8 d f M S F p - v a l u e
G r o u p 0 . 1 7 1 , 5 0 0 . 1 7 0 . 6 9 N S
Tests of Within Subject Effects
T a s k
G r o u p  X  T a s k
2 . 1 5
0
1 . 5 0
1 . 5 0
2 . 1 5
0
1 1 . 5 4
0
< 0 . 0 1
N S
Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f M S F p - v a l u e
G r o u p 0 . 5 3 1 , 5 0 0 . 5 3 2 . 2 5 N S
' 6- 2 '
Tests of Within Subject Effects
T a s k 0 . 7 7 1 , 5 0 0 . 7 7 4 . 4 2 < 0 . 0 5
G r o u p  X  T a s k 0 1 , 5 0 0 0 . 0 1 N S
Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f M S F p - v a l u e
G r o u p 0 . 5 7 1 , 5 0 0 . 5 7 1 . 5 7 N S
Tests of Within Subject Effects
T a s k 1 1 , 5 0 1 8 . 3 6 < 0 . 0 1
G r o u p  X  T a s k 0 . 0 7 1 , 5 0 0 . 0 7 0 . 6 2 N S
'7-1'
N=117
APPENDIX 3 
Experiment 4 
Memory v Hypothetical
Analysis of Variance 
Tests of Between Subjects Effects
S o u r e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f M S F p - v a l u e
G r o u p 55.7 1 , 1 1 3 5 5 . 7 1 6 . 2 6 < 0 . 0 0 1
A g e 2 . 2 4 1 , 1 1 3 2 . 2 4 0 . 6 5 N S
G r o u p  X  A g e 3 5 . 0 4 1 , 1 1 3 3 5 . 0 4 1 0 . 2 3 < 0 . 0 1
Tests of Witliin Subjects Effects
T a s k 3 7 . 1 1 , 1 1 3 3 7 . 1 4 0 . 0 8 < 0 . 0 0 1
G r o u p  X  T a s k 8 . 4 5 1 , 1 1 3 8 . 4 5 9 . 1 3 < 0 . 0 1
A g e  X  T a s k 0 . 2 2 1 , 1 1 3 0 . 2 2 0 . 2 4 N S
G r o u p  X  A g e  x  T a s k 0 1 , 1 1 3 0 0 . 7 N S
T y p e 2 . 4 4 1 , 1 1 3 2 . 4 4 3 . 2 5 N S  ( 0 . 0 7 )
G r o u p  X T y p e 0 . 0 1 1 , 1 1 3 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1 N S
A g e  X T y p e 0 . 0 4 1 , 1 1 3 0 . 0 4 0 . 0 6 N S
G r o u p  X A g e  x  T y p e 0 . 0 9 1 , 1 1 3 0 . 0 9 0 . 1 2 N S
T a s k  X T y p e 2 . 1 5 1 , 1 1 3 2 . 1 5 2 . 9 2 N S ( 0 . 0 9 )
G r o u p  X T a s k  x  T y p e 2 . 0 9 1 , 1 1 3 2 . 0 9 2 . 8 5 N S  ( 0 . 0 9 )
A g e  X T a s k  x T y p c 0 . 0 1 1 , 1 1 3 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1 N S
G r o u p  X A g e  x  T a s k  x  
T y p e
0 . 2 3 1 , 1 1 3 0 . 2 3 0 . 3 1 N S
N—178
S o u r e  o f  V a r i a t i o n
Group
A g e
G r o u p  X A g e
APPENDIX 4 
Experiment 5 
Memory v Imagery v Combined (Memory + Imagery) 
Analysis of Variance
Tests of Between Subjects Effects
S S
2 9 . 1 7
9 2 . 6 6
4 . 9 5
df
2 . 1 7 2
1 . 1 7 2
2 . 1 7 2
M S
1 4 . 5 9
9 2 . 6 6
2 . 4 8
F
3 . 8 9
2 4 . 7 1
0.66
p - v a l u e
< 0 . 0 5
< 0.001
N S
Tests of Within Subjects Effects
T a s k 2 8 . 8 3 1 , 1 7 2 2 8 . 8 3 2 7 . 8 5 < 0 . 0 0 1
G r o u p  X T a s k 2 7 . 9 4 2 , 1 7 2 1 3 . 9 7 1 3 . 4 9 < 0 . 0 0 1
A g e  X T a s k 5 . 1 9 1 , 1 7 2 5 . 1 9 5 . 0 1 < 0 . 0 5
G r o u p  X A g e  x  T a s k 1 .8 8 2 , 1 7 2 0 . 9 4 0 . 9 1 N S
T y p e 1 0 . 9 1 1 , 1 7 2 1 0 . 9 1 1 4 . 7 7 < 0 . 0 0 1
G r o u p  X T y p e 3 . 1 8 2 , 1 7 2 1 . 5 9 2 . 1 5 N S
A g e  X T y p e 0 . 1 8 1 , 1 7 2 0 . 1 8 0 . 2 5 N S
G r o u p  X A g e  x  T y p e 0 . 2 2 , 1 7 2 0 . 1 0 . 1 3 N S
T a s k  X T y p e 1 . 4 9 1 , 1 7 2 1 . 4 9 2 . 5 1 N S
G r o u p  X T a s k  x  T y p e 1 . 2 4 2 , 1 7 2 0 . 6 2 1 . 0 5 < 0 . 0 1
A g e  X T a s k  x T y p e 0 . 3 1 1 , 1 7 2 0 . 3 1 0 . 5 2 N S
G r o u p  X A g e  x  T a s k  x  
T y p e
0 . 0 3 2 , 1 7 2 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 3 N S
N=89
APPENDIX 5
Experiment 6
Written v Hypothetical
(Older children only)
Analysis of Variance 
Tests of Between Subjects Effects
S o u r e  o f  V a r i a t i o n  
G r o u p
S S
6 4 . 6 1
d f
1 , 8 7
M S
6 4 . 6 1
F
1 5 . 7 9
p - v a l u e
< 0.001
Tests of Witliin Subjects Effects
T a s k
G r o u p  X  T a s k
3 2 . 3
2 . 0 2
1 . 8 7
1 . 8 7
3 2 . 3
2 . 0 2
2 9 . 8 6
1 . 8 7
< 0 . 0 0 1
N S
T y p e 1 2 . 6 6 1 , 8 7 1 2 . 6 6 1 8 . 8 < 0 . 0 0 1
G r o u p  X  T y p e 5 . 0 8 1 , 8 7 5 . 0 8 7 . 5 4 < 0 . 0 1
T a s k  X T y p e 4 . 8 1 , 8 7 4 . 8 7 . 9 3 < 0 . 0 1  1
G r o u p  X  T a s k  x  T y p e 0 . 3 2 1 , 8 7 0 . 3 2 0 . 5 2 N S  1
APPENDIX 6.1
Experiment 7
N=120
Counters v Fingers 
Analysis of Variance
Tests of Between Subjects Effects
S o u r e  o f  V a r i a t i o n
Group
A g e
G r o u p  X  A g e
S S
2 5 . 3 9
2 1 . 5 9
9 . 2
d f
1 , 1 1 6
1 , 1 1 6
1 , 1 1 6
M S
2 5 . 3 9
2 1 . 5 9
9 . 2
F
9 . 7
8 . 2 5
3 . 5 1
p - v a l u e  
< 0.01 
< 0.01 
N S  ( 0 . 0 6 )
Tests of Witliin Subjects Effects
T a s k 3 1 . 6 2 1 , 1 1 6 3 1 . 6 2 3 4 . 9 8  ' < 0 . 0 0 1
Group X T a s k 2 5 . 1 7 1 , 1 1 6 2 5 . 1 7 2 7 . 8 5 < 0 . 0 0 1
A g e  X T a s k 0 . 0 5 1 , 1 1 6 0 . 0 5 0 . 0 5 N S
G r o u p  X A g e  x  T a s k 1 . 8 8 1 , 1 1 6 1 . 8 8 2 . 0 8 N S
T y p e 0 . 1 3 1 , 1 1 6 0 . 1 3 0 . 2 3 N S
G r o u p  x T y p e 0 . 1 9 1 , 1 1 6 0 . 1 9 0 . 3 3 N S
A g e  X T y p e 0 . 1 3 1 , 1 1 6 0 . 1 3 0 . 2 3 N S
G r o u p  X A g e  x  T y p e 0 . 0 9 1 , 1 1 6 0 . 0 9 0 . 1 6 N S
T a s k  X T y p e 2 . 5 8 1 , 1 1 6 2 . 5 8 4 . 1 2 < 0 . 0 5
G r o u p  X T a s k  x T y p e 1 . 3 1 1 , 1 1 6 1 . 3 1 2 . 0 9 N S
A g e  X T a s k  x T y p e 0 . 1 6 1 , 1 1 6 0 . 1 6 0 . 2 5 N S
G r o u p  X A g e  x T a s k  x 
T y p e
0 . 0 2 1 , 1 1 6 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 3 N S
APPENDIX 6.2
Experiment 8
Teddies
8
Analysis of Variance 
Tests of Between Subjects Effects
S o u r e  o f  V a r i a t i o n  
A g e
S S
20.86
d f
1 , 5 6
M S
20.86
F
7 . 4 6
p - v a l u e
<0,01
Tests of Within Subjects Effects
T a s k 3 . 1 2 1 , 5 6 3 . 1 2 2 . 8 4 N S
A g e  X T a s k 3 . 1 2 1 , 5 6 3 . 1 2 2 . 8 4 N S
T y p e 7 . 5 9 1 , 5 6 7 . 5 9 1 5 . 2 3 <0,001
A g e  X T y p e 0 1 , 5 6 0 0 N S
T a s k x T y p e 1 3 . 0 7 1 , 5 6 1 3 . 0 7 1 8 . 5 1 <0.001 I
A g e  X T a s k  x  T y p e 4 . 3 8 1 , 5 6 4 . 3 8 6 . 2 < 0 . 0 5
N=92
APPENDIX 6.3
Experiment 9
Counters
Analysis of Variance
Tests of Between Subjects Effects
S o u r e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S df M S F p - v a l u e
A g e 5 9 . 6 3 2 , 8 9 2 9 . 8 1 1 3 . 0 6 < 0 . 0 0 1
Tests of Witliin Subjects Effects
T a s k 5 8 . 5 7 1 , 8 9 5 8 . 5 7 5 8 . 4 4 < 0 . 0 0 1
A g e  X  T a s k 6 . 2 8 2 , 8 9 3 . 1 4 3 . 1 3 < 0 . 0 5
T y p e 0 . 3 9 1 , 8 9 0 . 3 9 0 . 5 8 N S
A g e  X  T y p e 0 . 0 1 2 , 8 9 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1 N S
T a s k  X T y p e 7 . 4 3 1 , 8 9 7 . 4 3 1 4 . 2 9 < 0 . 0 0 1
A g e  X  T a s k  x T y p e 0 . 3 5 2 , 8 9 0 . 1 7 0 . 3 3 N S
N=241
• 1 + r
APPENDIX 7.1.1
Experiment 2 
Imagery v Hypothetical (Eyes Closed v Eyes Open) 
Individual problem Analysis
Analysis of Variance
Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f M S F p - v a l u e
G r o u p 0 . 2 8 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 2 8 3 . 1 6 N S  ( 0 . 0 7 )
A g e 0 . 1 1 1 , 2 3 3 O . l l 1 . 2 4 N S
C o n d i t i o n 0 . 0 1 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 6 N S
A g e  X G r o u p 0 . 1 8 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 1 8 1 . 9 7 N S
G r o u p  X C o n d i t i o n 0 . 1 5 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 1 5 1 . 7 3 N S
C o n d i t i o n  x  A g e 0 . 0 2 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 2 0 . 2 3 N S
G r o u p  X C o n d i t i o n  x  
A g e
0 . 0 5 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 5 0 . 5 8 N S
Tests of Witliin Subject Effects
T a s k 3 . 2 1 1 , 2 3 3 3 . 2 1 4 0 . 8 7 < 0 . 0 0 1
A g e  X T a s k 0 . 0 7 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 7 0 . 8 6 N S
G r o u p  X T a s k 0 . 1 8 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 1 8 2 . 3 N S
C o n d i t i o n  x  T a s k 0 . 0 3 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 3 0 . 4 3 N S
A g e  X G r o u p  x  T a s k 0 . 4 6 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 4 6 5 . 8 6 < 0 . 0 5
G r o u p  X C o n d i t i o n  x  
T a s k
0 . 2 2 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 2 2 2 . 8 1 N S  ( 0 . 0 9 )
C o n d i t i o n  x  A g e  x  
T a s k
0 . 0 1 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 1 0 . 1 6 N S
G r o u p  X C o n d i t i o n  x  
A g e  X T a s k
0 . 0 2 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 2 0 . 2 8 N S
' 1+ 2 ’
Tests of Between Sub ject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f M S F p - v a l u e
G r o u p 0 . 0 9 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 9 0 . 6 1 N S
A g e 0 . 6 3 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 6 3 4 . 4 1 < 0 . 0 5
C o n d i t i o n 0 . 0 7 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 7 0 . 5 N S
A g e  X G r o u p 0 . 0 7 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 7 0 . 4 8 N S
G r o u p  X C o n d i t i o n 0 . 0 5 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 5 0 . 3 7 N S
C o n d i t i o n  x  A g e 0 . 0 6 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 6 0 . 4 2 N S
G r o u p  X C o n d i t i o n  x  
A g e
0 . 4 2 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 4 2 2 . 9 3 N S  ( 0 . 0 9 )
Tests of Within Subject Effects
T a s k 5 . 7 8 1 , 2 3 3 5 . 7 8 5 2 . 1 8 < 0 . 0 0 1
A g e  X T a s k 0 . 0 6 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 6 0 . 5 N S
G r o u p  X  T a s k 0 . 2 2 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 2 2 2 . 0 2 N S
C o n d i t i o n  x  T a s k 0 . 0 5 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 5 0 . 4 2 N S
A g e  X G r o u p  x  T a s k 0 . 0 1 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 6 N S
G r o u p  X  C o n d i t i o n  x  
T a s k
0 . 0 2 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 2 0 . 1 9 N S
C o n d i t i o n  x  A g e  x  
T a s k
0 . 1 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 1 0 . 8 6 N S
G r o u p  X C o n d i t i o n  x  
A g e  X T a s k
0 . 4 5 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 4 5 4 . 0 4 < 0 . 0 5
Tests o f  Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f M S F p - v a l u e
A g e 1 . 5 8 1 , 2 3 3 1 . 5 8 5 . 7 5 < 0 . 0 5
G r o u p 0 . 1 6 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 1 6 0 . 5 7 N S
C o n d i t i o n 0 . 0 6 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 6 0 . 2 2 N S
A g e  X G r o u p 2 . 4 6 1 , 2 3 3 2 . 4 6 8 . 9 7 < 0 . 0 1
G r o u p  X C o n d i t i o n 0 . 1 9 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 1 9 0 . 6 8 N S
C o n d i t i o n  x  A g e 3 . 6 2 1 , 2 3 3 3 . 6 2 1 3 . 2 < 0 . 0 0 1
G r o u p  X C o n d i t i o n  x  
A g e
0 . 1 9 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 1 9 0 . 6 9 N S
'2+3
Tests of Within Subject Effects
T a s k 0 . 7 9 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 7 9 4 . 3 2 < 0 . 0 5
A g e  X T a s k 0 . 3 6 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 3 6 1 . 9 9 N S
G r o u p  X T a s k 0 . 9 4 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 9 4 5 . 1 1 < 0 . 0 5
C o n d i t i o n  x  T a s k 0 . 1 4 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 1 4 0 . 7 7 N S
A g e  X G r o u p  x  T a s k 0 . 5 7 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 5 7 3 . 1 2 N S ( 0 . 0 8 )
G r o u p  X C o n d i t i o n  x  
T a s k
0 . 0 5 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 5 0 . 2 7 N S
C o n d i t i o n  x  A g e  x  
T a s k
0 . 0 1 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 4 N S
G r o u p  X C o n d i t i o n  x  
A g e  X T a s k
0 1 , 2 3 3 0 0 . 0 1 N S
'5+2'
Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f M S F p - v a l u e
A g e 2 . 1 1 , 2 3 3 2 . 1 6 . 2 5 < 0 . 0 5
G r o u p 1 . 4 5 1 , 2 3 3 1 . 4 5 4 . 3 3 < 0 . 0 5
C o n d i t i o n 1 . 2 5 1 , 2 3 3 1 . 2 5 3 . 7 1 = 0 . 0 5
A g e  X G r o u p 3 . 8 1 , 2 3 3 3 . 8 1 1 . 3 1 < 0 . 0 1
G r o u p  X C o n d i t i o n 0 . 0 4 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 4 0 . 1 3 N S
C o n d i t i o n  x  A g e 1 . 2 6 1 , 2 3 3 1 . 2 6 3 . 7 6 = 0 . 0 5
G r o u p  X C o n d i t i o n  x  
A g e
0 . 1 2 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 1 2 0 . 3 5 N S
Tests of Within Subject Effects
T a s k 0 . 2 3 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 2 3 1 . 8 6 N S
A g e  X T a s k 0 1 , 2 3 3 0 0 . 0 3 N S
G r o u p  X T a s k 0 . 0 1 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 1 0 . 1 1 N S
C o n d i t i o n  x T a s k 0 . 3 2 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 3 2 2 . 5 5 N S
A g e  X G r o u p  x  T a s k 0 . 0 1 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 1 0 . 1 N S
G r o u p  X C o n d i t i o n  x  
T a s k
0 . 1 4 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 1 4 1 . 1 6 N S
C o n d i t i o n  X A g e  x  
T a s k
0 . 1 5 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 1 5 1 . 2 N S
G r o u p  X C o n d i t i o n  x  
A g e  X T a s k
0 . 1 4 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 1 4 1 . 1 2 N S
'6+ 1'
Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f M S F p - v a l u e
G r o u p 0 . 8 6 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 8 6 2 . 4 6 N S
A g e 0 . 9 9 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 9 9 2 . 8 3 N S
C o n d i t i o n 1 . 1 6 1 , 2 3 3 1 . 1 6 3 . 3 2 N S  ( 0 . 0 7 )
A g e  X G r o u p 0 . 9 9 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 9 9 2 . 8 5 N S ( 0 . 0 9 )
G r o u p  X C o n d i t i o n 0 . 3 3 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 3 3 0 . 9 4 N S
C o n d i t i o n  x  A g e 0 . 0 9 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 9 0 . 2 5 N S
G r o u p  X C o n d i t i o n  x  
A g e
0 . 2 3 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 2 3 0 . 6 5 N S
Tests of Within Subject Effects
T a s k 2 . 4 3 1 , 2 3 3 2 . 4 3 2 3 . 6 < 0 . 0 0 1
A g e  X T a s k 0 . 4 3 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 4 3 4 . 1 3 < 0 . 0 5
G r o u p  X T a s k 0 . 0 4 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 4 0 . 4 1 N S
C o n d i t i o n  x  T a s k 0 . 0 6 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 6 0 . 6 3 N S
A g e  X G r o u p  x  T a s k 0 . 0 3 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 3 0 . 2 6 N S
G r o u p  X C o n d i t i o n  x  
T a s k
0 . 0 1 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 6 N S
C o n d i t i o n  x  A g e  x  
T a s k
0 . 0 3 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 3 0 . 2 6 N S
G r o u p  X C o n d i t i o n  x  
A g e  X T a s k
0 . 0 1 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 5 N S
' 2- 1'
Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f M S F p - v a l u e
G r o u p 0 1 , 2 3 3 0 0 . 0 1 N S
A g e 0 . 0 3 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 3 0 . 3 9 N S
C o n d i t i o n 0 . 2 2 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 2 2 3 . 0 3 N S  ( 0 . 0 8 )
A g e  X G r o u p 0 1 , 2 3 3 0 0 . 0 2 N S
G r o u p  X C o n d i t i o n 0 1 , 2 3 3 0 0 . 0 2 N S
C o n d i t i o n  x  A g e 0 . 0 9 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 9 1 . 2 5 N S
G r o u p  X A g e  X 
C o n d i t i o n
0 1 , 2 3 3 0 0 . 0 1 N S
’3-2'
Tests o f  Within Subject Effects
T a s k 2 . 5 9 1 , 2 3 3 2 . 5 9 3 8 . 6 < 0 . 0 0 1
A g e  X T a s k 0 . 0 3 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 3 0 . 3 9 N S
G r o u p  X T a s k 0 . 0 1 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1 N S
C o n d i t i o n  X T a s k 0 . 2 2 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 2 2 3 . 2 1 N S
A g e  X G r o u p  x  T a s k 0 . 0 2 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 2 0 . 3 3 N S
G r o u p  X C o n d i t i o n  x  
T a s k
0 . 0 5 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 5 0 . 7 9 N S
A g e  X C o n d i t i o n  x  
T a s k
0 . 0 1 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 1 0 . 1 9 N S
G r o u p  X A g e  x  
C o n d i t i o n  x  T a s k
0 1 , 2 3 3 0 0 . 0 2 N S
Tests o f  Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f M S F p - v a l u e
G r o u p 0 . 2 1 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 2 1 1 . 2 1 N S
A g e 0 . 5 8 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 5 8 3 . 4 N S ( 0 . 0 7 )
C o n d i t i o n 0 . 5 4 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 5 4 3 . 1 2 N S  ( 0 . 0 8 )
A g e  X G r o u p 0 . 1 6 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 1 6 0 . 9 1 N S
G r o u p  X C o n d i t i o n 0 . 0 4 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 4 0 . 2 5 N S
A g e  X C o n d i t i o n 0 . 4 4 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 4 4 2 . 5 9 N S
G r o u p  X A g e  x  
C o n d i t i o n
0 . 2 1 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 2 1 1 . 2 4 N S
Tests of Within Subject Effects
T a s k 1 1 . 3 1 , 2 3 3 1 1 . 3 6 9 . 4 < 0 . 0 0 1
A g e  X T a s k 0 . 0 1 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 8 N S
G r o u p  X T a s k 0 . 3 4 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 3 4 2 . 0 8 N S
C o n d i t i o n  x  T a s k 0 . 1 4 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 1 4 0 . 8 7 N S
A g e  X G r o u p  x  T a s k 0 . 0 1 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 7 N S
G r o u p  X C o n d i t i o n  x  
T a s k
0 . 0 1 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 8 N S
A g e  X C o n d i t i o n  x  
T a s k
0 . 0 2 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 2 0 . 1 1 N S
G r o u p  X A g e  x  
C o n d i t i o n  x  T a s k
0 . 1 5 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 1 5 0 . 9 5 N S
'4-3'
Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f M S F p - v a l u e
A g e 0 . 2 7 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 2 7 1 . 1 N S
G r o u p 0 . 3 8 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 3 8 1 . 5 5 N S
C o n d i t i o n 0 . 1 7 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 1 7 0 . 6 9 N S
A g e  X G r o u p 0 . 0 2 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 8 N S
G r o u p  X C o n d i t i o n 0 . 0 3 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 3 0 . 1 2 N S
A g e  X C o n d i t i o n 1 . 9 2 1 , 2 3 3 1 . 9 2 7 . 7 1 < 0 . 0 1
G r o u p  X A g e  x  
C o n d i t i o n
1 . 5 9 1 , 2 3 3 1 . 5 9 6 3 7 < 0 . 0 5
Tests of Within Subject Effects
T a s k 8 . 1 8 1 , 2 3 3 8 . 1 8 4 1 . 8 2 < 0 . 0 0 1
A g e  X T a s k 1 . 3 5 1 , 2 3 3 1 . 3 5 6 . 8 8 < 0 . 0 1
G r o u p  X T a s k 0 . 3 2 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 3 2 1 . 6 2 N S
C o n d i t i o n  x  T a s k 0 . 0 6 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 6 0 . 3 2 N S
A g e  X G r o u p  x  T a s k 0 . 1 7 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 1 7 0 . 8 5 N S
G r o u p  X C o n d i t i o n  x  
T a s k
0 . 6 4 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 6 4 3 . 2 6 N S
A g e  x  C o n d i t i o n  x  
T a s k
0 . 1 3 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 1 3 0 . 6 4 N S
G r o u p  X A g e  x  
C o n d i t i o n  X T a s k
0 . 0 3 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 3 0 . 1 5 N S
Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f M S F p - v a l u e
G r o u p 0 . 0 1 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 4 N S
A g e 0 . 8 9 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 8 9 3 . 2 6 N S  ( 0 . 0 7 )
C o n d i t i o n 0 1 , 2 3 3 0 0 N S
A g e  X G r o u p 0 . 5 6 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 5 6 2 . 0 5 N S
G r o u p  X C o n d i t i o n 0 1 , 2 3 3 0 0 . 0 1 N S
A g e  X C o n d i t i o n 1 . 4 6 1 , 2 3 3 1 . 4 6 5 . 3 4 < 0 . 0 5
G r o u p  X A g e  x  
C o n d i t i o n
1 . 3 7 1 , 2 3 3 1 . 3 7 5 . 0 4 < 0 . 0 5
Tests of Within Subject Effects
T a s k 0 . 2 4 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 2 4 1 . 7 N S
A g e  X  T a s k 0 . 0 4 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 4 0 . 3 2 N S
G r o u p  X  T a s k 0 . 0 3 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 3 0 . 2 4 N S
C o n d i t i o n  x  T a s k 0 . 0 9 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 9 0 . 6 2 N S
A g e  X G r o u p  x  T a s k 0 . 2 1 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 2 1 1 . 5 N S
G r o u p  X  C o n d i t i o n  x  
T a s k
0 . 0 4 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 4 0 . 3 N S
A g e  X  C o n d i t i o n  x  
T a s k
0 . 1 5 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 1 5 1 . 0 6 N S
G r o u p  X  A g e  x  
C o n d i t i o n  x  T a s k
0 . 0 6 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 6 0 . 4 6 N S
' 6- 2 '
'7-1'
Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f M S F p - v a l u e
G r o u p 0 . 0 2 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 5 N S
A g e 3 . 6 2 1 , 2 3 3 3 . 6 2 1 0 . 0 2 < 0 . 0 1
C o n d i t i o n 1 . 8 2 1 , 2 3 3 1 . 8 2 5 . 0 4 < 0 . 0 5
A g e  X G r o u p 1 . 5 1 , 2 3 3 1 . 5 4 . 1 7 /  < 0 . 0 5
G r o u p  X C o n d i t i o n 0 1 , 2 3 3 0 0 N S
A g e  X C o n d i t i o n 0 . 8 6 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 8 6 2 . 4 N S
G r o u p  X A g e  x  
C o n d i t i o n
0 . 0 9 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 9 0 . 2 4 N S
Tests of Within Subject Effects
T a s k 0 . 6 8 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 6 8 5 . 8 2 < 0 . 0 5
A g e  X T a s k 0 . 0 1 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 9 N S
G r o u p  X T a s k 0 . 0 3 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 3 0 . 2 2 N S
C o n d i t i o n  x  T a s k 0 . 0 4 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 4 0 . 3 9 N S
A g e  X G r o u p  x  T a s k 0 . 0 4 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 4 0 . 3 3 N S
G r o u p  X C o n d i t i o n  x  
T a s k
0 . 0 8 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 8 0 . 6 4 N S
A g e  X C o n d i t i o n  x  
T a s k
0 1 , 2 3 3 0 0 . 0 1 N S
G r o u p  X C o n d i t i o n  x  
A g e  X T a s k
0 . 0 1 1 , 2 3 3 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 6 N S
APPENDIX 7.1.2 
Experiment 2 
Imagery v Hypothetical (Eyes Closed v Eyes Open) 
Individual Problem Analysis 
Mean number of correct responses (out of 1) by age, group and condition 
(with standard deviations In brackets) 
ADDITION
N=241
1 + 1
E Y E S  O P E N
H Y P O T H E T I C A L I M A G E R Y
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 1 ) Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )
T a s k l 1 ( 0 ) 1 ( 0 ) 1 ( 0 ) 0 . 9 7  ( 0 . 1 8 )
T a s k 2 0 . 8 6  ( 0 . 3 6 ) 0 . 7 7 ( 0 . 4 3 ) 0 . 7 1  ( 0 . 4 6 ) 0 . 9 0  ( 0 . 3 1 )
E Y E S  C L O S E D
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 3 3 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 ) Y o u n g e r  ( n = 3 1 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )
T a s k l 0 . 9 4  ( 0 . 2 4 ) 1 ( 0 ) 0 . 9 7 ( 0 . 1 8 ) 0 . 9 7 ( 0 . 1 8 )
T a s k 2 0 . 9 1  ( 0 . 2 9 ) 0 . 9 0  ( 0 . 3 1 ) 0 . 6 8  ( 0 . 4 8 ) 0 . 8 0  ( 0 . 4 1 )
1 + 2
E Y E S  O P E N
H Y P O T H E T I C A L I M A G E R Y
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 1 ) Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )
T a s k l 0 . 8 9  ( 0 . 3 2 ) 0 . 9 4  ( 0 . 2 5 ) 0 . 9 3  ( 0 . 2 6 ) 1 ( 0 )
T a s k Z 0 . 7 9  ( 0 . 4 2 ) 0 . 6 8  ( 0 . 4 8 ) 0 . 5 7 ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 7 7 ( 0 . 4 3 )
E Y E S  C L O S E D
T a s k l 0 . 9 4  ( 0 . 2 4 ) 0 . 9 7 ( 0 . 1 8 ) 0 . 9 0  ( 0 . 3 0 ) 0 . 9 7 ( 0 . 1 8 )
T a s k Z 0 . 6 7  ( 0 . 4 8 ) 0 . 9 0 ( 0 . 3 1 ) 0 . 6 8  ( 0 . 4 8 ) 0 . 7 3  ( 0 . 4 5 )
2 + 3
E Y E S  O P E N
H Y P O T H E T I C A L I M A G E R Y
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 1 ) Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )
T a s k l 0 . 5 7 ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 1 9 ( 0 . 4 0 ) 0 . 5 0 ( 0 . 5 1 ) 0 . 6 3  ( 0 . 4 9 )
T a s k Z 0 . 4 3  ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 3 2  ( 0 . 4 8 ) 0 . 2 9  ( 0 . 4 6 ) 0 . 4 0 ( 0 . 5 0 )
E Y E S  C L O S E D
T a s k l 0 . 3 9  ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 4 7 ( 0 . 5 1 ) 0 . 2 9  ( 0 . 4 6 ) 0 . 7 0  ( 0 . 4 7 )
T a s k Z 0 . 3 0  ( 0 . 4 7 ) 0 . 6 0  ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 1 9 ( 0 . 4 0 ) 0 . 5 7  ( 0 . 5 0 )
5 + 2
E Y E S  O P E N
H Y P O T H E T I C A L I M A G E R Y
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 1 ) Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )
T a s k l 0 . 3 9  ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 2 9  ( 0 . 4 6 ) 0 . 4 6 ( 0 . 5 1 ) 0 . 5 7 ( 0 . 5 0 )
T a s k Z 0 . 3 6  ( 0 . 4 9 ) 0 . 2 3  ( 0 . 4 3 ) 0 . 2 5  ( 0 . 4 4 ) 0 . 5 0 ( 0 . 5 1 )
E Y E S  C L O S E D
T a s k l 0 . 4 2  ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 4 7 ( 0 . 5 1 ) 0 . 2 6  ( 0 . 4 5 ) 0 . 7 7 ( 0 . 4 3 )
T a s k Z 0 . 4 2  ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 4 3  ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 3 6  ( 0 . 4 9 ) 0 . 7 3  ( 0 . 4 5 )
6 + 1
E Y E S  O P E N
H Y P O T H E T I C A L I M A G E R Y
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 1 ) Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )
T a s i d 0 . 6 1  ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 5 5 ( 0 . 5 1 ) 0 . 7 1  ( 0 . 4 6 ) 0 . 7 7 ( 0 . 4 3 )
T a s l d 0 . 3 9  ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 4 8 ( 0 . 5 1 ) 0 . 4 6 ( 0 . 5 1 ) 0 . 6 3  ( 0 . 4 9 )
E Y E S  C L O S E D
T a s k l 0 . 7 6  ( 0 . 4 4 ) 0 . 6 7 ( 0 . 4 8 ) 0 . 6 5  ( 0 . 4 9 ) 0 . 8 7  ( 0 . 3 5 )
T a s k Z 0 . 5 8  ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 6 3  ( 0 . 4 9 ) 0 . 4 8 ( 0 . 5 1 ) 0 . 7 7 ( 0 . 4 3 )
SUBTRACTION
2 - 1
E Y E S  O P E N
H Y P O T H E T I C A L I M A G E R Y
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 1 ) Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )
T a s I d 0 . 9 6  ( 0 . 1 9 ) 1 ( 0 ) 1 ( 0 ) 1 ( 0 )
T a s I t Z 0 . 7 9  ( 0 . 4 2 ) 0 . 8 4  ( 0 . 3 7 ) 0 . 7 5  ( 0 . 4 4 ) 0 . 8 3  ( 0 . 3 8 )
E Y E S  C L O S E D
T a s k l 1 ( 0 ) 1 ( 0 ) 1 ( 0 ) 0 . 9 7 ( 0 . 1 8 )
T a s k Z 0 . 8 8  ( 0 . 3 3 ) 0 . 8 7 ( 0 . 3 5 ) 0 . 9 0  ( 0 . 3 0 ) 0 . 9 0  ( 0 . 3 1 )
3 - 2
E Y E S  O P E N
H Y P O T H E T I C A L I M A G E R Y
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 1 ) Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )
T a s i d 0 . 8 9  ( 0 . 3 2 ) 0 . 8 7  ( 0 . 3 4 ) 0 . 8 6  ( 0 . 3 6 ) 0 . 9 0 ( 0 . 3 1 )
T a s k Z 0 . 5 4 ( 0 . 5 1 ) 0 . 4 2  ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 5 4 ( 0 . 5 1 ) 0 . 6 7  ( 0 . 4 8 )
E Y E S  C L O S E D
T a s k l 0 . 8 8  ( 0 . 3 3 ) 0 . 9 7 ( 0 . 1 8 ) 0 . 8 4 ( 0 . 3 7 ) 0 . 9 7 ( 0 . 1 8 )
T a s k l 0 . 5 2 ( 0 . 5 1 ) 0 . 7 0  ( 0 . 4 7 ) 0 . 6 1  ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 7 3  ( 0 . 4 5 )
4 - 3
E Y E S  O P E N
H Y P O T H E T I C A L I M A G E R Y
Y o u n g e r  ( n = = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 1 ) Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )
T a s k l 0 . 7 5  ( 0 . 4 4 ) 0 . 5 5  ( 0 . 5 1 ) 0 . 5 4 ( 0 . 5 1 ) 0 . 4 3  ( 0 . 5 0 )
T a s k l 0 . 3 2  ( 0 . 4 8 ) 0 . 1 6 ( 0 . 3 7 ) 0 . 2 5  ( 0 . 4 4 ) 0 . 4 0  ( 0 . 5 0 )
E Y E S  C L O S E D
T a s i d 0 . 5 2 ( 0 . 5 1 ) 0 . 7 0  ( 0 . 4 7 ) 0 . 6 1  ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 5 0  ( 0 . 5 1 )
T a s i d 0 . 1 8 ( 0 . 3 9 ) 0 . 6 0  ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 1 9 ( 0 . 4 0 ) 0 . 4 0  ( 0 . 5 0 )
6 - 2
E Y E S  O P E N
H Y P O T H E T I C A L I M A G E R Y
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 1 ) Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )
T a s i d 0 . 4 3  ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 1 9 ( 0 . 4 0 ) 0 . 3 2  ( 0 . 4 8 ) 0 . 4 0  ( 0 . 5 0 )
T a s k l 0 . 3 6  ( 0 . 4 9 ) . 0 . 1 9 ( 0 . 4 0 ) 0 . 1 4 ( 0 . 3 6 ) 0 . 3 7 ( 0 . 4 9 )
E Y E S  C L O S E D
T a s k l 0 . 1 5  ( 0 . 3 6 ) 0 . 4 7 ( 0 . 5 1 ) 0 . 2 6  ( 0 . 4 5 ) 0 . 3 7  ( 0 . 4 9 )
T a s I d 0 . 2 1  ( 0 . 4 2 ) 0 . 3 7 ( 0 . 4 9 ) 0 . 1 9 ( 0 . 4 0 ) 0 . 4 0  ( 0 . 5 0 )
7 - 1
E Y E S  O P E N
H Y P O T H E T I C A L I M A G E R Y
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 1 ) Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )
T a s i d 0 . 5 0 ( 0 . 5 1 ) 0 . 5 2 ( 0 . 5 1 ) 0 . 4 6  ( 0 . 5 1 ) 0 . 6 0  ( 0 . 5 0 )
T a s i d 0 . 4 3  ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 4 2  ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 3 2  ( 0 . 4 8 ) 0 . 5 3 ( 0 . 5 1 )
■' E Y E S  C L O S E D
T a s k l 0 . 5 8  ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 7 0  ( 0 . 4 7 ) 0 . 4 2  ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 8 0  ( 0 . 4 1 )
T a s k l 0 . 4 9 ( 0 . 5 1 ) 0 . 6 0  ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 3 9  ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 8 0  ( 0 . 4 1 )
APPENDIX 7.2.1
Experiment 4
Memory v Hypothetical 
Individual Problem Analysis
Analysis of Variance 
N=117 
There was no variance in the baseline task for problem T+T.
' 1+ 2 '
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f M S F p - v a l u e
A g e 0 . 0 1 1 , 1 1 3 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 5 N S
G r o u p 0 . 0 3 1 , 1 1 3 0 . 0 3 0 . 2 1 N S
A g e  X G r o u p 0 . 0 3 1 , 1 1 3 0 . 0 3 0 . 2 1 N S
Tests o f  Within Subject Effects
T a s k 2 . 2 1 , 1 1 3 2 . 2 1 6 . 5 5 < 0 . 0 0 1
A g e  X T a s k 0 . 1 5 1 , 1 1 3 0 . 1 5 1 . 1 6 N S
G r o u p  X T a s k 0 . 0 1 1 , 1 1 3 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 6 N S
A g e  X G r o u p  x  T a s k 0 . 0 3 1 , 1 1 3 0 . 0 3 0 . 2 5 < 0 . 0 5
'2+3'
Tests o f  Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f M S F p - v a l u e
A g e 0 . 0 4 1 , 1 1 3 0 . 0 4 0 . 1 5 N S
G r o u p 0 . 6 7 1 , 1 1 3 0 . 6 7 2 . 4 6 N S
A g e  X G r o u p 4 . 1 9 1 , 1 1 3 4 . 1 9 1 5 . 3 6 < 0 . 0 0 1
Tests of Witliin Subject Effects
T a s k 0 1 , 1 1 3 0 0 . 0 1 N S
A g e  X T a s k 0 . 2 1 , 1 1 3 0 . 2 1 .1 N S
G r o u p  X T a s k 0 . 0 1 1 , 1 1 3 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 5 N S
A g e  X G r o u p  x  T a s k 0 . 3 5 1 , 1 1 3 0 . 3 5 1 . 8 6 N S
'5+2'
Tests o f  Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f M S F p - v a l u e
A g e 0 . 3 4 1 , 1 1 3 0 . 3 4 0 . 9 6 N S
G r o u p 4 . 1 1 , 1 1 3 4 . 1 1 1 . 4 4 < 0 . 0 1
A g e  X G r o u p 2 . 1 9 1 , 1 1 3 2 . 1 9 6 . 1 < 0 . 0 5
Tests of Within Subject Effects
T a s k 0 1 , 1 1 3 0 0 . 0 5 N S
A g e  X T a s k 0 . 0 4 1 , 1 1 3 0 . 0 4 0 . 4 6 N S
G r o u p  X T a s k 0 . 1 1 , 1 1 3 0 . 1 1 . 0 9 N S
A g e  X G r o u p  x  T a s k 0 . 1 1 , 1 1 3 0 . 1 1 . 0 9 N S
•6+1’
Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n
A g e
Group
A g e  X  G r o u p
S S
0 . 6 2
3 . 0 9
0 . 4 4
d f
1 . 1 1 3
1 . 1 1 3
1 . 1 1 3
M S
0 . 6 2
3 . 0 9
0 . 4 4
1 . 8 2
9 . 0 3
1 . 3
p - v a l u e
N S
< 0.01
N S
Tests of Within Subject Effects
T a s k 0 . 6 3 1 , 1 1 3 0 , 6 3 6 . 4 3 < 0 . 0 5
A g e  X T a s k 0 . 0 9 1 , 1 1 3 0 . 0 9 0 . 8 8 N S
G r o u p  X T a s k 0 . 0 7 1 , 1 1 3 0 . 0 7 0 . 7 3 N S
A g e  X G r o u p  x  T a s k 0 , 0 8 1 , 1 1 3 0 . 0 8 0 . 7 8 N S
SUBTRACTION
’2-1»
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f M S F p - v a l u e
A g e 0 . 0 3 1 , 1 1 3 0 . 0 3 0 . 5 1 N S
G r o u p 0 . 4 3 1 , 1 1 3 0 . 4 3 7 . 2 2 < 0 . 0 1
A g e  X G r o u p 0 . 0 3 1 , 1 1 3 0 . 0 3 0 . 4 6 N S
Tests of Within Sub ject Effects
T a s k 0 . 6 1 1 , 1 1 3 0 . 6 1 1 3 . 4 8 < 0 . 0 0 1
A g e  X T a s k 0 1 , 1 1 3 0 0 . 0 3 N S
G r o u p  X T a s k 0 . 2 7 1 , 1 1 3 0 . 2 7 5 . 9 1 < 0 . 0 5
A g e  X G r o u p  x T a s k 0 1 , 1 1 3 0 0 . 0 2 N S
'3-2'
Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f M S F p - v a l u e
A g e 0 . 1 3 1 , 1 1 3 0 . 1 3 0 . 9 9 N S
G r o u p 2 . 8 9 1 , 1 1 3 2 . 8 9 2 2 . 8 4 < 0 . 0 0 1
A g e  X G r o u p 0 . 7 8 1 , 1 1 3 0 . 7 8 6 . 1 5 < 0 . 0 5
Tests of Within Sub ject Effects
T a s k 4 . 0 7 1 , 1 1 3 4 . 0 7 3 0 . 9 < 0 . 0 0 1
A g e  X T a s k 0 . 0 3 1 , 1 1 3 0 . 0 3 0 . 2 1 N S
G r o u p  X T a s k 1 . 1 5 1 , 1 1 3 1 . 1 5 8 . 7 2 < 0 . 0 1
A g e  X G r o u p  x  T a s k 0 . 2 8 1 , 1 1 3 0 . 2 8 2 . 1 N S
'4-3'
Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f M S F p - v a l u e
A g e 0 . 2 4 1 , 1 1 3 0 . 2 4 1 . 0 3 N S
G r o u p 0 . 1 2 1 , 1 1 3 0 . 1 2 0 . 5 1 N S
A g e  X G r o u p 0 . 7 9 1 , 1 1 3 0 . 7 9 3 . 3 8 N S  ( 0 . 0 7 )
Tests of Within Subject Effects
T a s k 4 . 6 2 1 , 1 1 3 4 . 6 2 2 0 . 9 6 < 0 . 0 0 1
A g e  X T a s k 0 1 , 1 1 3 0 0 . 0 1 N S
G r o u p  X T a s k 0 . 9 3 1 , 1 1 3 0 . 9 3 4 . 2 4 < 0 . 0 5
A g e  X G r o u p  x  T a s k 0 . 0 2 1 , 1 1 3 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 7 N S
' 6 - 2 '
Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f M S F p - v a l u e
A g e 0 . 1 1 , 1 1 3 0 . 1 0 . 3 8 N S
G r o u p 0 . 7 8 1 , 1 1 3 0 . 7 8 2 . 9 6 N S  ( 0 . 0 9 )
A g e  X G r o u p 3 . 3 8 1 , 1 1 3 3 . 3 8 1 2 . S < 0 . 0 1
Tests of Witliin Subject Effects
T a s k 0 . 0 2 1 , 1 1 3 0 . 0 2 0 . 1 2 N S
A g e  X T a s k 0 . 0 7 1 , 1 1 3 0 . 0 7 0 . 4 3 N S
G r o u p  X T a s k 0 . 0 2 1 , 1 1 3 0 . 0 2 0 . 1 N S
A g e  X G r o u p  x  T a s k 0 1 , 1 1 3 0 0 N S
'7-1'
Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f M S F p - v a l u e
A g e 0 . 3 1 1 , 1 1 3 0 . 3 1 0 . 9 1 N S
G r o u p 3 . 0 8 1 , 1 1 3 3 , 0 8 9 . 1 2 < 0 . 0 1
A g e  X G r o u p 0 . 2 8 1 , 1 1 3 0 . 2 8 0 . 8 2 N S
Tests of Within Subject Effects
T a s k 0 . 0 6 1 , 1 1 3 0 . 0 6 0 . 4 9 N S
A g e  X T a s k 0 . 0 1 1 , 1 1 3 0 . 0 1 0 . 1 N S
G r o u p  X T a s k 0 . 1 5 1 , 1 1 3 0 . 1 5 1 . 1 6 N S
A g e  X G r o u p  x T a s k 0 1 , 1 1 3 0 0 N S
N=117
APPENDIX 7.2.2
Experiment 4
Memory v Hypothetical 
Individual Problem Analysis
Mean number of correct responses (out of 1) by age, task and group 
(with standard deviations in brackets)
ADDITION
1 + 1
H y p o t l i d i c a l M e m o r y
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 1 ) Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )
T a s i d 1 ( 0 ) 1 ( 0 ) 1 ( 0 ) 1 ( 0 )
T a s k Z 0 . 8 6 ( 0 . 3 6 ) 0 . 7 7  ( 0 . 4 3 ) 0 . 9 6 ( 0 . 1 9 ) 0 . 9 0  ( 0 . 3 1 )
1 + 2
H y p o t h d i c a l M e m o r y
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 1 ) Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )
T a s i d 0 . 8 9  ( 0 . 3 2 ) 0 . 9 4  ( 0 . 2 5 ) 0 . 9 3  ( 0 . 2 6 ) 0 . 9 7 ( 0 . 1 8 )
T a s k 2 0 . 7 9  ( 0 . 4 2 ) 0 . 6 8  ( 0 . 4 8 ) 0 . 7 5  ( 0 . 4 4 ) 0 . 7 3  ( 0 . 4 5 )
2 + 3
H y p o t l i e t i c a l M e m o r y
Y o i m g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 1 ) Y o u n g e r  ( 1 1 = 2 8 ) O l d a "  ( n = 3 0 )
T a s i d 0 . 5 7 ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 1 9 ( 0 . 4 0 ) 0 . 3 2  ( 0 . 4 8 ) 0 . 6 3  ( 0 . 4 9 )
T a s i d 0 . 4 3  ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 3 2  ( 0 . 4 8 ) 0 . 3 6  ( 0 . 4 9 ) 0 . 6 3  ( 0 . 4 9 )
5 + 2
H y p o t l i e t i c a l M e m o r y
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 1 ) Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )
T a s k l 0 . 3 9  ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 2 9  ( 0 . 4 6 ) 0 . 4 6 ( 0 . 5 1 ) 0 . 6 7 ( 0 . 4 8 )
T a s i d 0 . 3 6  ( 0 . 4 9 ) 0 . 2 3  ( 0 . 4 3 ) 0 . 4 3  ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 7 7 ( 0 . 4 3 )
6 + 1
H y p o t h d i c a l M e m o r y
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 1 ) Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )
T a s k l 0 . 6 1 ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 5 5 ( 0 . 5 1 ) 0 . 6 8  ( 0 . 4 8 ) 0 . 8 7  ( 0 . 3 5 )
T a s k 2 0 . 3 9  ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 4 8  ( 0 . 5 1 ) 0 . 6 1  ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 8 0  ( 0 . 4 1 )
SUBTRACTION
2 - 1
H y p o t l i e t i c a l M e m o r y
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 1 ) Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )
T a s k l 0 . 9 6  ( 0 . 1 9 ) 1 ( 0 ) 1 ( 0 ) 1 ( 0 )
T a s k Z 0 . 7 9  ( 0 . 4 2 ) 0 . 8 4  ( 0 . 3 7 ) 0 . 9 6 ( 0 . 1 9 ) 0 . 9 7 ( 0 . 1 8 )
3 - 2
H y p o t h e t i c a l M e m o r y
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 1 ) Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )
T a s k l 0 . 8 9  ( 0 . 3 2 ) 0 . 8 7 ( 0 . 3 4 ) 0 . 9 3  ( 0 . 2 6 ) 1 ( 0 )
T a s k 2 0 . 5 4 ( 0 . 5 1 ) 0 . 4 2  ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 7 1  ( 0 . 4 6 ) 0 . 9 7 ( 0 . 1 8 )
4 - 3
H y p o t h d ; i c a l M e m o r y
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2  8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 1 ) Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )
T a s i d 0 . 7 5  ( 0 . 4 4 ) 0 . 5 5  ( 0 . 5 1 ) 0 . 5 4 ( 0 . 5 1 ) 0 . 6 0  ( 0 . 5 0 )
T a s i d 0 . 3 2  ( 0 . 4 8 ) 0 . 1 6 ( 0 . 3 7 ) 0 . 3 9  ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 4 3  ( 0 . 5 0 )
6 - 2
H y p o t l i d i c a l M e m o r y
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 1 ) Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )
T a s k l 0 . 4 3  ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 1 9 ( 0 . 4 0 ) 0 . 2 9  ( 0 . 4 6 ) 0 . 5 3  ( 0 . 5 1 )
T a s i d 0 . 3 6  ( 0 . 4 9 ) 0 . 1 9 ( 0 . 4 0 ) 0 . 2 5  ( 0 . 4 4 ) 0 . 5 7 ( 0 . 5 0 )
7 - 1
H y p o t h d , i c a l M e m o r y
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 1 ) Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )
T a s k l 0 . 5 0  ( 0 . 5 1 ) 0 . 5 2 ( 0 . 5 1 ) 0 . 6 1  ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 7 7 ( 0 . 4 3 )
T a s i d 0 . 4 3  ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 4 2  ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 6 4  ( 0 . 4 9 ) 0 . 7 7 ( 0 . 4 3 )
N=178
' 1+ 1'
APPENDIX 7.3,1
Experiment S
Memory v Imagery v Combined (Memory + Imagery) 
Individual Problem Analysis
Analysis of Variance
Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f M S F p - v a i u e
A g e 0 1 , 1 7 2 0 0 . 0 4 N S
G r o u p 0 . 4 2 , 1 7 2 0 . 2 3 . 7 6 < 0 . 0 5
A g e  X G r o u p 0 . 2 3 2 , 1 7 2 0 . 1 1 2 . 0 9 N S
Tests of Within Subject Effects
T a s k 0 . 7 3 1 , 1 7 2 0 . 7 5 1 7 . 0 8 < 0 . 0 0 1
A g e  X T a s k 0 . 0 6 1 , 1 7 2 0 . 0 6 1 . 3 8 N S
G r o u p  X T a s k 0 . 3 3 2 , 1 7 2 0 . 1 7 3 . 7 7 < 0 . 0 5
A g e  X G r o u p  x  T a s k 0 . 3 2 2 , 1 7 2 0 . 1 6 3 . 6 2 < 0 . 0 5
'1+2'
Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f M S F p - v a l u e
A g e 0 . 4 3 1 , 1 7 2 0 . 4 3 2 . 4 4 N S
G r o u p 0 . 3 9 2 , 1 7 2 0 . 2 1 . 1 3 N S
A g e  X G r o u p 0 . 2 2 2 , 1 7 2 0 . 1 1 0 . 6 3 N S
Tests of Within Subject Effects
T a s k 3 . 7 3 1 , 1 7 2 3 . 7 3 3 2 . 5 1 < 0 . 0 0 1
A g e  X T a s k 0 . 0 3 1 , 1 7 2 0 . 0 3 0 . 2 5 N S
G r o u p  x T a s k 0 . 4 9 2 , 1 7 2 0 . 2 5 2 . 1 6 N S
A g e  X G r o u p  x  T a s k 0 . 1 2 2 , 1 7 2 0 . 0 6 0 . 5 N S
'2+3'
Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f M S F p - v a l u e
A g e 4 . 0 9 1 , 1 7 2 4 . 0 9 1 3 . 4 7 < 0 . 0 0 1
G r o u p 0 . 1 1 2 , 1 7 2 0 . 0 6 0 . 1 8 N S
A g e  X G r o u p 0 . 4 3 2 , 1 7 2 0 . 2 1 0 . 7 N S
Tests of Witliin Subject Effects
T a s k 0 . 9 1 , 1 7 2 0 - 9 5 . 1 5 < 0 . 0 5
A g e  X T a s k 0 . 0 1 1 , 1 7 2 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 3 N S
G r o u p  X T a s k 0 . 8 5 2 , 1 7 2 0 . 4 2 2 . 4 1 N S  ( 0 . 0 9 )
A g e  X G r o u p  x  T a s k 0 . 0 1 2 , 1 7 2 0 0 . 0 2 N S
•5+2'
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n
Tests of Between Subject Effects
A g e
G r o u p
A g e  X  G r o u p
S S
5.34
1.02
0.36
d f
1.172
2.172
2.172
M S
5.34
0.51
0.18
16.37
1.56
0.55
p - v a l u e
< 0.001
N S
N S
Tests o f Within Subject Effects
T a s k 0.12 1,172 0.12 0.83 N S
A g e  X T a s k 0.56 1,172 0.56 3.84 =0.05
G r o u p  x T a s k 0.36 2,172 0.18 1.24 N S
A g e  X G r o u p  x  T a s k 0.06 2,172 0.03 0.19 N S
'6+1'
Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S df M S F p - v a l u e
A g e 4.32 1,172 4.32 14.63 <0.001
G r o u p 0.57 2,172 0.28 0.96 N S
A g e  X G r o u p 0.98 2,172 0.49 1.66 N S
Tests o f Witliin Subject Effects
T a s k 0.32 1,172 0.32 2.95 N S  (0.09)
A g e  X  T a s k 0.02 1,172 0.02 0.16 N S
G r o u p  X T a s k 1.12 2,172 0.56 5.21 <0.01
A g e  X G r o u p  x  T a s k 0.09 2,172 0.05 0.44 N S
'2-1'
SUBTRACTION
Tests o f Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S df M S F p - v a l u e
A g e 0.02 1,172 0.02 0.41 N S
G r o u p 0.44 2,172 0.22 4.12 <0.05
A g e  X G r o u p 0.03 2,172 0.01 0.28 N S
Tests o f Within Subject Effects
T a s k 0.95 1,172 0.95 17.29 <0.001
A g e  X  T a s k 0.12 1,172 0.12 2.16 N S
G r o u p  X T a s k 0.5 2,172 0.25 4.55 <0.05
A g e  X G r o u p  x  T a s k 0.07 2,172 0.03 0.59 N S
'3-2'
Tests o f Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S df M S F p - v a l u e
A g e 1.37 1,172 1.37 9.36 <0.01
G r o u p 1.53 2,172 0.77 5.24 <0.01
A g e  X G r o u p 0.08 2,172 0.04 0.28 N S
Tests of Within Subject Effects
T a s k 2 1 , 1 7 2 2 1 7 . 2 <0.001
A g e  X T a s k 0 . 2 3 1 , 1 7 2 0 . 2 3 1 . 9 7 N S
Group X T a s k 0 . 8 1 2 , 1 7 2 0 . 4 3 . 4 6 < 0 . 0 5
A g e  X G r o u p  x  T a s k 0 . 0 8 2 , 1 7 2 0 . 0 4 0 . 3 5 N S
’4 -3’
Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f M S F p - v a l u e
A g e 0 . 6 1 , 1 7 2 0 . 6 2 . 0 6 N S
G r o u p 0 . 9 3 2 , 1 7 2 0 . 4 7 1 . 6 1 N S
A g e  X G r o u p 0 . 3 6 2 , 1 7 2 0 . 1 8 0 . 6 2 N S
Tests of Within Subject Effects
T a s k 0 . 3 5 1 , 1 7 2 0 . 3 5 1 . 8 7 N S
A g e  X T a s k 0 . 4 2 1 , 1 7 2 0 . 4 2 2 . 2 5 N S
Group X T a s k 1 . 6 2 2 , 1 7 2 0 . 8 1 4 . 3 1 < 0 . 0 5
A g e  X G r o u p  x  T a s k 0 . 3 2 , 1 7 2 0 . 1 5 0 . 8 N S
6 - 2 ’
Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f M S F p - v a l u e
A g e 4 . 6 1 1 , 1 7 2 4 . 6 1 1 5 . 0 2 <0.001
G r o u p 0 . 6 2 2 , 1 7 2 0 . 3 1 1 N S
A g e  X G r o u p 0 . 2 7 2 , 1 7 2 0 . 1 4 0 . 4 4 N S
Tests of Witliin Subject Effects
T a s k 0 1 , 1 7 2 0 0 N S
A g e  X T a s k 0 . 1 4 1 , 1 7 2 0 . 1 4 1 . 0 3 N S
G r o u p  X T a s k 0 . 7 2 2 , 1 7 2 0 . 3 6 2 . 6 1 N S  ( 0 . 0 8 )
A g e  X G r o u p  x  T a s k 0 . 0 6 2 , 1 7 2 0 . 0 3 0 . 2 8 N S
’7-1'
Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f M S F p - v a l u e
A g e 5 . 1 4 1 , 1 7 2 5 . 1 4 1 7 . 3 7 <0.001
Group 3 . 7 8 2 , 1 7 2 1 . 8 9 6 . 3 9 <0.01
A g e  X G r o u p 1 . 2 6 2 , 1 7 2 0 . 6 3 2 . 1 3 N S
Tests of Witliin Subject Effects
T a s k 0 1 , 1 7 2 0 0 N S
A g e  X T a s k 0.02 1 , 1 7 2 0.02 0.2 N S
G r o u p  X  T a s k 0 . 6 1 2 , 1 7 2 0 . 3 2 . 5 2 N S  ( 0 . 0 8 )
A g e  X G r o u p  x  T a s k 0 . 0 5 2 , 1 7 2 0 . 0 3 0.22 N S
N=178
APPENDIX 7.3.2
Experiment 5
Memory v Imagery v Combined (Imagery + Memory) 
Individual Problem Analysis
Mean number of correct responses (out of 1) by age, task and group 
(with standard deviations in brackets)
ADDITION
1 + 1
I M A G E R Y M E M O R Y
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 ) Y o i u i g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )
T a s l d 1 ( 0 ) 0 . 9 7 ( 0 . 1 8 ) 1 ( 0 ) 1 ( 0 )
T a s ! c 2 0 . 7 1  ( 0 . 4 6 ) 0 . 9 0 ( 0 . 3 1 ) 0 . 9 6 ( 0 . 1 9 ) 0 . 9 0 ( 0 . 3 1 )
C O M B I N E D  ( I M A G E R Y + M E M O R Y )
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 3 0 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 2 )
T a s k l 1 ( 0 ) 0 . 9 7 ( 0 . 1 8 )
T a s l d 0 . 9 7  ( 0 . 1 8 ) 0 . 9 4 ( 0 . 2 5 )
1 + 2
I M A G E R Y M E M O R Y
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 ) Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )
T a s l d 0 . 9 3  ( 0 . 2 6 ) 1 ( 0 ) 0 . 9 3  ( 0 . 2 6 ) 0 . 9 7 ( 0 . 1 8 )
T a s k ! 0 . 5 7  ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 7 7  ( 0 . 4 3 ) 0 . 7 5  ( 0 . 4 4 ) 0 . 7 3  ( 0 . 4 5 )
C O M B I N E D  ( I M A G E R Y + M E M O R Y )
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 3 0 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 2 )
T a s l d 0 . 8 0  ( 0 . 4 1 ) 0 . 8 4  ( 0 . 3 7 )
T a s l d 0 . 6 7  ( 0 . 4 8 ) 0 . 7 5  ( 0 . 4 4 )
2 + 3
I M A G E R Y M E M O R Y
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 ) Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )
T a s l d 0 . 5 0 ( 0 . 5 1 ) 0 . 6 3  ( 0 . 4 9 ) 0 . 3 2  ( 0 . 4 8 ) 0 . 6 3  ( 0 . 4 9 )
T a s l d 0 . 2 9  ( 0 . 4 6 ) 0 . 4 0  ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 3 6 ( 0 . 4 9 ) 0 . 6 3  ( 0 . 4 9 )
C O M B I N E D  ( I M A G E R Y + M E M O R Y )
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 3 0 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 2 )
T a s l d 0 . 4 3  ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 6 6  ( 0 . 4 8 )
T a s l d 0 . 3 3  ( 0 . 4 8 ) 0 . 5 6  ( 0 . 5 0 )
T a s l d
T a s l d
5+2
I M A G E R Y M E M O R Y
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 )  
0 . 4 6 ( 0 . 5 1 )  
0 . 2 9  ( 0 . 4 6 )
O l d e r  ( 1 1 = 3 0 )  
0 . 5 7  ( 0 . 5 0 )  
0 . 5 0 ( 0 . 5 1 )
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 )  
0 . 4 6 ( 0 . 5 1 )  
0 . 4 3  ( 0 . 5 0 ) )
O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )  
0 . 6 7 ( 0 . 4 8 )  
0 . 7 7 ( 0 . 4 3 )
C O M B I N E D  ( I M A G E R Y + M E M O R Y )
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 3 0 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 2 )
T a s k l 0 . 4 0  ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 5 9  ( 0 . 5 0 )
T a s l d 0 . 2 7  ( 0 . 4 5 ) 0 . 6 9  ( 0 . 4 7 )
6+1
I M A G E R Y M E M O R Y
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 ) Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )
T a s k l 0 . 7 1  ( 0 . 4 6 ) 0 . 7 7 ( 0 . 4 3 ) 0 . 6 8  ( 0 . 4 8 ) 0 . 8 7 ( 0 . 3 5 )
T a s l d 0 . 4 6  ( 0 . 5 1 ) 0.63 ( 0 . 4 9 ) 0 . 6 1  ( 0 . 5 0 ) ) 0 . 8 0  ( 0 . 4 1 )
C O M B I N E D  ( I M A G E R Y + M E M O R Y )
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 3 0 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 2 )
T a s k l 0 . 4 3  ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 8 1  ( 0 . 4 0 )
T a s l d 0 . 5 3 ( 0 . 5 1 ) 0 . 8 8  ( 0 . 3 4 )
SUBTRACTION
2-1
I M A G E R Y M E M O R Y
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 ) Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )
T a s k l 1 ( 0 ) 1 ( 0 ) 1 ( 0 ) 1 ( 0 )
T a s l d 0 . 7 5  ( 0 . 4 4 ) 0.83 ( 0 . 3 8 ) 0 . 9 6 ( 0 . 1 9 ) ) 0 . 9 7 ( 0 . 1 8 )
C O M B I N E D  ( I M A G E R Y + M E M O R Y )
Y o i m g e r  ( n = 3 0 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 2 )
T a s k l 1 ( 0 ) 0 . 9 4  ( 0 . 2 5 )
T a s l d 0 . 8 7  ( 0 . 3 5 ) 0 . 9 4 ( 0 . 2 5 )
3-2
I M A G E R Y M E M O R Y
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 ) Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )
T a s k l 0 . 8 6  ( 0 . 3 6 ) 0 . 9 0  ( 0 . 3 1 ) 0 . 9 3  ( 0 . 2 6 1 ( 0 )
T a s l d 0 . 5 4 ( 0 . 5 1 ) 0 . 6 7  ( 0 . 4 8 ) 0 . 7 1  ( 0 . 4 6 ) ) 0 . 9 7 ( 0 . 1 8 )
C O M B I N E D  ( I M A G E R Y + M E M O R Y )
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 3 0 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 2 )
T a s k l 0 . 8 0  ( 0 . 4 1 ) 0 . 9 1  ( 0 . 3 0 )
T a s l d 0 . 7 3  ( 0 . 4 5 ) 0 . 8 8  ( 0 . 3 4 )
Taskl
Task2
4-3
IMAGERY MEMORY
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 )  
0 . 5 4 ( 0 . 5 1 )  
0 . 2 5  ( 0 . 4 4 )
O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )  
0 . 4 3  ( 0 . 5 0 )  
0 . 4 0  ( 0 . 5 0 )
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 )  
0 . 5 4 ( 0 . 5 1 )  
0 . 3 9  ( 0 . 5 0 ) )
O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )  
0 . 6 0  ( 0 . 5 0 )  
0 . 4 3  ( 0 . 5 0 )
COMBINED (IMAGERY+MEMORY)
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 3 0 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 2 )
Taskl 0 . 2 7 ( 0 . 4 5 ) 0 . 3 4  ( 0 . 4 8 )
Tasld 0 . 3 0  ( 0 . 4 7 ) 0 . 5 6  ( 0 . 5 0 )
Taskl
Tasld
6 - 2
IMAGERY MEMORY
Y o u n g e r  ( n = = 2 8 )  
0 . 3 2  ( 0 . 4 8 )  
0 . 1 4 ( 0 . 3 6 )
O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )  
0 . 4 0  ( 0 . 5 0 )  
0 . 3 7 ( 0 . 4 9 )
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 )  
0 . 2 9  ( 0 . 4 6 )  
0 . 2 5  ( 0 . 4 4 ) )
O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )  
0 . 5 3 ( 0 . 5 1 )  
0 . 5 7 ( 0 . 5 0 )
COMBINED (IMAGERY+MEMORY)
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 3 0 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 2 )
Taskl 0 . 2 0 ( 0 . 4 1 ) 0 . 4 4  ( 0 . 5 0 )
Tasld 0 . 3 0 ( 0 . 4 7 ) 0 . 5 6  ( 0 . 5 0 )
Tasld
Tasld
7-1
IMAGERY MEMORY
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 )  
0 . 4 6 ( 0 . 5 1 )  
0 . 3 2  ( 0 . 4 8 )
O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )  
0 . 6 0  ( 0 . 5 0 )  
0 . 5 3  ( 0 . 5 1 )
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 )  
0 . 6 1  ( 0 . 5 0 )  
0 . 6 4 ( 0 . 4 9 ) )
O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )  
0 . 7 7 ( 0 . 4 3 )  
0 . 7 7  ( 0 . 4 3 )
COMBINED (IMAGERY+MEMORY)
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 3 0 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 2 )
Taskl 0 . 4 7 ( 0 . 5 1 ) 0 . 8 4  ( 0 . 3 7 )
Tasld 0 . 5 3  ( 0 . 5 1 ) 0 . 9 7 ( 0 . 1 8 )
APPENDIX 7.4.1
Experiment 6
Written v Hypothetical 
(Older Children only) 
Individual Problem Analysis
Analysis of Variance 
N=89 
There was no variance in Taskl for problems T+l* and '2-1',
’1+ 2 ’
Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f  M S F p - v a l u e
G r o u p 0 . 5 4 1 , 8 7  0 . 5 4 6 . 3 2 < 0 . 0 5
Tests o f  Within Subject Effects
T a s k 0 . 9 7 1 , 8 7  0 . 9 7 8 . 9 8 < 0 . 0 1
G r o u p  X T a s k 0 . 4 3 1 , 8 7  0 . 4 3 3 . 9 8 < 0 . 0 5
*2+3’
Tests o f  Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f  M S F p - v a l u e
G r o u p 3 . 6 9 1 , 8 7  3 . 6 9 1 4 . 6 3 < 0 . 0 0 1
Tests o f  Within Subject Effects
T a s k 0 . 2 2 1 , 8 7  0 . 2 2 1 . 0 3 N S
G r o u p  X T a s k 0 . 1 3 1 , 8 7  0 . 1 3 0 . 6 N S
’5+2’
Tests o f  Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f  M S F p - v a l u e
G r o u p 6 . 9 4 1 , 8 7  6 . 9 4 2 1 . 2 3 < 0 . 0 0 1
Tests o f  Within Subject Effects
T a s k 0 . 1 8 1 , 8 7  0 . 1 8 1 . 7 8 N S
G r o u p  X T a s k 0 1 , 8 7  0 0 N S
’6+1’
Tests o f  Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f  M S F p - v a l u e
G r o u p 2 . 2 1 1 , 8 7  2 . 2 1 7 . 7 7 < 0 . 0 1
Tests o f  Within Subject Effects
T a s k 0 . 3 5 1 , 8 7  0 . 3 5 2 . 5 1 N S
G r o u p  X T a s k 0 . 0 3 1 , 8 7  0 . 0 3 0 . 2 3 N S
'3-2'
SUBTRACTION
Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f  M S F p - v a l u e
G r o u p 0 . 9 9 1 , 8 7  0 . 9 9 5 . 6 9 < 0 . 0 1
Tests of Within Subject Effects
T a s k 4 . 6 1 1 , 8 7  4 . 6 1 3 1 . 1 5 < 0 . 0 0 1
G r o u p  X T a s k 0 . 5 2 1 , 8 7  0 . 5 2 3 . 5 3 N S  ( 0 . 0 6 )
'4-3*
Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f  M S F p - v a l u e
G r o u p 0 . 3 5 1 , 8 7  0 . 3 5 1 . 4 7 N S
Tests of Within Subject Effects
T a s k 1 . 5 1 1 , 8 7  1 . 5 1 6 . 6 9 < 0 . 0 5
G r o u p  X T a s k 1 . 5 1 1 , 8 7  1 . 5 1 6 . 6 9 < 0 . 0 5
' 6 - 2 '
Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f  M S F p - v a l u e
G r o u p 1 . 5 3 1 , 8 7  1 . 5 3 5 . 3 7 < 0 . 0 5
Tests of Within Subject Effects
T a s k 0 . 0 3 1 , 8 7  0 . 0 3 0 . 1 9 N S
G r o u p  X T a s k 0 . 0 3 1 , 8 7  0 . 0 3 0 . 1 9 N S
'7-1'
Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f  M S F p - v a l u e
G r o u p 2 . 8 4 1 , 8 7  2 . 8 4 9 . 4 4 < 0 . 0 1
Tests of Witliin Subject Effects
T a s k 0 . 8 3 1 , 8 7  0 . 8 3 6 . 6 7 < 0 . 0 5
G r o u p  X Task 0 . 0 9 1 , 8 7  0 . 0 9 0 . 7 N S
APPENDIX 7.4.2
Experiment 6
N=89
Written v Hypothetical 
Individual Problem Analysis 
(Older children only)
Mean number of correct responses (out of 1) by task and group 
(with standard deviations in brackets)
ADDITION
1 + 1
H y p o t h d i c a l W r i t t a t
O l d e r  ( n = 3 1 ) O l d e r  ( n = 5 8 )
T a s k l 1 ( 0 ) 1 ( 0 )
T a s k l 0 . 7 7  ( 0 . 4 3 ) 0 . 9 3  ( 0 . 2 6 )
1 + 2
H y p o t l i c t i c a l W r i t t a i
O l d e r  ( n = 3 1 ) O l d e r  ( n = 5 8 )
T a s k l 0 . 9 4  ( 0 . 2 5 ) 0 . 9 5  ( 0 . 2 2 )
T a s k l 0 . 6 8  ( 0 . 4 8 ) 0 . 9 0 ( 0 . 3 1 )
2 + 3
H y p o t l i e t i c a l W r i t t a i
O l d e r  ( n = 3 1 ) O l d e r  ( n = 5 8 )
T a s k l 0 . 1 9 ( 0 . 4 0 ) 0 . 5 5  ( 0 . 5 0 )
T a s l d 0 . 3 2  ( 0 . 4 8 ) 0 . 5 7 ( 0 . 5 0 )
5 + 2
H y p o t h ^ i c a l W r i t t e n
O l d e r  ( n = 3 1 ) O l d e r  ( n = 5 8 )
T a s l d 0 . 2 9  ( 0 . 4 6 ) 0 . 7 1  ( 0 . 4 6 )
T a s k l 0 . 2 3  ( 0 . 4 3 ) 0 . 6 4  ( 0 . 4 9 )
6 + 1
H y p o t l i d i c a l W r i t t e n
O l d e r  ( n = 3 1 ) O I d e r ( n = 5 8 )
T a s k l 0 . 5 5 ( 0 . 5 1 ) 0 . 8 1  ( 0 . 4 0 )
T a s k l 0 . 4 8  ( 0 . 5 1 ) 0 . 6 9  ( 0 . 4 7 )
SUBTRACTION
2 - 1
H y p o t l i d i c a l W r h t a i
O l d e r  ( n = 3 1 ) O l d e r  ( n = 5 8 )
T a s k l 1 ( 0 ) 1 ( 0 )
T a s k l 0 . 8 4  ( 0 . 3 7 ) 0 . 7 1  ( 0 . 4 6 )
3 - 2
H y p o t h e t i c a l W r i t t e n
O l d e r  ( n = 3 1 ) O l d e r  ( n = 5 8 )
T a s k l 0 . 8 7  ( 0 . 3 4 ) 0 . 9 1  ( 0 . 2 8 )
T a s k l 0 . 4 2  ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 6 9  ( 0 . 4 7 )
4 - 3
H y p o t h d i c a l W r i t t a i
O l d e r  ( n = 3 1 ) 0 1 d e r ( n = 5 8 )
T a s k l 0 . 5 5 ( 0 . 5 1 ) 0 . 4 5  ( 0 . 5 0 )
T a s l d 0 . 1 6 ( 0 . 3 7 ) 0 . 4 5  ( 0 . 5 0 )
6 - 2
H y p o t h e t i c a l W r i t t a i
O l d e r  ( n = 3 1 ) O l d e r  ( n = 5 8 )
T a s k l 0 . 1 9 ( 0 . 4 0 ) 0 . 3 6  ( 0 . 4 9 )
T a s l d 0 . 1 9 ( 0 . 4 0 ) 0 . 4 1  ( 0 . 5 0 )
7 - 1
H y p o t l i e t i c a l W r i t t e n
O l d e r  ( n = 3 1 ) O l d e r  ( n = 5 8 )
T a s k l 0 . 5 2 ( 0 . 5 1 ) 0 . 8 3  ( 0 . 3 8 )
T a s l d 0 . 4 2  ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 6 4  ( 0 . 4 9 )
APPENDIX 7.5.1
Experiment 7 
Counters v Fingers 
Individual Problem Analysis
N=120 
Analysis of Variance 
There is no variance in baseline Taskl for problems T+l' and '2-T 
' 1+ 2 ' 
Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n
G r o u p
A g e
G r o u p  X  A g e
S S
0.1
0.02
0.1
d f
1 , 1 1 6
1 , 1 1 6
1 , 1 1 6
M S
0.1
0.02
0.1
0 . 9 5
0.22
0 . 9 5
p - v a l u e
N S
N S
N S
Tests o f  Within Subject Effects
T a s k 0 . 4 3 1 , 1 1 6 0 . 4 3 6 . 6 5 < 0 . 0 5
G r o u p  x T a s k 0 . 0 8 1 , 1 1 6 0 . 0 8 1 . 2 5 N S
A g e  X  T a s k 0 . 0 2 1 , 1 1 6 0 . 0 2 0 . 3 N S
G r o u p  X A g e  x  T a s k 0 1 , 1 1 6 0 0 . 0 1 N S
*2+3'
Tests o f  Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f M S F p - v a l u e
Group 1 . 0 7 1 , 1 1 6 1 . 0 7 4 . 1 3 < 0 . 0 5
A g e 0 . 3 2 1 , 1 1 6 0 . 3 2 1 . 2 4 N S
G r o u p  X A g e 0 . 2 7 1 , 1 1 6 0 . 2 7 1 . 0 4 N S
Tests o f  Within Subject Effects
T a s k 1 . 3 5 1 , 1 1 6 1 . 3 5 5 . 9 8 < 0 , 0 5
G r o u p  x T a s k 0 . 0 1 1 , 1 1 6 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 6 N S
A g e  X T a s k 0 . 4 1 1 , 1 1 6 0 . 4 1 1 . 8 3 N S
G r o u p  X A g e  x  T a s k 0 . 0 2 1 , 1 1 6 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 9 N S
'5+2'
Tests o f  Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f M S F p - v a l u e
G r o u p 0 . 9 3 1 , 1 1 6 0 . 9 3 3 . 4 6 N S  ( 0 . 0 6 )
A g e 1 . 9 6 1 , 1 1 6 1 . 9 6 7 . 2 7 < 0 . 0 1
G r o u p  X A g e 0 . 2 1 , 1 1 6 0 . 2 0 . 7 5 N S
Tests of Within Subject Effects
T a s k 5 . 3 3 1 , 1 1 6 5 . 3 3 4 3 . 3 8 < 0 . 0 0 1
G r o u p  X T a s k 3 . 1 8 1 , 1 1 6 3 . 1 8 2 5 . 9 < 0 . 0 0 1
A g e  X  T a s k 0 . 0 6 1 , 1 1 6 0 . 0 6 0 . 4 9 N S
G r o u p  X  A g e  x  T a s k 0 . 2 5 1 , 1 1 6 0 . 2 5 1 . 9 9 N S
'6+ 1'
Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n
S S d f M S F p - v a l u e
Group 2 1 , 1 1 6 2 7 . 8 7 < 0 . 0 1
A g e 0 . 8 1 1 , 1 1 6 0 . 8 1 3 . 1 8 N S  ( 0 . 0 8 )
G r o u p  X A g e 0 . 1 5 1 , 1 1 6 0 . 1 5 0 . 5 8 N S
Tests of Within Subject Effects
T a s k 0 . 1 8 1 , 1 1 6 0 . 1 8 1 . 1 9 N S
G r o u p  X T a s k 0 . 1 7 1 , 1 1 6 0 . 1 7 1 . 1 4 N S
A g e  X T a s k 0 . 4 6 1 , 1 1 6 0 . 4 6 3 . 0 9 N S  ( 0 . 0 8 )
G r o u p  X A g e  x  T a s k 0 . 1 7 1 , 1 1 6 0 . 1 7 1 . 1 4 N S
' 3 - 2 '
SUBTRACTION
Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n
S S d f M S F p - v a l u e
G r o u p 0 . 1 6 1 , 1 1 6 0 . 1 6 1 . 8 7 N S
A g e 0 . 7 3 1 , 1 1 6 0 . 7 3 8 . 6 9 <0.01
G r o u p  X  A g e 0 . 0 2 1 , 1 1 6 0 . 0 2 0 . 2 3 N S
Tests of Within Sub ject Effects
T a s k 0 1 , 1 1 6 0 0 . 0 5 N S
G r o u p  X T a s k 0 . 0 4 1 , 1 1 6 0 . 0 4 0 . 4 9 N S
A g e  X T a s k 0 1 , 1 1 6 0 0 . 0 5 N S
G r o u p  X A g e  x  T a s k 0 1 , 1 1 6 0 0 . 0 6 N S
' 4 - 3 '
Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n
S S d f M S F p - v a l u e
G r o u p 0 . 3 5 1 , 1 1 6 0 . 3 5 1 . 4 7 N S
A g e 0 1 , 1 1 6 0 0 . 0 1 N S
G r o u p  X A g e 0 . 2 1 1 , 1 1 6 0 . 2 1 0 . 9 N S
Tests of Within Subject Effects
T a s k 2 . 1 1 , 1 1 6 2 . 1 1 1 . 8 9 < 0 . 0 1
G r o u p  X  T a s k 5 . 2 8 1 , 1 1 6 5 . 2 8 2 9 . 8 3 < 0 . 0 0 1
A g e  X T a s k 0 . 5 5 1 , 1 1 6 0 . 5 5 3 . 1 1 N S  ( 0 . 0 8 )
G r o u p  X A g e  x  T a s k 0 . 3 9 1 , 1 1 6 0 . 3 9 2 . 1 8 N S
' 6 - 2 '
Tests of Between Sub ject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n
S S d f M S F p - v a l u e
G r o u p 0 . 9 7 1 , 1 1 6 0 . 9 7 4 . 0 6 < 0 . 0 5
A g e 0 . 8 2 1 , 1 1 6 0 . 8 2 3 . 4 3 N S
G r o u p  X A g e 0 . 9 7 1 , 1 1 6 0 . 9 7 4 . 0 6 < 0 . 0 5
Tests of Within Subject Effects
T a s k 6 . 8 2 1 , 1 1 6 6 . 8 2 3 8 . 1 7 < 0 . 0 0 1
G r o u p s  T a s k 1 . 5 8 1 , 1 1 6 1 . 5 8 8 . 8 5 < 0 . 0 1
A g e  X T a s k 0 . 0 8 1 , 1 1 6 0 . 0 8 0 . 4 7 N S
G r o u p  X A g e  x  T a s k 0 . 0 8 1 , 1 1 6 0 . 0 8 0 . 4 7 N S
'7-1'
Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n
S S d f M S F p - v a l u e
G r o u p 1 . 3 1 , 1 1 6 1 . 3 5 . 2 2 < 0 . 0 5
A g e 2 . 5 5 1 , 1 1 6 2 . 5 5 1 0 . 2 9 < 0 . 0 1
G r o u p  X A g e 0 . 1 3 1 , 1 1 6 0 . 1 3 0 . 5 4 N S
Tests of Within Subject Effects
T a s k 1 . 9 5 1 , 1 1 6 1 . 9 5 1 1 . 4 7 < 0 . 0 1
G r o u p  X T a s k 0 . 2 2 1 , 1 1 6 0 . 2 2 1 . 2 8 N S
A g e  X T a s k 0 . 0 1 1 , 1 1 6 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 7 N S
G r o u p  X A g e  x  T a s k 0 . 0 4 1 , 1 1 6 0 . 0 4 0 . 2 5 N S
APPENDIX 7.5.2
Experiment 7
Counter v Fingers 
Individual Problem Analysis
Mean number of correct responses (out of 1) by age, group and task 
(with standard deviations in brackets)
ADDITION
N=120
1 + 1
C o u n t e r s F i n g e r s
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 3 2 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 ) Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )
T a s l d 1 ( 0 ) 1 ( 0 ) 1 ( 0 ) 1 ( 0 )
T a s l d 1 ( 0 ) 0 . 9 3  ( 0 . 2 5 ) 0 . 8 9  ( 0 . 3 2 ) 0 . 9 7 ( 0 . 1 8 )
1 + 2
C o u n t e r s F i n g e r s
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 3 2 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 ) Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )
T a s l d 0 . 9 7 ( 0 . 1 8 ) 0 . 9 3  ( 0 . 2 5 ) 0 . 9 3  ( 0 . 2 6 ) 0 . 9 7 ( 0 . 1 8 )
T a s l d 0 . 9 1  ( 0 . 3 0 ) 0 . 9 0 ( 0 . 3 1 ) 0 . 7 9  ( 0 . 4 2 ) 0 . 8 7 ( 0 . 3 5 )
• 2 + 3 '
C o u n t e r s F i n g e r s
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 3 2 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 ) Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )
T a s k l 0 . 5 6  ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 4 7 ( 0 . 5 1 ) 0 . 3 6  ( 0 . 4 9 ) 0 . 4 3  ( 0 . 5 0 )
T a s l d 0 . 6 3  ( 0 . 4 9 ) 0 . 7 3  ( 0 . 4 5 ) 0 . 4 3  ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 6 3  ( 0 . 4 9 )
• 5 + 2 '
C o u n t e r s F i n g e r s
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 3 2 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 ) Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )
T a s l d 0 . 2 8  ( 0 . 4 6 ) 0 . 5 0 ( 0 . 5 1 ) 0 . 3 9  ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 6 0  ( 0 . 5 0 )
T a s l d 0 . 9 1  ( 0 . 3 0 ) 0 . 9 3  ( 0 . 2 5 ) 0 . 4 3  ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 7 0  ( 0 . 4 7 )
• 6 + 1 '
C o u n t e r s F i n g e r s
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 3 2 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 ) Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )
T a s k l 0 . 6 3  ( 0 . 4 9 ) 0 . 8 3  ( 0 . 3 8 ) 0 . 5 0  ( 0 . 5 1 ) 0 . 7 0  ( 0 . 4 7 )
T a s l d 0 . 8 8  ( 0 . 3 4 ) 0 . 8 0  ( 0 . 4 1 ) 0 . 5 4 ( 0 . 5 1 ) 0 . 6 7  ( 0 . 4 8 )
SUBTRACTION
• 2 - 1 '
C o u n t e r s F i n g e r s
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 3 2 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 ) Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )
T a s k l 1 ( 0 ) 1 ( 0 ) 1 ( 0 ) 1 ( 0 )
T a s k 2 1 ( 0 ) 0 . 9 3  ( 0 . 2 5 ) 0 . 8 6 ( 0 . 3 6 ) 1 ( 0 )
' 3 - 2 '
C o u n t e r s F i n g e r s
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 3 2 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 ) Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )
T a s k l 0 . 8 8  ( 0 . 3 4 ) 0 . 9 7 ( 0 . 1 8 ) 0 . 8 2  ( 0 . 3 9 ) 0 . 9 7 ( 0 . 1 8 )
T a s l d 0 . 9 0  ( 0 . 3 0 ) 1 ( 0 ) 0 . 8 2  ( 0 . 3 9 ) 0 . 9 3  ( 0 . 2 5 )
' 4 - 3 '
C o u n t e r s F i n g e r s
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 3 2 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 ) Y o u n g e r  ( n ~ 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )
T a s k l 0 . 4 4  ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 3 7 ( 0 . 4 9 ) 0 . 6 8  ( 0 . 4 8 ) 0 . 5 7  ( 0 . 5 0 )
T a s l d 0 . 9 1  ( 0 . 3 0 ) 0 . 8 7 ( 0 . 3 5 ) 0 . 3 9  ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 6 3  ( 0 . 4 9 )
' 6 - 2 '
C o i m t e r s F i n g e r s
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 3 2 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 ) Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )
T a s k l 0 . 3 4  ( 0 . 4 8 ) 0 . 3 3  ( 0 . 4 8 ) 0 . 2 1  ( 0 . 4 2 ) 0 . 5 3  ( 0 . 5 1 )
T a s l d 0 . 8 4 ( 0 . 3 7 ) 0 . 8 3  ( 0 . 3 8 ) 0 . 4 6 ( 0 . 5 1 ) 0 . 6 3  ( 0 . 4 9 )
' 7 - 1 '
C o u n t e r s F i n g e r s
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 3 2 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 ) Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )
T a s k l 0 . 5 0 ( 0 . 5 1 ) 0 . 7 0  ( 0 . 4 7 ) 0 . 3 9  ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 6 3  ( 0 . 4 9 )
T a s l d 0 . 7 8  ( 0 . 4 2 ) 0 . 9 0  ( 0 . 3 1 ) 0 . 5 0 ( 0 . 5 1 ) 0 . 7 7 ( 0 . 4 3 )
APPENDIX 7.5.3
Experiment 6
Teddies 
Individual Problem Analysis
Analysis of Variance
N=58
There is no variance in the baseline Taskl for problems '1+T and '2-1'.
' 1+ 2 '
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f M S F p - v a l u e
A g e 0.26 1,56 0.26 2.34 N S
Tests o f Within Subject Effects
T a s k 0.46 1,56 0.46 4 . 8 5 < 0 . 0 5
A g e  X  T a s k 0.74 1,56 0.74 7.73 < 0 . 0 1
'2+3'
Tests o f Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f M S F p - v a l u e
A g e 0.76 1,56 0.76 2,89 N S  ( C O .  1 0 )
Tests of Within Subject Effects
T a s k
A g e  X  T a s k
0.46
0.74
1.56 0.46
1.56 0.74
2.28
3.64
N S  
N S  (<0.07)
'5+2'
Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f  M S F p - v a l u e
A g e 1.24 1,56 1.24 4.42 < 0 . 0 5
Tests of Within Subject Effects
T a s k 0.59 1,56 0.59 3.05 N S  (<0.09)
A g e  X T a s k 0.59 1,56 0.59 3.05 N S  (0.09)
'6+ 1'
Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f M S F p - v a l u e
A g e 0.05 1,56 0.05 0.19 N S
Tests o f Within Subject Effects
Task 1.02 1,56 1.02 5.52 <0.05
A g e  X T a s k 0.06 1,56 0.06 0.32 N S
3-2'
SUBTRACTION
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f  M S F p - v a l u e
A g e 0 . 0 9 1 , 5 6  0 . 0 9 2 . 2 1 N S
Tests of Within Snhfect Effects
T a s k 0 . 0 8 1 , 5 6  0 . 0 8 1 . 8 5 N S
A g e  X  T a s k 0 . 0 1 1 , 5 6  0 . 0 1 0 . 2 4 N S
'4-3'
Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f  M S F p - v a l u e
A g e 0 . 3 4 1 , 5 6  0 . 3 4 1 . 8 4 N S
Tests of Within Subject Effects
T a s k 0 . 2 1 1 , 5 6  0 . 2 1 0 . 8 3 N S
A g e  X  T a s k 0 . 0 7 1 , 5 6  0 . 0 7 0 . 2 7 N S
' 6 - 2 '
Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f  M S F p - v a l u e
A g e 0 . 7 1 , 5 6  0 . 7 2 . 3 5 N S
Tests of Within Subject Effects
T a s k 2 . 6 3 1 , 5 6  2 . 6 3 1 9 . 8 4 < 0 , 0 0 1
A g e  X T a s k 1 . 5 9 1 , 5 6  1 . 5 9 1 2 . 0 3 < 0 . 0 1
'7-1'
Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f  M S F p - v a l u e
A g e 1 . 5 3 1 , 5 6  1 . 5 3 5 . 3 4 < 0 . 0 5
Tests of Witliin Subject Effects
T a s k 0 . 0 3 1 , 5 6  0 . 0 3 0 . 2 2 N S
A g e  X T a s k 0 . 1 3 1 , 5 6  0 . 1 3 0 . 9 5 N S
APPENDIX 7.5.4
Experiment 8 
Teddies Individual Problem Analysis
N=58
Mean number of correct responses (out of 1) by age and task 
(with standard deviations in brackets 
ADDITION
T + l ’
T a s k l
T a s k 2
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 )  
1 ( 0 )
0 . 7 9  ( 0 . 4 2 )
O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )  
1 ( 0 )  
0 . 9 7 ( 0 . 1 8 )
' 1 + 2 '
T a s l d
T a s l d
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 )  
0 . 9 6  ( 0 . 1 9 )  
0 . 6 8  ( 0 . 4 8 )
O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )  
0 . 9 0 ( 0 . 3 1 )  
0 . 9 3  ( 0 . 2 5 )
' 2 + 3 '
T a s k l
T a s l d
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 )  
0 . 4 6 ( 0 . 5 1 )  
0 . 1 8 ( 0 . 3 9 )
O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )  
0 . 4 7 ( 0 . 5 1 )  
0 . 5 0 ( 0 . 5 1 )
' 5 + 2 '
T a s l d
T a s l d
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 )  
0 . 5 4 ( 0 . 5 1 )  
0 . 2 5 ( 0 . 4 4 )
O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )  
0 . 6 0  ( 0 . 5 0 )  
0 . 6 0  ( 0 . 5 0 )
' 6 + 1 '
T a s k l
T a s l d
Y o u n g e r ( n = 2 8 )  
0 . 7 1  ( 0 . 4 6 )  
0 . 5 7 ( 0 . 5 0 )
O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )  
0 . 8 0 ( 0 . 4 1 )  
0 . 5 7  ( 0 . 5 0 )
SUBTRACTION
' 2 - 1 '
T a s k l
T a s l d
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 )  
1 ( 0 )
0 . 8 2  ( 0 . 3 9 )
O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )  
1 ( 0 )  
0 . 9 3  ( 0 . 2 5 )
'3 - 2 '
T a s k l
T a s l d
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 )  
0 . 9 6 ( 0 . 1 9 )  
0 . 8 9  ( 0 . 3 2 )
O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )  
1 ( 0 )  
0 . 9 7 ( 0 . 1 8 )
• 4 - 3 ’
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )
T a s l d 0 . 6 1  ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 6 7  ( 0 . 4 8 )
T a s l d 0 . 6 4  ( 0 . 4 9 ) 0 . 8 0  ( 0 . 4 1 )
' 6 - 2 '
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2 8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )
T a s k l 0 . 1 4 ( 0 . 3 6 ) 0 . 5 3 ( 0 . 5 1 )
T a s k 2 0 . 6 8  ( 0 . 4 8 ) 0 . 6 0  ( 0 . 5 0 )
7 - 1 '
Y o u n g e r  ( n = 2  8 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )
T a s l d 0 . 5 7 ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 7 3  ( 0 . 4 5 )
T a s l d 0 . 5 4 ( 0 . 5 1 ) 0 . 8 3  ( 0 . 3 8 )
N-92
' 1+ 1'
APPENDIX 7.5.5
Experiment 9
Counters 
Individual Problem Analysis 
Very Young, Younger and Older
Analvsis of Variance
Tests of Between Sub ject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f  M S F p - v a l u e
A g e 0 . 0 5 2 , 8 9  0 . 0 2 1 . 1 1 N S
Tests of Within Sub ject Effects
T a s k 0 . 0 2 1 , 8 9  0 . 0 2 1 . 0 4 N S
A g e  X T a s k 0 . 0 4 2 , 8 9  0 . 0 2 1 . 0 3 N S
* 1 + 2 '
Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f  M S F p - v a l u e
A g e 0 . 8 5 2 , 8 9  0 . 4 3 3 . 3 < 0 . 0 5
Tests of Within Sub ject Effects
T a s k 0 . 8 1 , 8 9  0 . 8 1 2 . 7 8 < 0 . 0 1
A g e  X T a s k 0 . 6 5 2 , 8 9  0 . 3 2 5 . 1 6 < 0 . 0 1
' 2 + 3 '
Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f  M S F p - v a l u e
A g e 0 . 8 7 2 , 8 9  0 . 4 4 1 . 7 5 N S
Tests of Witliin Subject Effects
T a s k 0 . 1 3 1 , 8 9  0 . 1 3 0 . 5 7 N S
A g e  X T a s k 1 . 4 1 2 , 8 9  0 . 7 2 . 9 9 = 0 . 0 6
' 5 + 2 '
Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f  M S F p - v a l u e
A g e 3 . 0 6 2 , 8 9  1 . 5 3 6 . 9 8 < 0 . 0 1
Tests of Within Subject Effects
T a s k 1 0 . 8 6 1 , 8 9  1 0 . 8 6 8 7 . 6 < 0 . 0 0 1
A g e  X T a s k 0 . 4 6 2 , 8 9  0 . 2 3 1 . 8 6 N S
' 6+ 1'
Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f  M S F p - v a l u e
A g e 3 . 7 5 2 , 8 9  1 . 8 8 6 . 9 6 <0.01
Tests o f Within Subject Effects
T a s k 0 . 7 5 1 , 8 9  0 . 7 5 6 . 3 2 <0.05
A g e  X  T a s k 0 . 6 5 2 , 8 9  0 . 3 3 2 . 7 4 N S
'2-1'
SUBTRACTION
Tests o f Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f  M S F p - v a l u e
A g e 0 . 0 3 2 , 8 9  0 . 0 2 1 . 0 8 N S
Tests o f Within Subject Effects
T a s k 0 . 0 1 1 , 8 9  0 . 0 1 0 . 3 6 N S
A g e  X  T a s k 0 . 0 8 2 , 8 9  0 . 0 4 2 . 4 5 N S
3-2'
Tests o f Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f  M S F p - v a l u e
A g e 1 . 2 2 , 8 9  0 . 6 6.01 <0.01
Tests o f Witliin Subject Effects
T a s k 0 . 0 5 1 , 8 9  0 . 0 5 0 . 5 2 N S
A g e  X  T a s k 0 2 , 8 9  0 0 N S
'4-3'
Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f  M S F p - v a l u e
A g e 0 . 4 6 2 , 8 9  0 . 2 3 1 . 2 3 N S
Tests o f Within Subject Effects
Task 7 . 3 8 1 , 8 9  7 . 3 8 3 5 . 6 6 <0.001
A g e  X  T a s k 0 . 6 4 2 , 8 9  0 . 3 2 1 . 5 5 N S
'6-2'
Tests o f Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f  M S F p - v a l u e
A g e 3 . 3 7 2 , 8 9  1 . 6 9 8.28 <0.01
Tests o f Within Subject Effects
T a s k 9 . 0 8 1 , 8 9 9 . 0 8 5 3 . 5 7 < 0 . 0 0 1
A g e  X T a s k 0 . 2 8 2 , 8 9 0 . 1 4 0 . 8 3 N S
'7-1' Tests of Between Subject Effects
S o u r c e  o f  V a r i a t i o n S S d f M S F p - v a l u e
A g e 4 . 4 5 2 , 8 9 2 . 2 3 9 . 0 4 < 0 . 0 0 1
Tests of Within Subject Effects
T a s k 2 . 1 4 1 , 8 9 2 . 1 4 1 2 . 9 6 < 0 , 0 1
A g e  X  T a s k 0 . 1 1 2 , 8 9 0 . 0 5 0 . 3 3 N S
APPENDIX 7.5.6
Experiment 9 
Counters Individual Problem Analysis
N=92
Mean number of correct responses (out of 1) by age and task 
(with standard deviations in brackets) 
ADDITION
T + l '
V e r y  Y o i i n g  ( n = 3 0 ) Y o u n g  ( n = 3 2 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )
T a s k l 0 . 9 7 ( 0 . 1 8 ) 1 ( 0 ) 1 ( 0 )
T a s l d 0 . 9 7  ( 0 . 1 8 ) 1 ( 0 ) 0 . 9 3  ( 0 . 2 5 )
' 1 + 2 '
V e r y  Y o u n g  ( n = 3 0 ) Y o u n g  ( n = 3 2 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )
T a s l d 0 . 9 3  ( 0 . 2 5 ) 0 . 9 7 ( 0 . 1 8 ) 0 . 9 3  ( 0 . 2 5 )
T a s l d 0 . 6 3  ( 0 . 4 9 ) 0 . 9  ( 0 . 3 0 ) 0 . 9 ( 0 . 3 1 )
' 2 + 3 '
V e r y  Y o u n g  ( n = 3 0 ) Y o u n g  ( n = 3 2 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )
T a s k l 0 . 5 3 ( 0 . 5 1 ) 0 . 5 6  ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 4 7 ( 0 . 5 1 )
T a s l d 0 . 3 7  ( 0 . 4 9 )  . 0 . 6 3  ( 0 . 4 9 ) 0 . 7 3  ( 0 . 4 5 )
' 5 + 2 '
V e r y  Y o u n g  ( n = 3 0 ) Y o u n g  ( n = = 3 2 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )
T a s l d 0 . 2  ( 0 . 4 1 ) 0 . 2 8  ( 0 . 4 6 ) 0 . 5 ( 0 . 5 1 )
T a s l d 0 . 6  ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 9 1  ( 0 . 3 0 ) 0 . 9 3  ( 0 . 2 5 )
' 6 + 1 '
V e r y  Y o u n g  ( n = 3 0 ) Y o u n g  ( n = 3 2 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )
T a s k l 0 . 4  ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 6 3  ( 0 . 4 9 ) 0 . 8 3  ( 0 . 3 8 )
T a s l d 0 . 5 7 ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 8 8  ( 0 . 3 4 ) 0 . 8  ( 0 . 4 1 )
SUBTRACTION
' 2 - 1 '
V e r y  Y o u n g  ( n = 3 0 ) Y o u n g  ( n = 3 2 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )
T a s k l 0 . 9 7 ( 0 . 1 8 ) 1 ( 0 ) 1 ( 0 )
T a s l d 1 ( 0 ) 1 ( 0 ) 0 . 9 3  ( 0 . 2 5 )
'3 - 2 '
V e r y  Y o u n g  ( n = 3 0 ) Y o u n g  ( n = 3 2 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )
T a s k l 0 . 7 7 ( 0 . 4 3 ) 0 . 8 8  ( 0 . 3 4 ) 0 . 9 7 ( 0 . 1 8 )
T a s l d 0 . 8  ( 0 . 4 1 ) 0 . 9 1  ( 0 . 3 0 ) 1 ( 0 )
'4 - 3 '
V e r y  Y o u n g  ( n = 3 0 ) Y o u n g  ( n = 3 2 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )
T a s k l 0 . 4 3  ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 4 4 ( 0 . 5 0 ) 0 . 3 7 ( 0 . 4 9 )
T a s l d 0 . 6 7 ( 0 . 4 8 ) 0 . 9 1  ( 0 . 3 0 ) 0 . 8 7 ( 0 . 3 5 )
'6 - 2 '
V e r y  Y o u n g  ( n = 3 0 ) Y o u n g  ( n = 3 2 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )
T a s l d 0 . 1 3  ( 0 . 3 5 ) 0 . 3 4  ( 0 . 4 8 ) 0 . 3 3  ( 0 . 4 8 )
T a s l d 0 . 4 7 ( 0 . 5 1 ) 0 . 8 4 ( 0 . 3 7 ) 0 . 8 3  ( 0 . 3 8 )
7 - 1 '
V e r y  Y o u n g  ( n = 3 0 ) Y o u n g  ( n = 3 2 ) O l d e r  ( n = 3 0 )
T a s k l 0 . 3 3  ( 0 . 4 8 ) 0 . 5 ( 0 . 5 1 ) 0 . 7 ( 0 . 4 7 )
T a s l d 0 . 5 ( 0 . 5 1 ) 0 . 7 8  ( 0 . 4 2 ) 0 . 9 ( 0 . 5 1 )
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